Artificial Intelligence


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Lavery Legal Lab on Artificial Intelligence (L3IA)


We anticipate that within a few years, all companies, businesses and organizations, in every sector and industry, will use some form of artificial intelligence in their day-to-day operations to improve productivity or efficiency, ensure better quality control, conquer new markets and customers, implement new marketing strategies, as well as improve processes, automation and marketing or the profitability of operations.

For this reason, Lavery created the Lavery Legal Lab on Artificial Intelligence (L3IA) to analyze and monitor recent and anticipated developments in artificial intelligence from a legal perspective. Our Lab is interested in all projects pertaining to artificial intelligence (AI) and their legal peculiarities, particularly the various branches and applications of artificial intelligence which will rapidly appear in companies and industries.

"As soon as a company knows what it wants, tools exist, it must make the best use of them, and our Lab is there to advise it in this regard. "


The development of artificial intelligence, through a broad spectrum of branches and applications, will also have an impact on many legal sectors and practices, from intellectual property to protection of personal information, including corporate and business integrity and all fields of business law.

Discover our lexicon which demystifies the most commonly used terms in artificial intelligence:

Lexicon on Artificial IntelligenceClick here to learn more


L3IA attendance at conferences and events:

L3IA conference artificial intelligence montreal international mila may 2019


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  1. SOCAN Decision: Online music distributors must only pay a single royalty fee

    In Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Entertainment Software Association1 (the “SOCAN Decision”), the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the obligation to pay a royalty for making a work available to the public on a server, where it can later be streamed or downloaded. At the same time, it clarified the applicable standard of review for appeals where administrative bodies and courts share concurrent first instance jurisdiction and revisited the purpose of the Copyright Act2and its interpretation in light of the WIPO Copyright Treaty3. The Supreme Court also took the opportunity to reiterate the importance of the principle of technological neutrality in the application and interpretation of the Copyright Act. This reminder can also be applied to other artistic mediums and is very timely in a context where the digital visual arts market is experiencing a significant boom with the production and sale of non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”). In 2012, Canadian legislators amended the Copyright Act by adopting the Copyright Modernization Act4. These amendments incorporate Canada’s obligations under the Treaty into Canadian law by harmonizing the legal framework of Canada’s copyright laws with international rules on new and emerging technologies. The CMA introduced three sections related to “making [a work] available,” including section 2.4(1.1) of the CMA. This section applies to original works and clarifies section 3(1)(f), which gives authors the exclusive right to “communicate a work  to the public by telecommunication”: 2.4(1.1) Copyright Act. “For the purposes of this Act, communication of a work or other subject-matter to the public by telecommunication includes making it available to the public by telecommunication in a way that allows a member of the public to have access to it from a place and at a time individually chosen by that member of the public.” Before the CMA came into force, the Supreme Court also found that downloading a musical work from the Internet was not a communication by telecommunication within the meaning of section 3(1)(f) of the CMA5, while streaming was covered by this section.6 Following the coming into force of the CMA, the Copyright Board of Canada (the “Board”) received submissions regarding the application of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act. The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (“SOCAN”) argued, among other things, that section 2.42.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act required users to pay royalties when a work was published on the Internet, making no distinction between downloading, streaming and cases where works are published but never transmitted. The consequence of SOCAN’s position was that a royalty had to be paid each time a work was made available to the public, whether it was downloaded or streamed. For each download, a reproduction royalty also had to be paid, while for each stream, an additional performance royalty had to be paid. Judicial history The Board’s Decision7 The Board accepted SOCAN’s interpretation that making a work available to the public is a “communication”. According to this interpretation, two royalties are due when a work is published online. Firstly,  when the work is made available to the public online, and secondly, when it is streamed or downloaded. The Board’s Decision was largely based on its interpretation of Section 8 of the Treaty, according to which the act of making a work available requires separate protection by Member States and constitutes a separately compensable activity. Federal Court of Appeal’s Decision8 Entertainment Software Association, Apple Inc. and their Canadian subsidiaries (the “Broadcasters”) appealed the Board’s Decision before the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”). Relying on the reasonableness standard, the FCA overturned the Board’s Decision, affirming that a royalty is due only when the work is made available to the public on a server, not when a work is later streamed. The FCA also highlighted the uncertainty surrounding the applicable review standard in appeals following Vavilov9 in cases where administrative bodies and courts share concurrent first instance jurisdiction. SOCAN Decision The Supreme Court dismissed SOCAN’s appeal seeking the reinstatement of the Board’s Decision. Appellate standards of review The Supreme Court recognized that there are rare and exceptional circumstances that create a sixth category of issues to which the standard of correctness applies, namely concurrent first instance jurisdiction between courts and administrative bodies. Does section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act entitle the holder of a copyright to the payment of a second royalty for each download or stream after the publication of a work on a server, making it publicly accessible? The copyright interests provided by section 3(1) of the Copyright Act The Supreme Court began its analysis by considering the three copyright interests protected by the Copyright Act, or in other words, namely the rights provided for in section 3(1): to produce or reproduce a work in any material form whatsoever; to perform the work in public; to publish an unpublished work. These three copyright interestsare distinct and a single activity can only engaged one of them. For example, the performance of a work is considered impermanent, allowing the author to retain greater control over their work than reproduction. Thus, “when an activity allows a user to experience a work for a limited period of time, the author’s performance right is engaged. A reproduction, by contrast, gives a user a durable copy of a work”.10 The Supreme Court also emphasized that an activity not involving one of the three copyright interests under section 3(1) of the Copyright Act or the author’s moral rights is not protected by the Copyright Act. Accordingly, no royalties should be paid in connection with such an activity. The Court reiterated its previous view that downloading a work and streaming a work are distinct protected activities, more precisely  downloading is considered reproduction, while streaming is considered performance. It also pointed out that downloading is not a communication under section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act, and that making a work available on a server is not a compensable activity distinct from the three copyright interests.11 Purpose of the Copyright Act and the principle of technological neutrality The Supreme Court criticized the Board’s Decision, opining that it violates the principle of technological neutrality, in particular by requiring users to pay additional fees to access online works. The purpose of the CMA was to “ensure that [the Copyright Act] remains technologically neutral”12 and thereby show, at the same time, Canada’s adherence to the principle of technological neutrality. The principle of technological neutrality is further explained by the Supreme Court: [63] The principle of technological neutrality holds that, absent parliamentary intent to the contrary, the Copyright Act should not be interpreted in a way that either favours or discriminates against any form of technology: CBC, at para. 66. Distributing functionally equivalent works through old or new technology should engage the same copyright interests: Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326, at para. 43; CBC, at para. 72. For example, purchasing an album online should engage the same copyright interests, and attract the same quantum of royalties, as purchasing an album in a bricks-and-mortar store since these methods of purchasing the copyrighted works are functionally equivalent. What matters is what the user receives, not how the user receives it: ESA, at paras. 5-6 and 9; Rogers, at para. 29. In its summary to the CMA, which precedes the preamble, Parliament signalled its support for technological neutrality, by stating that the amendments were intended to “ensure that [the Copyright Act] remains technologically neutral”. According to the Supreme Court, the principle of technological neutrality must be observed in the light of the purpose of the Copyright Act, which does not exist solely for the protection of authors’ rights. Rather, the Act seeks to strike a balance between the rights of users and the rights of authors by facilitating the dissemination of artistic and intellectual works aiming to enrich society and inspire other creators. As a result, “[w]hat matters is what the user receives, not how the user receives it.”13 Thus, whether the reproduction or dissemination of the work takes place online or offline, the same copyright applies and leads to the same royalties. What is the correct interpretation of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act? Section 8 of the Treaty The Supreme Court reiterated that international treaties are relevant at the context stage of the statutory interpretation exercise and they can be considered without textual ambiguity in the statute.14 Moreover, wherethe text permits, it must be interpreted so as to comply with Canada’s treaty obligations, in accordance with the presumption of conformity, which states that a treaty cannot override clear legislative intent.15 The Court concluded that section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act was intended to implement Canada’s obligations under Section 8 of the Treaty, and that the Treaty must therefore be taken into account in interpreting section 2.4(1.1) of the Act. Although Section 8 of the Treaty gives authors the right to control making works available to the public, it does not create a new and protected “making available” right that would be separately compensable. In such cases, there are no “distinct communications” or in other words, “distinct performances”.16 Section 8 of the Treaty creates only two obligations: “protect on demand transmissions; and give authors the right to control when and how their work is made available for downloading or streaming.”17 Canada has the freedom to choose how these two objectives are implemented in the Copyright Act, either through the right of distribution, the right of communication to the public, the combination of these rights, or a new right.18 The Supreme Court concluded that the Copyright Act gives effect to the obligations arising from Section 8 of the Treaty through a combination of the performance, reproduction, and authorization rights provided for in section 3(1) of the Copyright Act, and by respecting the principle of technological neutrality.19 Which interpretation of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act should be followed? The purpose of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act is to clarify the communication right in section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act by emphasizing its application to on-demand streaming. A single on-demand stream to a member of the public thus constitutes a “communication to the public” within the meaning of section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act.20 Section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act states that a work is performed as soon as it is made available for on-demand streaming.21 Therefore, streaming is only a continuation of the performance of the work, which starts when the work is made available. Only one royalty should be collected in connection with this right: [100] This interpretation does not require treating the act of making the work available as a separate performance from the work’s subsequent transmission as a stream. The work is performed as soon as it is made available for on-demand streaming. At this point, a royalty is payable. If a user later experiences this performance by streaming the work, they are experiencing an already ongoing performance, not starting a new one. No separate royalty is payable at that point. The “act of ‘communication to the public’ in the form of ‘making available’ is completed by merely making a work available for on?demand transmission. If then the work is actually transmitted in that way, it does not mean that two acts are carried out: ‘making available’ and ‘communication to the public’. The entire act thus carried out will be regarded as communication to the public”: Ficsor, at p. 508. In other words, the making available of a stream and a stream by a user are both protected as a single performance — a single communication to the public. In summary, the Supreme Court stated and clarified the following in the SOCAN Decision: Section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act does not cover download of a work. Making a work available on a server and streaming the work both involve the same copyright interest to the performance of the work. As a result, only one royalty must be paid when a work is uploaded to a server and streamed. This interpretation of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act is consistent with Canada’s international obligations for copyright protection. In cases of concurrent first instance jurisdiction between courts and administrative bodies, the standard of correctness should be applied. As artificial intelligence works of art increase in amount and as a new market for digital visual art emerges, driven by the public’s attraction for the NFT exchanges, the principle of technological neutrality is becoming crucial for understanding the copyrights attached to these new digital objects and their related transactions. Fortunately, the issues surrounding digital music and its sharing and streaming have paved the way for rethinking copyright in a digital context. It should also be noted that in decentralized and unregulated digital NFT markets, intellectual property rights currently provide the only framework that is really respected by some market platforms and may call for some degree of intervention on the part of the market platforms’ owners. 2022 SCC 30. R.S.C. (1985), c. C-42 (hereinafter the “Copyright Act”). Can. T.S. 2014 No. 20, (hereinafter the “Treaty”). S.C. 2012, c. 20 (hereinafter the “CMA”). Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34. Rogers Communications Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35. Copyright Board of Canada, 2017 CanLII 152886 (hereinafter the “Board’s Decision”). Federal Court of Appeal, 2020 FCA 100 (hereinafter the “FCA’s Decision”). Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. SOCAN Decision, par. 56. Ibid, para. 59. CMA, Preamble. SOCAN Decision, para. 70, emphasis added by the SCC. Ibid, paras. 44-45. Ibid, paras. 46-48. Ibid, paras. 74-75. Ibid, para. 88. Ibid, para. 90. Ibid, paras. 101 and 108. Ibid, paras. 91-94. Ibid, paras. 95 and 99-100.

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  2. Crypto asset works of art and non-fungible token (NFT) investments: Be careful!

    On March 11, 2021, Christie’s auction house made a landmark sale by auctioning off an entirely digital artwork by the artist Beeple, a $69 million transaction in Ether, a cryptocurrency.1 In doing so, the famous auction house put non-fungible tokens (“NFT”), the product of a decentralized blockchain, in the spotlight. While many extol the benefits of such crypto asset technology, there are also significant risks associated with it,2 requiring greater vigilance when dealing with any investment or transaction involving NFTs. What is an NFT? The distinction between fungible and non-fungible assets is not new. Prior to the invention of blockchain, the distinction was used to differentiate assets based on their availability, fungible assets being highly available and non-fungible assets, scarce. Thus, a fungible asset can easily be replaced by an equivalent asset with the same market value. The best example is money, whether it be coins, notes, deposit money or digital money, such as Bitcoin. On the contrary, a non-fungible asset is unique and irreplaceable. As such, works of art are non-fungible assets in that they are either unique or very few copies of them exist. Their value is a result of their authenticity and provenance, among other things. NFTs are crypto assets associated with blockchain technology that replicate the phenomenon of scarcity. Each NFT is associated with a unique identifier to ensure traceability. In addition to the art market, online, NFTs have been associated with the collection of virtual items, such as sports cards and other memorabilia and collectibles, including the first tweet ever written.3 NFTs can also be associated with tangible goods, in which case they can be used to track exchanges and transactions related to such goods. In 2019, Ernst & Young developed a system of unique digital identifiers for a client to track and manage its collection of fine wines.4 Many projects rely on cryptocurrencies, such as Ether, to create NFTs. This type of cryptocurrency is programmable and allows for metadata to be embedded through a code that becomes the key to tracking assets, such as works of art or other valuables. What are the risks associated with NFTs? Although many praise the benefits of NFTs, in particular the increased traceability of the origin of goods exchanged through digital transactions, it has become clear that the speculative bubble of the past few weeks has, contrary to expectations, resulted in new opportunities for fraud and abuse of the rights associated with works exchanged online. An unregulated market? While there is currently no legislative framework that specifically regulates crypto asset transactions, NFT buyers and sellers are still subject to the laws and regulations currently governing the distribution of financial products and services5, the securities laws6, the Money-Services Business Act7 and the tax laws8. Is an NFT a security? In January 2020, the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) identified crypto asset “commodities” as assets that may be subject to securities laws and regulations. Thus, platforms that manage and host NFTs on behalf of their users engage in activities that are governed by the laws that apply to securities trading, as long as they retain possession or control of NFTs. On the contrary, a platform will not be subject to regulatory oversight if: “the underlying crypto asset itself is not a security or derivative; and the contract or instrument for the purchase, sale or delivery of a crypto asset results in an obligation to make immediate delivery of the crypto asset, and is settled by the immediate delivery of the crypto asset to the Platform’s user according to the Platform’s typical commercial practice.”9 Fraud10 NFTs don’t protect collectors and investors from fraud and theft. Among the documented risks, there are fake websites robbing investors of their cryptocurrencies, thefts and/or disappearances of NFTs hosted on platforms, and copyright and trademark infringement. Theft and disappearance of NFT assets As some Nifty Gateway users unfortunately learned the hard way in late March, crypto asset platforms are not inherently immune to the hacking and theft of personal data associated with accounts, including credit card information. With the hacking of many Nifty Gateway accounts, some users have been robbed of their entire NFT collection.11 NFTs are designed to prevent a transaction that has been concluded between two parties from being reversed. Once the transfer of the NFT to another account has been initiated, the user, or a third party such as a bank, cannot reverse the transaction. Cybercrime targeting crypto assets is not in its infancy—similar schemes have been seen in thefts of the cryptocurrency Ether. Copyright infringement and theft of artwork images The use of NFTs makes it possible to identify three types of problems that could lead to property right and copyright infringement: It is possible to create more than one NFT for the same work of art or collectible, thus generating separate chains of ownership. NFTs can be created for works that already exist and are not owned by the person marketing them. There are no mechanisms to verify copyrights and property rights associated with transacted NFTs. This creates false chains of ownership. The authenticity of the original depends too heavily on URLs that are vulnerable and could eventually disappear.12 For the time being, these problems have yet to be addressed by both the various platforms and the other parties involved in NFT transactions, including art galleries. Thus, the risks are borne solely by the buyer. This situation calls for increased accountability for platforms and others involved in transactions. The authenticity of the NFTs traded must be verified, as should the identity of the parties involved in a transaction. Money laundering and proceeds of crime In September 2020, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)13 published a report regarding the main risks associated with virtual assets and with platforms offering services relating to such virtual assets. In particular, FATF pointed out that money laundering and other types of illicit activity financing are facilitated by virtual assets, which are more conducive to rapid cross-border transactions in decentralized markets that are not regulated by national authorities;14 that is, the online marketplaces where cryptocurrencies and decentralized assets are traded on blockchains. Among other things, FATF pointed to the anonymity of the parties to transactions as a factor that increases risk. Considering all the risks associated with NFTs, we recommend taking the utmost precaution before investing in this category of crypto assets. In fact, on April 23, 2021, the Autorité des marchés financiers reiterated its warning about the “inordinately high risks” associated with investments involving cryptocurrencies and crypto assets.15 The best practices to implement prior to any transactions are: obtaining evidence identifying the party you are transacting with, if possible, safeguarding your crypto assets yourself, and checking with regulatory bodies to ensure that the platform on which the exchange will take place is compliant with applicable laws and regulations regarding the issuance of securities and derivatives. On April 23, 2021, the Autorité des marchés financiers reiterated its warnings about issuing tokens and investing in crypto assets. Act respecting the regulation of the financial sector, CQLR, c. E-6.1; Act respecting the distribution of financial products and services, CQLR, c. D-9.2. Securities Act, CQLR., c. V-1.1; see also the regulatory sandbox produced by the CSA: CQLR, c. E-12.000001;; FATF is an independent international body that assesses the risks associated with money laundering and the financing of both terrorist activities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction., p. 1.

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  3. Artificial intelligence soon to be regulated in Canada?

    For the time being, there are no specific laws governing the use of artificial intelligence in Canada. Certainly, the laws on the use of personal information and those that prohibit discrimination still apply, no matter if the technologies involved are so-called artificial intelligence technologies or conventional ones. However, the application of such laws to artificial intelligence raises a number of questions, especially when dealing with “artificial neural networks,” because the opacity of the algorithms behind these makes it difficult for those affected to understand the decision-making mechanisms at work. Such artificial neural networks are different in that they provide only limited explanations as to their internal operation. On November 12, 2020, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) published its recommendations for a regulatory framework for artificial intelligence.1 Pointing out that the use of artificial intelligence requiring personal information can have serious privacy implications, the OPC has made several recommendations, which involve the creation of the following, in particular: A requirement for those who develop such systems to ensure that privacy is protected in the design of artificial intelligence systems; A right for individuals to obtain an explanation, in understandable terms, to help them understand decisions made about them by an artificial intelligence system, which would also involve the assurance that such explanations are based on accurate information and are not discriminatory or biased; A right to contest decisions resulting from automated decision making; A right for the regulator to require evidence of the above. It should be noted that these recommendations include the possibility of imposing financial penalties on companies that would fail to abide by this regulatory framework. Moreover, contrary to the approach adopted in the General Data Protection Regulation and the Government of Quebec’s Bill 64, the rights to explanation and contestation would not be limited solely to automated decisions, but would also cover cases where an artificial intelligence system assists a human decision-maker. It is likely that these proposals will eventually provide a framework for the operation of intelligence systems already under development. It would thus be prudent for designers to take these recommendations into account and incorporate them into their artificial intelligence system development parameters as of now. Should these recommendations be adopted, it will also become necessary to consider how to explain the mechanisms behind the systems making or suggesting decisions based on artificial intelligence. As mentioned in these recommendations, “while trade secrets may require organizations to be careful with the explanations they provide, some form of meaningful explanation should always be possible without compromising intellectual property.”2 For this reason, it may be crucial to involve lawyers specializing in these matters from the start when designing solutions that use artificial intelligence and personal information. Ibid.

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  4. Use of patents in artificial intelligence: What does the new CIPO report say?

    Artificial intelligence is one of the areas of technology where there is currently the most research and development in Canada. To preserve Canada's advantageous position in this area, it is important to consider all forms of intellectual property protection that may apply. Although copyright has historically been the preferred form of intellectual property in computer science, patents are nevertheless very useful in the field of artificial intelligence. The monopoly they grant can be an important incentive to foster innovation. This is why the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) felt the need to report on the state of artificial intelligence and patents in Canada. In its report titled Processing Artificial Intelligence: Highlighting the Canadian Patent Landscape published in October 2020, CIPO presents statistics that clearly demonstrate the upward trend in patent activity by Canadian researchers in the area of artificial intelligence. However, this increase remains much less marked than those observed in the United States and China, the champions in the field. Nevertheless, Canada ranked sixth in the world in the number of patented inventions attributed to Canadian researchers and institutions. International patent activity in AI between 1998 et 2017 Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Industry, 2020   International patent activity by assignee's country of origin in AI between 1998 and 2017 Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Industry, 2020   Canadian researchers are particularly specialized in natural language processing, which is not surprising for a bilingual country. But their strengths also lie in knowledge representation and reasoning, and in computer vision and robotics. We can also see that, generally speaking, the most active areas of application for artificial intelligence in Canada are in life sciences and medicine and computer networks, followed by energy management, in particular. This seems to be a natural fit for Canada, a country with well-developed healthcare systems and telecommunications and energy infrastructure that reflects its vast territory. The only shortcoming is the lack of representation of women in artificial intelligence patent applications in Canada. This is an important long-term issue, since maintaining the country's competitiveness will necessarily require ensuring that all the best talent is involved in the development of artificial intelligence technology in Canada. Regardless of which of these fields you work in, it may be important to consult a patent agent early in the invention process, particularly to ensure optimal protection of your inventions and to maximize the benefits for Canadian institutions and businesses. Please do not hesitate to contact a member of our team!

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  1. Lavery and the Fondation Montréal inc. launch a $15,000 grant for artificial intelligence

    Lavery and Fondation Montréal inc. are pleased to announce the creation of the Lavery AI Grant offered to start-ups in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Valued at $15,000, grant winners will also have access to the full range of services provided by Fondation Montréal inc., as well as legal coaching by Lavery, tailored to the needs of young businesses in the artificial intelligence industry. The Lavery AI Grant is an annual grant and will be awarded each spring by Fondation Montréal inc. and Lavery to the start-up that has made the biggest impact in the area of artificial intelligence and that demonstrates great potential for growth. “With each passing day, Montréal is becoming the world city for artificial intelligence and six months ago, Lavery created an AI legal laboratory to analyze and predict the impact of AI in specific areas of the law, from intellectual property to the protection of personal information, including corporate governance and every aspect of business law. Our intention in creating this grant was to resolutely propel start-ups working in this activity sector and offer them legal guidance using the knowledge we developed in our laboratory,” stated Guillaume Lavoie, a partner and head of the Lavery CAPITAL group. “Young entrepreneurs are increasingly incorporating artificial intelligence into the core of their business model. We are happy that we can offer, in addition to the grant, services specific to this industry, thereby strengthening the role of Fondation Montréal inc. as a super connector with the business community,” remarked Liette Lamonde, Executive Director of Fondation Montréal inc.  Applicants can submit an application starting today through the Fondation Montréal inc. website (

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