The Final Date to Register Assignments of Calims Contained in Old Indemnity Agreements is Now Known: it Will be on August 31, 1996

September 1, 1995

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April 16, 2024

Tax opportunities under the Indian Act

Although it is not often well-understood in business and tax circles, the Indian Act (the “Act”), coupled with federal and provincial tax laws, provides several tax planning opportunities for Indigenous taxpayers. These laws provide various tax exemptions for people who qualify as “Indians” under the Act, as well as for “bands” and other “councils.” These terms are defined in the Act and require case-by-case analysis, but essentially they refer to people of Indigenous origin who have at least one family member who is registered or entitled to be registered as an Indian within the meaning of the Act. The criteria for a tax exemption In particular, those who qualify can benefit from a tax exemption when income is earned on a “reserve.” There are several criteria to be met, and although the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) has issued guidelines on the subject, their application remains a question of fact that varies depending on the particular circumstances applicable to each taxpayer. In general, the CRA requires that income earned by an “Indian” within the meaning of the Act be sufficiently connected to a reserve to be exempt. This is the case when, for example, income-generating services are performed entirely or almost entirely within the territory of a reserve, when the employer and the employee reside on a reserve, or when income is derived from non-commercial activities carried out by a band. Business income can also be tax-exempt, but the criteria for being considered connected to a reserve are stricter, since generally only income-generating activities situated on a reserve will be tax-exempt. However, it is still possible to organize the affairs of a taxpayer and their corporate entities to ensure that these criteria are met, or to highlight certain connecting factors. Such planning, if done properly, is entirely legitimate and can result in significant tax savings. In a recent interpretation (CRA Views 2022-0932231I7), the CRA illustrated this principle by considering employment income related to an off-reserve airport to be exempt, even if none of the guidelines are followed, in cases where such an airport is necessary to supply a reserve that has no other means of transportation and delivery. This interpretation shows that the connection between an income and a reserve is not established solely by the physical presence of the income-generating business, and that several other arguments, sometimes more subtle, can be used to support the connection between an income and a reserve. A few nuances to consider However, care must be taken when a company is incorporated by someone who qualifies as an “Indian.” A company with its head office on a reserve cannot qualify as “Indian” within the meaning of the Act. Its income therefore cannot be tax-exempt, and will be taxed according to the usual rules. Despite this, certain plans can ease the tax burden on these companies and on shareholders who qualify as “Indians” under the Act, such as paying wages and bonuses to an employee shareholder. But it’s essential to carefully analyze the various pitfalls and risks that such planning entails. Furthermore, certain exemptions exist for companies formed by bands, but the eligibility criteria are strict and require a thorough analysis of the proposed structure. In addition to the income tax exemption, “Indians” within the meaning of the Act and certain entities mandated by bands may benefit from a tax exemption when they purchase goods on a reserve or have goods delivered to them on a reserve. Different exceptions and nuances apply. However, companies headquartered on a reserve are not exempt from their tax collection obligations and may be required to register for the GST/QST. To help you understand these rules and ensure optimal tax planning, we invite you to consult our tax team. We look forward to working with you on your business projects.

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April 15, 2024

Can artificial intelligence be designated as an inventor in a patent application?

Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is becoming increasingly sophisticated, and the fact that this human invention can now generate its own inventions opens the door to new ways of conceptualizing the notion of “inventor” in patent law. In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (“UK Supreme Court”) however found that an artificial intelligence system cannot be the author of an invention within the meaning of the applicable regulations under which patents are granted. This position is consistent with that of several courts around the world that have already ruled on the issue. But what of Canada, where the courts have yet to address the matter? In this bulletin, we will take a look at the decisions handed down by the UK Supreme Court and its counterparts in other countries before considering Canada’s position on the issue. In Thaler (Appellant) v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Mark,1 the UK Supreme Court ruled that “an inventor must be a person”. Summary of the decision In 2018, Dr. Stephen Thaler filed patent applications for two inventions described as having been generated by an autonomous AI system. The machine in question, DABUS, was therefore designated as the inventor in the applications. Dr. Thaler claimed that, as the owner of DABUS, he was entitled to file patent applications for inventions generated by his machine. That being so, he alleged that he was not required to name a natural person as the inventor. Both the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal dismissed Dr. Thaler’s appeal from the decision of the Intellectual Property Office of the United Kingdom not to proceed with the patent applications, in particular because the designated inventor was not valid under the Patents Act 1977. The UK Supreme Court, the country’s final court of appeal, also dismissed Dr. Thaler’s appeal. In a unanimous decision, it concluded that the law is clear in that “an inventor within the meaning of the 1977 Act must be a natural person, and DABUS is not a person at all, let alone a natural person: it is a machine”.2 Although there was no doubt that DABUS had created the inventions in question, that did not mean that the courts could extend the notion of inventor, as defined by law, to include machines. An ongoing trend The UK Supreme Court is not the first to reject Dr. Thaler’s arguments. The United States,3 the European Union4 and Australia5 have adopted similar positions, concluding that only a natural person can qualify as an inventor within the meaning of the legislation applicable in their respective jurisdictions. The UK ruling is part of the Artificial Inventor Project’s cross-border attempt to ensure that the DABUS machine—and AI in general—is recognized as a generative tool capable of generating patent rights for the benefit of AI system owners. To date, only South Africa has issued a patent to Dr. Thaler, naming DABUS as the inventor.6 This country is the exception that proves the rule. It should however be noted that the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission of South Africa does not review applications on their merits. As such, no reason was given for considering AI as the inventor. More recently, in February of this year, the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued a guidance on AI-assisted inventions. The guidance confirms the judicial position and states in particular that “a natural person must have significantly contributed to each claim in a patent application or patent”.7 What about Canada? In 2020, Dr. Thaler also filed a Canadian patent application for inventions generated by DABUS.8 The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (“CIPO”) issued a notice of non-compliance in 2021, establishing its initial position as follows: Because for this application the inventor is a machine and it does not appear possible for a machine to have rights under Canadian law or to transfer those rights to a human, it does not appear this application is compliant with the Patent Act and Rules.9 However, CIPO specified that it was open to receiving the applicant’s arguments on the issue, as follows: Responsive to the compliance notice, the applicant may attempt to comply by submitting a statement on behalf of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) machine and identify, in said statement, himself as the legal representative of the machine.10 To date, CIPO has issued no notice of abandonment and the application remains active. Its status in Canada is therefore unclear. It will be interesting to see whether Dr. Thaler will try to sway the Canadian courts to rule in his favour after many failed attempts in other jurisdictions around the world, and most recently in the UK Supreme Court. At first glance, the Patent Act11 (the “Act”) does not prevent an AI system from being recognized as the inventor of a patentable invention. In fact, the term “inventor” is not defined in the Act. Furthermore, nowhere is it stated that an applicant must be a “person,” nor is there any indication to that effect in the provisions governing the granting of patents. The Patent Rules12 offer no clarification in that regard either. The requirement implied by the clear use of the term “person” in the wording of the relevant sections of the law is important: It was a key consideration that the UK Supreme Court analyzed in Thaler. Case law on the subject is still ambiguous. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, given that the inventor is the person who took part in conceiving the invention, the question to ask is “[W]ho is responsible for the inventive concept?”13 That said, however, we note that the conclusion reached was that a legal person—as opposed to a natural person—cannot be considered an inventor.14 The fact is that the Canadian courts have never had to rule on the specific issue of recognizing AI as an inventor, and until such time as the courts render a decision or the government takes a stance on the matter, the issue will remain unresolved. Conclusion Given that Canadian law is not clear on whether AI can be recognized as an inventor, now would be a good time for Canadian authorities to clarify the issue. As the UK Supreme Court has suggested, the place of AI in patent law is a current societal issue, one that the legislator will ultimately have to settle.15 As such, it is only a matter of time before the Act is amended or CIPO issues a directive. Moreover, in addition to having to decide whether AI legally qualifies as an inventor, Canadian authorities will have to determine whether a person can be granted rights to an invention that was actually created by AI. The question as to whether an AI system owner can hold a patent on an invention generated by their machine was raised in Thaler. Once again, unlike the UK’s patent act,16 our Patent Act does not close the door to such a possibility. Canadian legislation contains no comprehensive list of the categories of persons to whom a patent may be granted, for instance. If we were to rewrite the laws governing intellectual property, given that the main purpose such laws is to encourage innovation and creativity, perhaps a better approach would be to allow AI system owners to hold patent rights rather than recognizing the AI as an inventor. Patent rights are granted on the basis of an implicit understanding: A high level of protection is provided in exchange for sufficient disclosure to enable a person skilled in the art to reproduce an invention. This ensures that society benefits from such inventions and that inventors are rewarded. Needless to say, arguing that machines need such an incentive is difficult. Designating AI as an inventor and granting it rights in that respect is therefore at odds with the very purpose of patent protection. That said, an AI system owner who has invested time and energy in designing their system could be justified in claiming such protection for the inventions that it generates. In such a case and given the current state of the law, the legislator would likely have to intervene. Would this proposed change spur innovation in the field of generative AI? We are collectively investing a huge amount of “human” resources in developing increasingly powerful AI systems. Will there come a time when we can no longer consider that human resources were involved in making AI-generated technologies? Should it come to that, giving preference to AI system owners could become counterproductive. In any event, for the time being, a sensible approach would be to emphasize the role that humans play in AI-assisted inventions, making persons the inventors rather than AI. As concerns inventions conceived entirely by an AI system, trade secret protection may be a more suitable solution. The professionals on our intellectual property team are at your disposal to assist you with patent registration and provide you with a clearer understanding of the issues involved. [2023] UKSC 49 [Thaler]. Ibid., para. 56. See the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Thaler v Vidal, 43 F. 4th 1207 (2022), application for appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed. See the decision of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office in J 0008/20 (Designation of inventor/DABUS) (2021), request to refer questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal denied. See the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Commissioner of Patents v Thaler, [2022] FCAFC 62, application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia denied. ZA 2021/03242. Federal Register: Inventorship Guidance for AI-Assisted Inventions. CA 3137161. Notice from CIPO dated February 11, 2022, in Canadian patent application 3137161. Ibid. R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4. SOR/2019-251. Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 77 at paras. 96–97. Sarnoff Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 712, para. 9. Thaler, paras. 48–49, 79. Ibid., para. 79.

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April 2, 2024

Environmental obligations: directors and officers, you may have more responsibilities than you think

In general, the directors and officers of a legal person have obligations and responsibilities relating to the legal person’s activities. Each director must act with prudence, diligence, honesty, loyalty and in the legal person’s interest.1 Each officer is responsible for representing the legal person and directing its activities.2 That said, directors and officers must keep in mind that they have greater duties and responsibilities and a heavier burden to meet when it comes to ensuring compliance with certain environmental laws. Since it came into force on May 12, 2022, the Act respecting certain measures enabling the enforcement of environmental and dam safety legislation (the “Act”) has ensured the enforcement of various environmental laws.3 The Act essentially provides for two types of consequences arising from the actions of directors, officers and, in some instances, other representatives of a legal person. The first involves a particular burden as regards compliance with environmental laws, and the second, consequences relating to the administration of the environmental authorization scheme. The duty of directors and officers to ensure compliance with environmental laws The Act’s criminal provisions provide for stiffer penalties for directors who commit an offence under an environmental law. Section 47 of the Act provides that where an offence is committed by a director or officer of a legal person, the minimum and maximum fines that would apply in the case of a natural person for such offence are doubled. Also, where a legal person commits an offence under an environmental law, its director or officer is presumed to have committed the offence, unless it is established that they exercised due diligence and took all necessary precautions to prevent the offence.4 The Act additionally provides that anyone who, by an act or omission, helps a person to commit an offence or induces a person, by encouragement, advice, consent, authorization or order to commit such an offence commits that offence and is liable to the same penalty as that prescribed for the offence they helped or induced the person to commit.5 Naturally, this rule applies to the directors and officers of a legal person, but is not limited to them. For example, it would also apply to an engineer or legal advisor who provides a legal person with advice causing it to commit an offence under an environmental law. Lastly, where a legal person has defaulted on payment of an amount owed,6 the directors and officers are solidarily liable, with the legal person, for payment of such amount. However, they may be exempted from this obligation if they are able to establish that they exercised due care and diligence to prevent the failure which led to the claim.7 This rule could apply, for instance, where a legal person is insolvent, which underscores the need to anticipate and effectively manage the environmental issues that a legal person is likely to face. Conduct of directors, officers and shareholders and the environmental authorization scheme The Environment Quality Act (EQA) establishes a ministerial authorization scheme for certain activities considered likely to have an impact on the quality of the environment.8 This authorization scheme is discretionary. Any activity covered by such scheme cannot be legally carried out unless the required authorization has first been issued. Holding and keeping such authorization is therefore fundamental for the company in question to continue to pursue its activities. Under the Act, the Minister of the Environment9 may refuse to issue, amend or renew a ministerial authorization, or decide to amend, revoke or cancel such an authorization, or oppose its transfer in certain situations relating to the conduct of the directors, officers and shareholders10 of the legal person holding the authorization.11 Situations in which the Minister may intervene in this way are, for example, those where one of a legal person’s directors, officers or shareholders has: filed a false declaration or document, or false information, or has distorted or omitted to report a material fact to have the authorization issued, maintained, amended, renewed or transferred failed to comply with an injunction made under any act that is administered by the Minister of the Environment defaulted on payment of an amount owed under any act administered by the Minister of the Environment (including monetary administrative penalties or any other fees that must be paid under such acts) been found guilty of an offence under an act administered by the Minister of the Environment or any regulations made under those acts been found guilty of an offence under a fiscal law or an criminal offence connected with activities covered by the authorization12 Thus, the conduct of directors, officers or shareholders can have repercussions on a legal person’s rights and obligations in carrying out activities authorized by the Minister. In addition, their conduct could hinder or even prevent the transfer of an authorization as part of an asset sale. Directors and officers have a vested interest in ensuring that the legal person they represent complies with environmental laws. Evidently, compliance is not only in the interest of the legal person itself, but also that of its directors and officers, whose personal liability and assets could be at stake should the legal person fail to comply. Articles 321 and 322 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.) Article 312 of the C.C.Q. These environmental laws are the Environment Quality Act, the Act to increase the number of zero-emission motor vehicles in Québec in order to reduce greenhouse gas and other pollutant emissions, the Natural Heritage Conservation Act, the Act respecting threatened or vulnerable species, the Pesticides Act and the Dam Safety Act (section 1 of the Act). Section 51 of the Act. Section 49 of the Act. The amount owing may be a monetary administrative penalty, a fine or financial compensation required under a notice of execution, among other things. Section 66 of the Act; In addition, under section 67 of the Act, the reimbursement of an amount owing is secured by a legal hypothec on the movable and immovable property of the debtor, in this case the director and officer of the legal person. Section 22 of the EQA. The EQA also provides that certain activities listed in the Regulation respecting the regulatory scheme applying to activities on the basis of their environmental impact may benefit from the more flexible declaration of compliance framework, or even an exemption. There is no need to describe these in detail for the purposes of this article. In accordance with section 2 of the Terms and conditions for the signing of certain documents of the Ministère du Développement durable, de l’Environnement et des Parcs (M-30.001, r. 1), assistant deputy ministers, directors general, the secretary general, directors, regional directors and assistant directors are authorized to sign any document relating to such decisions. For the purposes of these provisions of the Act, a shareholder means a natural person holding, directly or indirectly, shares that carry 20% or more of the voting rights in a legal person that is not a reporting issuer under the Securities Act (section 2 of the Act). Except in a situation where urgent action is required, the Minister must give prior notice of such a decision to the person concerned, so that they may submit their observations (section 39 of the Act). The Minister’s decision is then notified to the person concerned (section 40 of the Act), who may contest it before the Administrative Tribunal of Québec (sections 40 and 41 of the Act). See sections 32 to 36 of the Act.

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March 13, 2024

An insurer ordered to pay damages – The Court of Appeal intervenes

On February 12, 2024, the Court of Appeal of Quebec handed down its decision in Société d’assurance Beneva inc. c. Bordeleau,1 dealing in particular with the burden of proof incumbent on an insurer when it denies coverage on the basis of an insured’s intentional fault, and an award of damages against an insurer for breach of its duty of good faith. The facts This decision was rendered further to a dispute between Société d’assurance Beneva inc. (hereinafter the “Insurer") and some of its insureds, including Mr. Michel Bordeleau, the owner of a multi-storey rental building that was damaged by fire. He lived in one of the units with his parents. According to the uncontested expert evidence presented, the fire originated in one of the storage spaces in the basement of the building, which was assigned to a lessee couple. Access to the basement and all storage spaces was locked. The cause of the fire was deemed to be intentional, given the traces of accelerant found in the area of the fire’s origin. The instigator or instigators were not identified. On November 21, 2016, 60 days after the fire, the Insurer denied coverage because of the intentional nature of the fire, which it attributed to its insured, Mr. Bordeleau. A few months later, on March 22, 2017, it reached an agreement with Mr. Bordeleau’s hypothecary creditor. The subrogation release provides for the Insurer’s payment of the balance of the hypothecary debt of $149,720.99, and subrogation to the creditor’s rights up to the amount paid. Mr. Bordeleau, in his belief that he had been harmed by the Insurer’s decision, instituted legal proceedings to recover the insurance benefit to which he claimed to be entitled, while also claiming damages. The Insurer filed a cross-application for recovery of the balance paid to the hypothecary creditor. The trial The trial judge, relying on the evidence, concluded that although the fire was intentional in nature, the Insurer had not discharged its burden of establishing the insured’s involvement in the fire. Taking this conclusion into account, she then proceeded to analyze the plaintiffs’ claim and to weigh the damages in light of the evidence and the limits of the insurance policy. In particular, she ruled in favour of Mr. Bordeleau’s claim for damages for the building, the amount of which was admitted. In addition, she ordered the Insurer to pay $15,000.00 in damages for nuisance and inconvenience caused by its conduct, which she considered faulty. This conclusion was based on the Insurer’s duty to act in good faith, to consider the facts and act on their basis, and to conduct a full investigation, duty which the Insurer had breached by failing to sufficiently follow-up on leads that could have identified who was responsible for the fire. In order to deny coverage, clear and compelling evidence of the insured’s involvement, going beyond mere suspicion, was necessary. Given the sometimes implausible and sometimes contradictory testimonies of the people met during the investigation, there was no such evidence. In other words, the claims adjuster had jumped to conclusions. In light of her conclusions, the trial judge dismissed the Insurer’s cross-application, which she deemed to be unfounded, without giving further reasons. The appeal The Court of Appeal first refrained from intervening in light of the Superior Court’s conclusions regarding the failure to demonstrate Mr. Bordeleau’s involvement in the fire. It did however intervene on the damages awarded for nuisance and inconvenience suffered by the insureds, and pointed out the following: [40] [translation] Firstly, apart from the strict mathematical calculation of the amounts payable, and perhaps other technical aspects not requiring the exercise of judgment, the processing of a claim is an obligation of means, not one of result. The fact that a court found at the end of a trial held many years after the incident that an insurer should have covered in the first place obviously does not mean that the insurer necessarily committed a fault other than its refusal to pay, making it civilly liable, let alone that it acted in bad faith. [41] In this case, there was nothing in the evidence to support a finding of fault or breach of the duty of good faith. [42] On the contrary, there is enough evidence to conclude that the investigation by the appellant and its experts, which led to the denial of coverage, was not botched. . . . In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the evidence showed that the Insurer’s investigation had been done in a conscientious manner, in particular because it had transferred the claim file to a special investigative unit, mandated a fire origin and cause expert and external investigators, and interviewed many witnesses who could have provided information on the circumstances of the incident. Moreover, it had no allegations that the Insurer had failed to consider exculpatory evidence against its insured. In this context, although it took several years for the insured to obtain his due, with all the inconveniences of going through proceedings, the Insurer’s conduct could not be considered offending or revealing of bad faith. No damages could be awarded. Lastly, the Court of Appeal took a closer look at the question of the Insurer’s subrogation to the hypothecary creditor’s rights, which was little discussed in the judgment under appeal. Reiterating the fundamental principle in property and casualty insurance that the indemnification of an insured cannot result in enrichment, the Court of Appeal concluded that dismissing the Insurer’s cross-application would have such an effect. In addition to receiving an insurance benefit for the damages sustained, Mr. Bordeleau would also have had seen his hypothecary debt discharged. This would have given him a clear advantage. In this case, the benefit paid to the hypothecary creditor needed to be deducted from the damages claimed by the insured. The trial judge’s finding were thus revised accordingly. Conclusion Despite the clear principles addressed in this case, the Court of Appeal’s analysis points to practical difficulties that insureds and insurers can encounter when dealing with similar claims. It points to the coexistence of two factors that can be difficult to balance: First, the burden of proof where coverage is denied on the basis of the insured's intentional fault, and second, the insurer’s obligation of means in processing the associated claim. The dismissal of a coverage defence does not in itself warrant awarding damages. Société d’assurance Beneva inc. c. Bordeleau, 2024 QCCA 171

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