Publications

“Clear skies overhead, patent marking protects well, innovation blooms.” “Patent marking” is the practice of labelling a product to provide notification that it is protected by one or more patents. From a public perspective, it serves three related purposes: avoiding innocent infringement; encouraging patentees to give notice to the public and aiding the public to identify whether an article is indeed patented. (Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1998, p. 1443). From a patent holder’s perspective, patent marking puts the public on notice that the product is protected by one or more patents, which can deter potential infringers from copying the invention without permission. Additionally, it can help establish that an infringer had knowledge of the patent, which can be important in determining damages in an infringement lawsuit. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, and in particular the United States, proper patent marking serves as notice to an infringer, thereby allowing a patent owner, when suing an infringer, to demonstrate earlier infringement, which may result in higher monetary damages in a patent infringement lawsuit. The ability to establish higher potential damages may also provide for an improved negotiation position in discussions vis-à-vis a settlement or a potential sale. As such, patentees who make, offer for sale, sell, or import any article covered by a patent would be well advised to mark a patented article. Patentees should also require their licensees to do the same and monitor licensee products to ensure the licensee complies with the marking requirements. United States Current U.S. case law suggests that marking should only be required when a commercial product is covered by a product (apparatus/system) claim. In cases where there are only method and/or process claims in a patent, the courts have generally indicated that there is no marking requirement. Properly marking patented products at an early stage can have a significant positive impact on the calculation of damages, since such calculation takes into account damages accrued only after an infringer received either “constructive” or “actual” notice of the alleged infringement. This can be done by physically affixing a notice to the product if possible, or by including the notice in packaging or advertising materials. The notice should typically include the word “patent” or the abbreviation “pat.” and the number(s) of the applicable patent(s). Marking can also help enhance damages for past infringement, as the patent statute provides for enhanced damages and attorney fees in cases where an infringer has actual notice of the patent. Not marking or incorrectly marking a product directly affects available remedies. Indeed, the patent marking statute 35 U.S. Code § 287 provides that a patent owner is required to mark their products that are covered by one or more patents with the appropriate patent numbers: “… by fixing thereon the word “patent” or the abbreviation “pat.”, together with the number of the patent … or when, from the character of the article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice. …” Although patent marking is not required by law, 35 U.S. Code § 287 further encourages patent holders to give public notice of a patented article through physical application of the patent number to the article by providing: “… In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.” It is worth noting that marking a product with a patent that does not cover the product, without the consent of the owner or marking the product as patent pending when there is no patent pending may create liability for false patent marking. As a result, ensuring patent marking is accurate is an important feature of any patent marking practice. Marking a product with an expired patent, however, is not considered false patent marking thanks to amendments made to the marking statute in 2011. Also of note, once marked, a patent owner’s marking must be “substantially consistent and continuous.” (Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1998, p. 1446) Virtual Patent Marking The patent marking statute additionally provides that notice to the public may be given that a product is patented: “…by fixing thereon the word “patent” or the abbreviation “pat.” together with an address of a posting on the Internet, accessible to the public without charge for accessing the address, that associates the patented article with the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.” A URL suitable for patent marking would reference a page which lists the patent(s) in question cross-referenced with at least one representative product and representative product numbers, for example. Images of the representative products are sometimes also included. A typical URL is www.widget.com/patents. Currently, it is not recommended to use other machine readable types of markings such as bar codes or QR codes. Europe The European Patent Convention (EPC) itself does not require marking. The EPC is also silent as to the ramifications of marking or not, and the question can really only be answered on a country-by-country basis. In the United Kingdom, for example, damages cannot be awarded or an order for accounting of profits cannot be made against an innocent infringer (see UK Patent Act, subsection 62(1)). Of note is that the onus is on the infringer to prove their innocence, i.e., that at the date of the infringing act they were not aware, and had no reasonable grounds for supposing, that the patent (or published application for a patent) existed. As such, correctly marked products that put the public on notice of the patent may be used as a barrier to an infringer attempting to claim ignorance of the existence of the patent. Of note is that the United Kingdom also provides for virtual patent marking, provided it is accessible to the public free of charge and it clearly associates the product with the number of the patent. In view of the above, however, marking products in Europe in order to put the public on notice of the patent or to establish that an infringer had knowledge of the patent may prove beneficial. Canada In Canada, patent marking is not required by law, meaning that it is not mandatory for a patent owner to mark their products or processes to indicate that they are protected by one or more patents, and the Supreme Court has confirmed that the fact that the public is notified by the marking of patented products should not be used to calculate damages. Regardless, there are some situations where a patent owner may choose to mark their products or processes in order to put the public on notice of the patent or to establish that an infringer had knowledge of the patent. However, care should be taken to ensure correct marking. Indeed, paragraph 75(1)(b) of the Patent Act provides that every person is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to a fine of not more than?$200 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three months, or to both, who with intent to deceive the public, offers for sale as patented in Canada any article that is not patented in Canada. Industrial Design In Canada, the law of marking related to industrial designs differs from that of patents. As seen above in regard to patents, marking effectively plays no role in the determination of compensation for infringement. With designs, however, marking can be a key factor in establishing monetary damages. Indeed, subsection 17(1) of the Industrial Design Act provides a defence to a finding of infringement in that, if the infringer can “establish” that they were not aware that the design was registered, the most the plaintiff can be awarded is an injunction. On the other hand, subsection 17(2) of the Industrial Design Act provides that if the plaintiff “establishes” that the articles or their packaging were marked to indicate that they are the subject of a registered industrial design, the infringer cannot take advantage of the defence of subsection 17(1) of the Industrial Design Act. The statute is particular, and it is important to mark items covered by the design correctly. In particular, the items must be marked with the capital letter “D” in a circle and the name, or common abbreviation, of the current owner of the design, for example ? Widget Ltd. Of note is that the design mark can be on the articles or the labels or packaging associated with the article. In summary, patent marking is an important aspect of patent law that allows the public to know that a product or process is protected by one or more patents, and also serves as a tool for patent owners to deter infringement, establish knowledge of the patent and collect damages for past infringement.

On January 30, 2023, the Court of Appeal of Quebec rendered a decision in Commission scolaire De La Jonquière c. Intact Compagnie d’assurance.1 The key issues in this case are the potential for conflicts arising from liability insurance policies and the obligation to disclose documents where insurers’ duty to defend conflicts with their duty to indemnify insureds. The facts This case is part of a class action in which all Quebec school boards—now referred to as school service centres (SSCs)—were accused of violating the right to free elementary and secondary education. As part of this class action, the SSCs brought an action in warranty against their insurers, seeking compensation for any amount they may be required to pay. The insurers acknowledged their obligation to defend the appellants in the main proceedings; however, they argued that the claim was not covered by the insurance contract. Following negotiations, the parties to the class action reached a settlement. The action in warranty against the insurers is still pending. At the examination for discovery stage of the action in warranty, the insurers asked to obtain a copy of all communications exchanged between the appellants and their counsel since the beginning of the main proceedings. The SSCs objected to this request on the basis of professional secrecy and litigation privilege. The Court therefore had to rule on the merits of the objection. The trial Drawing on the decision in Domtar2, the Superior Court dismissed the SSCs’ objection, holding that they had waived their right to assert solicitor-client privilege regarding anything relating to the reasonableness of the settlement. It appears that the Court inferred this waiver from certain allegations made and from the disclosure of certain documents as part of the action in warranty. The Court concluded that the appellants had to provide the insurers with the documents, risk analyses, letters, exchanges with the appellants and expert opinions having related to the reasonableness of the settlement since the beginning of the main proceedings. However, according to the Court of Appeal, the Court failed to provide a framework for such disclosure of information and to grant the SSCs the right to raise new objections in relation to said documents. The appeal The Court of Appeal considered the conflicts that may arise from the dual responsibility of insurers: their duty to defend insureds and their duty to indemnify them. In this regard, it described liability insurers and their role as follows: [20] The liability insurer is effectively a two-headed hydra: A type of two-headed creature with a single corporate identity, but where one head handles the insured’s defence and the other protects the insurer’s financial interests by ensuring that it only pays out for covered losses.[21] Each head must base its decisions on the interest it is defending and the information available to it. The two heads must remain separate in order to give effect to the insurance contract. […] The risk of a conflict of interest is therefore very real, which is why the insurer must put measures in place to ensure that it complies with the coverage provided by the policy, while also ensuring the full and complete defence of the insured.] As for the ethical obligations of the lawyer mandated by the insurer to represent the insured, the Court stated that the lawyer becomes the insured’s counsel in all respects and owes the insured absolute loyalty. As such, the right to professional secrecy in the insured’s relationship with the lawyer can be set up against the insurer. That being said, the lawyer must report on the progress of the case to the head of the hydra handling the insured’s defence. The Court then stated that it was essential in this context that the information thus obtained be accessible only to that head, and that the insurer put in place the necessary measures to keep the two heads separate. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not err in concluding that the SSCs were required to provide the evidence necessary to examine the reasonableness of the settlement reached with the insurers. However, in order to do so, an exemption mechanism could be implemented, giving the SSCs the possibility to object to the disclosure of certain information. The Court also confirmed that there was no basis for concluding that the appellants had waived solicitor-client or litigation privilege with respect to all of their exchanges with their counsel. This information must remain protected by professional secrecy and therefore cannot be disclosed to the person at the insurer’s office in charge of the compensation file. The same goes for the accounts for fees, reports, opinions and other documents sent to the person at the insurer’s office handling the defence, unless the insured waives this right. Conclusion This case highlights the conflicts that can arise from the duality of insurers’ responsibilities and the distinction between insurers’ obligation to defend insureds and their obligation to indemnify them. Although the Court ruled that evidence aimed at verifying the reasonableness of a settlement from a qualitative and quantitative standpoint should be disclosed, it concluded that certain information and documents that are strictly relevant to insureds’ defence need not be disclosed. In so doing, it reiterated insurers’ dual responsibility and the importance of keeping the two heads separate when an insurer agrees to take on an insured’s defence, but maintained its refusal to indemnify the insured. Commission scolaire De La Jonquière c. Intact Compagnie d’assurance, 2023 QCCA 124. Chubb Insurance company of Canada c. Domtar, 2017 QCCA 1004.

Lavery celebrates International Women’s Day today   Today, Wednesday, March 8, we celebrate International Women’s Day. IWD is an opportunity to honour those who inspire us every day and who continue to demonstrate the progress we’ve made towards gender equality in the workplace, setting an example for future generations. This year, several of the firm’s women professionals shared why they decided to become lawyers. They talked about how they view women’s contributions to the evolution of the legal profession, how the profession has changed since they started and how it will continue to change. Louise Cérat Former Partner I decided to become a lawyer as the result of a simple but happy accident. From the beginning of my legal studies, I was aware of how lucky I was. I’ve sincerely enjoyed practicing law and have always felt privileged to be part of this community and the firm, which is the only place I’ve ever practiced, a place I am deeply attached to. When I first started out, the situation in the 80’s could have, in many ways, scared off even the most fearless among us. At first, there were not many women in the field. There were only two of us when I joined Lavery, which had been created following a recent merger and which comprised, if I’m not mistaken, about fifty lawyers at the time. Bear in mind, it was only in 1980 that the Act to establish a new Civil Code introduced the notion of equality between spouses in the management of family property and the education of children. However, the recognition of gender equality in 1980 didn’t mean that it was immediately reflected in the legal world as it is today. For example, there was no maternity leave policy in most large law firms until the late 1980s, and even then it was a rather feeble policy aimed only at salaried lawyers. The few women lawyers who became partners and got pregnant had to cover the income the firm lost as a result of their absence, not to mention the other difficulties they faced. Since then, stronger numbers have won us some battles, but the campaign is not over yet! The influx of female lawyers has brought an abundance of talent, renewed professionalism, a fresh perspective and added value to the legal world and to society in general, which were lacking for far too long. As we celebrate International Women’s Day, I call on men’s support to achieve equality for their wives, sisters, colleagues and friends, and I’m confident we’ll get there.   Justine Beauchesne Associate I realized this was the career I wanted to pursue during my time at university. Very early on in my career, I had a strong interest in business law, especially transactional law. I like the idea of being more than just a company’s lawyer, which is why I also see myself as a business partner. This profession is full of challenges, but accompanying our clients through transactions that are often significant milestones in their lives gives me a strong sense of accomplishment.   Women have made important contributions to the legal community throughout history, despite facing obstacles and discrimination. Women fought for the right to study law, to be admitted to the bar and to practice. These efforts have enabled today’s women to become judges, legal professionals and leaders in the field of law.   In recent years, women have continued to break down barriers in the legal world. There are more and more women law school graduates, and they are increasingly represented in the justice system and in leadership roles. They play a key role in shaping the legal community and in advocating for gender equality and social justice.   I believe women have brought new insight and a different approach to the legal profession. They have also been instrumental in the fight for gender equality and social justice, making significant contributions to the development of the legal system and shaping the legal landscape and even society as we know it. The increased presence of women in the legal world, and particularly in management positions, is bringing a much-needed change to this more conservative environment. If more women take on leadership roles in law firms, corporate legal departments and other legal organizations, they can help to create a more diverse and inclusive profession that is gender sensitive and more reflective of the communities it serves.     Marie-Hélène Jolicoeur Partner From the beginning, I had a desire for justice and fairness. I was also determined to speak up for those who can’t speak for themselves, who find it difficult to express or defend themselves, or who have trouble arguing a position with determination. I wanted to understand the law in order to be able to interpret it and ensure that it is properly applied. Women sometimes have different skills; they can present things from an alternative perspective and convince people in a different way. Women’s contribution to the legal profession is substantial and I feel it is recognized by my male peers. I’ve noticed that more and more women are finding their place in the business, building confidence and being heard. I see them in decision-making roles, which has been positively received. They are supported by their peers. I believe that they will continue to play an increasingly important role, if that’s what they want, and as long as they express this desire and remain supported.   Marie-Pier Landry Article Student I was motivated to become a lawyer by the varied intellectual challenges, the development opportunities and the human relations at the heart of the legal practice. I am lucky to have many women role models in my professional circle. I see empathy, leadership and passion in their practice. I am certain that bringing more women into the legal profession makes for a more inclusive and fair legal system.   Sophie Roy Senior Associate At first, I was first driven by the concept of justice. I also wanted to become a lawyer in order to speak out and be heard. Without falling into gender stereotypes, women’s presence has certainly contributed to making the legal profession more inclusive. The ability to listen and to collaborate seem to be increasingly important values.   Justine Chaput Associate What inspired me to become a lawyer was first and foremost my desire to make a difference in my community and to tackle the intellectual challenges of the legal field.   I believe women have brought new insight and a different approach to the legal profession. They have also been instrumental in the fight for gender equality and social justice, making significant contributions to the development of the legal system and shaping the legal landscape and even society as we know it. I am confident that the contribution of women to the legal profession will continue to evolve and help eliminate prejudice and discrimination in order to ensure equal opportunities.   Marie-Nancy Paquet Partner I have always felt that I needed to fulfil my dreams and use my talents. This was especially important to me because my mother regretted all her life that she had not been able to achieve her professional goals, and she suffered as a result of this. For her children, it was an exhortation to never give up. Moreover, for as long as I can remember, I have had a tendency to be very vocal. It soon became clear to me that a career as a lawyer would be an opportunity to put my skills to good use. Having said that, I didn’t really know what it meant to be a lawyer, as no one in my environment practised law or had even been to university. In my opinion, the contribution of women to the evolution of the legal profession is essential. We must not forget where we started and how far we have come thanks to the courage of our predecessors. I can’t help but think of all the women who would have had the talent to practice law, but couldn’t even think about doing that in their day. In the legal profession, women first had to prove that they had as much right to be there as their male colleagues. I have deep admiration for the trailblazing women who embraced careers as lawyers when they were the outliers in their classes. One look through a yearbook from the 1950s-1960s is enough to see that women were hardly there at the time. Among the 70 or so law graduates at my university in 1960, there were only three women. It took courage to study law as a woman! Things have changed and there are far more women in the field now, especially in the undergraduate cohorts. But challenges remain. However, one element is worth noting, and that is the influence that women have had on the transformation of the work-life balance. The fact that young men working in law are now also interested in this issue is undoubtedly due to the fact that women have entered the profession and, more generally, all areas of professional life. Looking towards the future, we must continue to work to ensure that the remaining glass ceilings are broken and that both men and women can find an equal place in the profession.   Jennifer Younes Article Student Growing up, I witnessed a range of situations where individuals were marginalized. As a result, I chose to study law to reduce the inequalities that exist between different groups of people. In my opinion, lawyers are the voice of justice and I chose to become a lawyer because I wanted to serve the cause of justice. Certainly the growing number of women in the legal profession in recent decades has had a positive impact on the evolution of the legal profession. The sharp increase in the representation of women has enabled the courts to have a more complete appreciation of certain issues, and will continue to do so into the future. In my opinion, the more stories we have in the field, the deeper and more diverse our legal discussions become. And the more diverse the legal community becomes, the more accessible it will be to members of these previously unrepresented groups.

In the decision Beijing Judian Restaurant Co. Ltd. v. Wei Meng, 2022 FC 743, rendered by the Honourable Angela Furlanetto on May 18, 2022, the Federal Court clarified what constitutes bad faith in trademark law. Prior to the decision, the concept of bad faith in relation to trademarks was interpreted rather cautiously in Canadian jurisprudence. Background Beijing Judian Restaurant Co. Ltd. (the “Applicant”) petitioned the Court to invalidate the registration of Respondent Wei Meng (the “Respondent”) for the trademark depicted below (the “Respondent’s Mark”), on the grounds that the registration was obtained in bad faith, and to strike the trademark from the Canadian Register of Trademarks, in accordance with subsection 57(1) and paragraph 18(1)(e) of the Trademarks Act (the “Act”). In support of its application, the Applicant filed two affidavits of its representatives, which set out the facts below. The Respondent did not cross-examine the Applicant on the affidavits, file any evidence, or appear at the hearing. The following facts are therefore undisputed. The facts Since 2005, the Applicant has been running a chain of restaurants in China and using, in connection with its restaurants, the mark below, as well as each of the components of this mark, alone or in combination (the “JU DIAN Marks”). The JU DIAN Marks are highly visible in China. They are featured in numerous advertisements promoting the Applicant’s restaurants and the JU DIAN Marks. The JU DIAN Marks and the Applicant’s chain of restaurants are therefore well known in that country. Moreover, in 2011 and 2013, respectively, the Applicant began promoting its restaurants in association with the JU DIAN Marks on the WEIBO and WECHAT platforms in an effort to target the Chinese population in and outside China. In 2015, the Applicant considered the possibility of bringing its chain of restaurants to Canada. The Applicant decided to open its first restaurants in Canada in the Vancouver and Toronto regions, as these have a large Chinese population that would likely be familiar with the Applicant’s chain of restaurants. The Applicant opened restaurants in Vancouver and Toronto in 2018, and a restaurant in Richmond, British Columbia, in 2019. The Applicant was however unaware that the Respondent had applied to register the Respondent’s Mark in Canada a few months earlier, on June 27, 2017, based on proposed use in association with restaurant services, among others. It appears that, during the same period, the Respondent had also applied to register in Canada several marks belonging to other Chinese restaurant chains. In April 2019, the Respondent visited the Applicant’s Vancouver restaurant and accused the Applicant of stealing his mark. A series of meetings and discussions between the parties ensued, during which the Respondent demanded that the Applicant pay him the sum of $1,500,000 to use the Respondent’s Mark without acquiring its ownership, and threatened to contact the Canada Revenue Agency if the Applicant did not cease using the mark. The Applicant refused to pay the Respondent any sum whatsoever and did not yield to his threats. In the meantime, the Respondent’s Mark was registered in Canada. In June 2019, the Applicant learned of an advertisement that the Respondent had posted on a British Columbia website. The advertisement was for the sale of the registration of the Respondent’s Mark. The Applicant contacted the Respondent anonymously to obtain more information on the offer. The Respondent offered the Applicant a trademark license at a cost of $100,000 per year, justifying the price by stating that the mark was already well known in China with the Applicant’s restaurants. The Applicant then sent the Respondent a formal notice demanding that he cease using the Applicant’s mark and abandon its registration in Canada. The Respondent refused to comply. The Applicant thus filed an application for invalidation and expungement of the registration. The law Although paragraph 18(1)(e) of the Act provides that a registration may be invalidated if the application for registration was filed in bad faith, the Federal Court noted in its decision that the Act contains no definition of the term “bad faith.” It pointed out that, because paragraph 18(1)(e) of the Act is relatively new, very little Canadian jurisprudence has examined what constitutes bad faith in trademark matters. In its decision, the Federal Court drew on various sources to determine whether the registration of the Respondent’s Mark could be invalidated on the basis of bad faith. First, the Court considered the observations of the Parliament of Canada regarding the adoption of the amendments to the Act, which state that: The amendments aim, notably, to hinder the registration of a trademark for the sole purpose of extracting value from preventing others from using it. The amendments would prevent the abusive use of the trademark regime, such as by applying for registration with the sole intention of seeking remuneration from the legitimate owner of a trademark. Second, the Court analyzed certain Canadian decisions rendered prior to the adoption of paragraph 18(1)(e) of the Act in matters of bad faith. It noted that Canadian jurisprudence had already invalidated trademark registrations on the basis of bad faith where the applicant had filed a series of applications for registration in Canada for well-known trademarks. Lastly, the Court reviewed decisions rendered in Europe and the United Kingdom. It concluded that in these jurisdictions, filing an application for registration of a trademark without intending to use it for a legitimate commercial purpose and with the sole intention of preventing a third party from entering the market or interfering with its business may constitute bad faith. The same is true where an applicant wishes to register a trademark for extortion purposes. The Court then analyzed the relevant date in order to assess bad faith under paragraph 18(1)(e) of the Act. It stated that while the relevant date is the date on which the application was filed, evidence subsequent to that date may be considered relevant if it helps to clarify the reasons why the application was filed. The Court held that the Applicant had the burden of establishing bad faith, which had to be proven on a balance of probabilities with clear and convincing evidence. The Court however specified that where the facts could only be known to the Respondent, circumstantial evidence and inferences from proven facts could be sufficient to establish the Respondent’s objectives at the time of the application’s filing. The facts show that, at the time the application was filed, the Respondent was aware of the Applicant’s restaurants in China and that the JU DIAN Marks had acquired a certain reputation, at the very least, among the Chinese population in British Columbia. The Court also concluded that it was highly unlikely that the Respondent had created a mark identical to that of the Applicant on his own, considering the originality of the mark. It was therefore more likely that the Respondent had wanted to register the same mark, knowing that it was associated with the Applicant’s restaurants in China, in order to benefit from its reputation. The Court nonetheless made the following clarification: filing an application for a trademark, even if it is identical to that of a third party, is insufficient to invalidate its registration, as there may be a legitimate basis to obtain a registered trademark in Canada for the same trademark that is registered and used by a third party elsewhere, where the third party’s trademark has no reputation in Canada.  Thus, it is the intention to “abuse the trademark regime” or the bad faith of the owner that must be established on a balance of probabilities. The Court concluded that the Applicant’s evidence established that the Respondent had registered the trademark without a legitimate commercial purpose: The JU DIAN Marks are known in Canada, at least by the Chinese population in British Columbia. The Respondent acknowledged in his exchanges that the JU DIAN Marks are associated with the Applicant’s chain of restaurants and are well-known trademarks.  The Respondent applied to register the Respondent’s Mark in Canada for the purpose of extorting money by leveraging the trademark’s reputation. The Respondent applied to register trademarks in Canada belonging to Chinese restaurant chains. The Court therefore held that the circumstances of the case constituted bad faith, but noted that in the United Kingdom, an inference of bad faith may be rebuttable where there is registration of a known trademark by an applicant who has no connection with the legitimate owner of the trademark. However, in the United Kingdom, where an applicant has engaged in a pattern of acquiring multiple such registrations, rebutting the inference of bad faith becomes significantly more difficult. In the absence of evidence from the Respondent to rebut the inference of bad faith created by the circumstantial evidence, the Court found that the evidence on file established the Respondent’s intent to use the registration for extortion purposes. The Court invalidated the registration of the Respondent’s Mark and ordered that the registration be expunged from the Register of Trademarks. What this means It appears from this decision that the Court’s analysis is largely factual and that the burden of establishing the intent of the owner of a given trademark at the time an application is filed may be difficult, especially where a foreign applicant’s trademark has no reputation in Canada.

In response to the pandemic, the Canadian government launched in the spring of 2020 the Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy (the “CEWS”), a program that provides employers with a subsidy based on the remuneration paid to their employees and income they lost during the pandemic. Section 125.7 of the Income Tax Act (the “ITA”) sets out how the subsidy is to be calculated, and likely caused problems for those who had to interpret this ambiguous provision without supporting doctrine or jurisprudence. For instance, calculating the “qualifying revenue,” which is central to the CEWS calculation, involves many nuances. As an example, it requires that an entity’s revenue during qualifying periods be estimated and that certain items be excluded, such as “extraordinary items,” a term new to the ITA. The calculation of “eligible remuneration,” another important component of the CEWS calculation, also has a number of peculiarities, such as the inclusion of remuneration for related and managerial employees. The Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) now has taxpayer’s CEWS calculation in its sights. The CRA began auditing CEWS claims and issuing notices of assessment to taxpayers in an effort to reduce the amount of CEWS originally granted. With reductions in pre-pandemic period qualifying income or the inclusion of items that taxpayers had initially excluded in their qualifying period income, such assessments are likely to have a significant impact on the CEWS amounts to which taxpayers were entitled, especially for companies with a large number of employees. In specific cases, the CRA may also impose penalties which can be as high as 50% of the excess subsidy claimed. Although the time limit for amending CEWS claims has expired, submitting a fairness request to amend a previously filed claim may be possible in some circumstances. Moreover, when notices of assessment are issued, a notice of objection may be filed to contest the adjustments made by the CRA. It is important to keep all documentation related to the calculation of the “qualifying revenue,” your employees’ remuneration and any other accounting documents to support the CEWS amounts claimed. A proactive approach and early intervention in a CEWS audit will not only result in a more favourable outcome in a given case, but will also prevent many back-and-forths with the CRA. Lavery’s tax law team is familiar with the CEWS program and its intricacies, and can assist you should you be audited or should you receive a notice of assessment from the CRA.

In early 2022, the Autorité des marchés financiers (the “AMF”) conducted specific consultations on financial products offered on the Internet. Further to these consultations, the AMF published explanations on the Regulation respecting Alternative Distribution Methods (the “RADM”) in late December 2022.1 Here are some key points that the AMF has clarified: Definitions The AMF has elaborated on the meaning of certain terms and expressions included in the RADM, thereby clarifying the obligations incumbent on firms as concerns insurance products offered on the Internet: “Providing” or “presenting” information: This implies delivering, giving or handing over information to a client without them having to take any action. A client should not have to search for the information to find it. As such, making the information accessible or referring to a policy is not enough.2 “Making visible at all times”: The information should be visible to the client at all times, regardless of the page the client is on. A representative’s contact information is the only information that must be visible on the digital transactional space at all times. Websites that are accessible to people who are blind or use a voice assistant must also have means to present this information.3 “Making a representative available”: The AMF only requires that representatives be available during regular business hours.4 “Making information readily accessible”: A client must have the option of taking cognizance of the information and be able to easily find it. The information must be accessible in one or two clicks. Including a hyperlink or an icon, for example, are ways of making information accessible.5 Under this obligation, a hyperlink may be used to redirect a client to a website or document external to the digital space.6 External documents that are accessible through hyperlinks, such as sample insurance policies, must be up to date. Summary of the complaint processing policy The AMF specifies that the summary of the complaint processing policy referred to in the RADM must be that of the firm running the transactional website, not of a third party. Thus, a property and casualty insurance brokerage cannot refer to an insurer’s policy summary.7 Identification of the firm A firm may display partner logos on its digital space only if doing so does not cause confusion. A client must know which firm runs the space and must be able to distinguish it from partners that do not offer the products or services.8 Product coverage, exclusions and limitations Further to its supervisory activities, the AMF has confirmed that product coverage appears to be well presented in digital spaces. However, exclusions and sometimes limitations are not as well presented. Given that exclusions and limitations constitute information that is necessary for a client to make an informed decision, the AMF urges firms to pay attention to these and to select them based on a proper analysis.9 Suspension of transactions The AMF has clarified how to apply the criteria under section 14 of the RADM, more specifically paragraph 3 of this section, which provides that a firm must suspend a transaction initiated through a digital space when no representative can immediately intervene with a client who asks to deal with a representative and there is a risk that the client will not be able to make an informed decision. The AMF specifies that it is up to the firm to assess and manage its risk. In order to determine whether such a risk exists, the AMF has proposed the following solutions: The firm may caution the client as follows: “Do you wish to continue the process even though no representative is available at this time?” The firm could post its representatives’ availability. If a client decides to enter into a contract through a digital space, the firm could ensure that a representative contacts them within 24 hours. A transaction does not have to be suspended immediately; it can be done at the end of the transaction, before the contract is concluded. Moreover, stopping or temporarily suspending a transaction may also be necessary if a contradiction or irregularity in the information the client provides could lead to an error.10 The digital space must be set up to detect such a contradiction automatically. The AMF considers it preferable to discontinue a transaction if contradictions are detected. It can also be temporarily suspended while the client is informed of the consequences of making false statements and the importance of knowing their entire situation, for example, and to allow them to make corrections, if necessary.11 To better understand the obligations of the RADM, we invite you to consult our bulletin Bill 141: Checklist on insurance products offered via the internet and distribution without a representative. These are only available in French at this time; Regulation respecting Alternative Distribution Methods, CQLR, c. D-9.2, r. 16.1. Autorité des marchés financiers, Explications à l’égard du règlement – Le RMAD expliqué article par article (hereinafter the “Explanations”), ss. 7, 9, 11, 12 and 12.2. The terms “explaining information” or “providing information” under section 12.1 of the RADM should be interpreted in the same manner. Explanations, s. 8. Explanations, s. 8. Explanations, ss. 8 and 10. Explanations, ss. 8 and 10. A representative’s contact information does not have to appear on external documents and websites at all times. It is important to note that under section 9 of the RADM, a document that is to be “provided” or “presented” to a client cannot be located on an external website. Explanations, s. 8. Explanations, s. 8, para. 1. Explanations, s. 9. For example, a client declaring they have no children yet selecting insurance for their children constitutes a contradiction. Explanations, s. 14.

Part 1: Four reasons to slow down and four reasons to speed up the process Part 2: Slowing down the process (CA, US, EP, PCT) Part 3: Fast track (CA, US, EP, PCT) Part 1: Why slow down or speed up the process? Slowing down the process Why would anyone want to slow down the process when it already usually takes several years for a patent to be issued? Cash flow Uncertainty for competitors Possibility of changing the scope Possibility of filing a divisional application In some cases, cash flow may justify spreading expenses over a longer period of time. Keeping an application pending longer may also be beneficial from a business perspective. In fact, it could create uncertainty for competitors, who cannot easily determine the scope of the exclusive right that may be granted to you. Moreover, claims are easier to amend while the application is pending. Lastly, filing a divisional application is usually only possible when the parent patent application is still pending. Speeding up the process If slowing down the process is so advantageous, why speed it up? Proof of patentability before expanding the patent application family Monetary valuation or capital raising Proceedings before the courts Strong negotiating position After filing a priority application, the applicant has 12 months to file corresponding applications in other countries. Filing abroad can entail considerable expenses. It may therefore be advantageous to obtain results quickly so you can make the best decision about filing applications in other countries. An issued patent is a far better indication of a technology’s value. This can have a major impact on a company’s valuation and, at the same time, allow for additional capital to be raised. Moreover, filing a patent application will not prevent infringers from marketing your technology; you may only commence proceedings in front of the court with an issued patent. The possibility of instituting legal proceedings could drastically change the tone of negotiations with your competitors—and sometimes your suppliers, too. Strategies and costs Special provisions exist to speed up and slow down the process in many territories. For the purposes of this exercise, we will discuss patent applications in Canada, the United States and Europe. We will also look at international patent applications, namely PCT applications. Part 2: Slowing down the process Canada With regard to slowing down the process, the simplest strategy in Canada is to wait before requesting examination as much as possible. While the provision for this has changed over the years, applicants now have four (4) years from the date of filing a Canadian application to request an examination. For PCT national phase entry, Canada allows an extension of the standard 30-month time limit to up to 42 months under certain conditions. However, examination request dates and maintenance fees remain the same. Therefore, this is beneficial in the short term only. For each examiner’s report (also called office action), it is possible to request an extension of the time limit by two months before the original time limit expires. This request must be accompanied by the late fee and is only accepted under certain conditions. The other option is to not reply to the examiner’s report and to wait until the application is deemed abandoned. The application may then be reinstated by filing a response to the examiner’s report and paying an additional fee. It is important to note that a Canadian application is no longer eligible for accelerated processing if an extension of the time limit was obtained for it or it was reinstated. Furthermore, while an application is abandoned, and even if it is later reinstated, third parties could obtain certain rights to the technology. United States In the United States, an extension of time fee may be paid at the same time as the reply to an examiner’s report is filed. However, the maximum time limit must not exceed six (6) months. It is also possible to file a request (or petition) for the suspension of the time limit for replying to an examiner’s report (by paying the relevant fee, of course). This request is only acceptable under certain conditions and cannot exceed six (6) months. Similarly, a request may be filed to defer the examination of the application, which may delay examination by up to three (3) years after the priority date. Once again, certain conditions must be met and there is a fee to pay. Europe As is the case for Canada, for each examiner’s report, a request can be made to extend the time limit by two (2) months before the original time limit expires. However, unlike in Canada, there are no fees or conditions for this request to be accepted. The other option is to not reply to the examiner’s report and to let the application lapse. The application may then be reinstated by filing a response to the examiner’s report and paying an additional fee. As for the 10-day rule, it will continue to apply until November 2023. This rule, which was established at a time when communications were still sent by mail, provides that a dated communication is deemed to have been delivered ten (10) days after the date of the document—the time limit is therefore automatically extended by ten (10) days. All things considered, the elimination of this rule is a plus in helping prevent various communication problems. PCT When it comes to slowing things down, the PCT application itself may be used to slow down the process. In fact, the international patent application system provides allows a decision on international applications to be made as late as 30 months from the priority date. The PCT system is based more on the reservation of rights than on slowing down the process. Nevertheless, both from cash flow and filing strategy standpoints, the longer time limit for making decisions may be beneficial. Summary–slowing down the process CA: Postpone filing the Canadian application or entering the national phase. Push back the examination request. Apply for an extension of the time limit. Do not respond, then apply for reinstatement. US: Pay time limit extension fees. Submit a request to suspend processing. Submit a request to defer the examination. EP: Apply for an extension of the time limit. Apply the 10-day rule. Do not respond, then pay the fees to have the application reinstated. PCT: Take advantage of the 30-to-42-month extension for each country. Part 3: Fast track Canada Of course, the best way to speed up the process is to request an examination as soon as possible and, above all, not put off replying to the examiner’s reports received. After requesting an examination and before receiving the first examiner’s report, it is possible to request that the application be processed expeditiously. The request requires that the Canadian application be published and it may be subject to a number of conditions. An applicant whose rights may be prejudiced by the examination time limit can pay an additional fee to expedite the process. When a patent application relates to so-called green technology or the COVID-19 pandemic, the notion of prejudice does not apply and no fee is due. Speeding up the process is also possible by taking advantage of the outcome of a corresponding application in another jurisdiction deemed credible by the Canadian Patent Office (e.g., Europe, United States, Japan, etc.). This is referred to as a PPH (patent prosecution highway) request (the French translation by “autoroute de traitement des demandes de brevet”, while quite accurate, is rarely used). United States Those who have the means to do so may pay an acceleration fee when filing the application in the US. The intent is then to complete the entire process within 12 months. The ability of the US Patent Office to meet the expectation is also taken into consideration before accepting the request. Special treatment may also be requested for a patent application where the health or age of one of the inventors warrants this. Such a request may also be made when the technology in the patent application is “green” or relates to “counterterrorism.” The US also takes part in the PPH system, and the decision made regarding a corresponding application in another jurisdiction can also help speed up the process. Evidently, it is important not to delay replying to the examiner’s reports received, no matter how else you may choose to accelerate the process. Europe The European Patent Office accepts PPH requests and also offers the “PACE” programme, which helps speed up processing times (search and/or examination) without any fees or specific conditions other than responding to examiner’s reports in a timely manner. The European Patent Office’s ability to handle the requests is also taken into account. PCT Quickly completing national phase entries (i.e., well before the 30-month time limit) makes it possible to proceed faster with the substantive examination in each jurisdiction. During the international phase of the PCT, attempts can be made to move the process along before entering the national phase. This procedure often dubbed as a “Chapter II request” does not guarantee that time will be saved, but certain questions may be anticipated thus avoid multiple delays in front of different examiners. Summary – speeding up the process CA: File the Canadian application or enter the national phase as soon as possible. Make the examination request as soon as possible. Respond quickly to examiner’s reports. Request accelerated processing based on PPH, green technology, COVID-19 technology or possible prejudice. US: Pay acceleration fees when filing. Request accelerated processing through the PPH system. Respond quickly to examiner’s reports. Submit a petition to make the application special (on the basis of age or health, green technology or counterterrorism technology). EP: Request access to PACE programme. Request accelerated processing through the PPH system. Quickly respond to examiner’s reports. PCT: Enter national phase as soon as possible. Apply for examination under “Chapter II.”

After two years of navigating COVID-19, the end of 2022 will be an opportunity for employers to organise larger activities for their employees, such as Christmas parties. The purpose of this newsletter is to make employers aware of their obligations during the holiday season festivities. Below, we will address the following three issues: industrial accidents, disciplinary measures and psychological harassment. Although Christmas parties are generally held outside of the workplace and outside normal working hours, an incident that occurs on such an occasion may qualify as an “industrial accident” within the meaning of the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases.1 Courts will consider several factors in weighing whether or not such an incident will constitute a work-related accident, including the purpose of the party, the time and place where it was held, whether or not it is organized and financed by the employer, and the presence or absence of a relationship of subordination at the time of the incident. None of these factors are decisive: they serve as a guideline for the tribunal. As many decisions have both granted2 or rejected3 claims in such circumstances. In one case where a Christmas party had been organized by the employer and was intended to encourage a sense of cohesion and belonging amongst the employees, an injury to the coccyx suffered by an employee while dancing with a co-worker was qualified as an industrial accident.4 However, in another case where an employee was injured on an escalator while escorting a drunken co-worker after a Christmas party, the tribunal ruled that the female employee had not suffered an industrial accident due to the absence of authority exercised by the employer at the time of the fall and also because the event was only intended to permit colleagues to fraternize and spend time together and not to improve the work environment.5 In the context of its management rights, an employer may, in certain circumstances, discipline an employee for behaviour which occurred during a Christmas party.6 The degree of the employer’s involvement in the organization of the party and the private nature of the party are important factors in determining whether the employer is justified in imposing disciplinary measures in such a context. For example, an arbitrator upheld the dismissal of an employee who repeatedly hit a colleague and former spouse during the employer's Christmas party held on its premises.7 The fact that the violent acts were committed during a party rather than in the direct context of work was not considered a mitigating factor. This disciplinary power is part of the employer's obligation to ensure a violence-free workplace. This obligation has gained in importance since the recent addition to the Act respecting occupational health and safety8 of the employer's obligation to “take the measures to ensure the protection of a worker exposed to physical or psychological violence, including spousal, family or sexual violence, in the workplace”.9 In another case, the arbitrator concluded that the employer could not discipline an employee for acts committed at a Christmas party organized and entirely financed by the employees and which took place outside the workplace.10 On another note, a single act of serious conduct at a Christmas party may constitute psychological harassment. A complaint for psychological harassment was upheld against an employer in a situation where the owner had touched the breast of an employee by slipping an ice cube into her sweater.11 This contact, a single gesture, was qualified by the arbitrator as serious conduct amounting to psychological harassment. The arbitrator also concluded that excessive alcohol consumption had no mitigating effect on the seriousness of the act committed. Sexual comments, forced touching and kissing by an employee during the Christmas party were also deemed to constitute psychological and sexual harassment by the courts justifying, in certain circumstances, dismissal.12 Conclusion In light of the foregoing, an employer must exercise caution and adopt measures to reduce the risks associated with the organization of Christmas parties, given that they may be held responsible for accidents or various acts or behaviour that occur during such gatherings. [1] CQLR, c. A-3.001, s. 2. [2] See in particular Fafard et Commission scolaire des Trois-Lacs, 2014 QCCLP 6156; Battram et Québec (Ministère de la Justice), 2007 QCCLP 4450. [3] See in particular Environnement Canada et Lévesque, 2001 CanLII 46818 (QCCLP), par. 35-39; Desjardins et EMD Construction inc., 2007 QCCLP 496. [4] Boivin et Centre communautaire juridique de l'Estrie, 2011 QCCLP 2645 [. [5] Roy-Bélanger et Ressources Globales Aéro inc., 2021 QCTAT 1739 [Quebec’s Tribunal administratif du travail]. [6] Teamsters Québec, section locale 1999 et Univar Canada ltée (Jean-Martin Gobeil), 2020 QCTA 344 (L. Viau). [7] Travailleurs et travailleuses unis de l'alimentation et du commerce, section locale 500 (TUAC-FTQ) et Royal Vézina inc. (St-Hubert) (Hicham Alaoui), 2017 QCTA 304 (F. Lamy). [8] CQLR, c. S-2.1. [9] Act respecting occupational health and safety, CQLR, s. 2.1, a. 51, par. 1 (16). This obligation was added pursuant to the Act to modernize the occupational health and safety regime (2021, c. 27, a. 139), [10] Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec et Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec (Joffrey Lemieux), 2021 QCTA 439 (C. Roy). [11] S.H. et Compagnie A, 2007 QCCRT 0348, D.T.E. 2007T-722 (T.A.) (F. Giroux). [12] Pelletier et Sécuritas Canada ltée, 2004 QCCRT 0554 (M. Marchand).  

In the decision in 9058-4004 Québec inc. c. 9337-9907 Québec inc.1 rendered on October 21, 2022, the court granted compensation to a subcontractor for its extrajudicial fees further to a general contractor’s unfounded contestation of its claim as part of a hypothecary action. The facts In May 2019, Portes de garage Citadelle Ltée (“Citadelle”) and general contractor 9337-9907 Québec inc. (“AllConstructions”) concluded a contract for the provision of services and materials needed to install unloading docks in a building under construction. On May 16, 2019, notice of the contract was given to the building owner, 9058-4004 Québec inc. (“Transport Pouliot”). The first two phases of Citadelle’s work were completed between June and August 2019. In late September 2019, AllConstructions allegedly vacated the worksite after a dispute with Transport Pouliot. The third phase of Citadelle’s work was completed in October 2019. On November 25, 2019, Citadelle sent a statement of account to AllConstructions and registered a legal hypothec on the building two days later. On December 23, 2019, after registering a prior notice of the exercise of a hypothecary right, AllConstructions brought a hypothecary action against Transport Pouliot in the Superior Court, claiming the sums it was owed. For its part, Citadelle brought a hypothecary action against the owner, Transport Pouliot, and instituted legal proceedings against AllConstructions in April 2020. It is important to note that during the proceedings, AllConstructions admitted that it had received payment from Transport Pouliot for the sums invoiced by Citadelle. To justify its refusal to pay its subcontractor Citadelle, AllConstructions argued summarily that the services and materials provided were inadequate and did not meet standards. Despite its weak position and the lack of compelling evidence, AllConstructions maintained its argument. Citadelle had no choice but to pursue its legal proceedings and apply to have AllConstructions’ action declared abusive in order to recover its extrajudicial fees. AllConstructions’ abuse of procedure Citadelle claimed that AllConstructions’ defence was unfounded, frivolous and intended to delay. AllConstructions only had testimonial evidence to support its allegations, and it failed to file any expert opinions or exhibits. The contract did not contain a “pay when paid” clause, and AllConstructions admitted in the proceedings that it had received payment from Transport Pouliot for the sums invoiced by Citadelle. AllConstructions claimed that it had serious arguments to make in response to the application to have its action declared abusive. It stated that the work performed by Citadelle was inadequate and that the materials and services provided were not up to standards. It maintained its position, despite the fact that it had vacated the worksite a month before Citadelle’s work was completed and, therefore, could not have verified the actual quality of the work performed. In March 2022, AllConstructions ultimately abandoned its contestation of Citadelle’s claim a few days before the trial and nearly a year and a half after the proceedings began. The judge allowed Citadelle’s application to have AllConstructions’ action declared abusive. AllConstructions’ defence was unfounded, frivolous and intended to delay. It had no solid factual or legal basis. The allegation that Citadelle failed to comply with standards in the performance of its contract is mere speculation, as AllConstructions left the worksite in September 2019. Citadelle incurred unnecessary extrajudicial fees as a result of AllConstructions’ unfounded contestation of its claim. The judge awarded Citadelle a sum of $9,000.00 as compensation for the legal fees that it had paid. What it means A general contractor that cannot justify a deduction from its subcontractor’s claims after the work is completed but does so anyway risks having its contestation declared abusive. Jurisprudence has established that abuse of procedure may consist of légèreté blâmable [blameworthy conduct]2 or témérité [recklessness] resulting from allegations that do not stand up to careful analysis or are exaggerated beyond the scope of the dispute between the parties.3 A manifestly unfounded action is a civil fault that may be subject to legal proceedings and sanctions in accordance with article 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure.4 A party that considers itself the victim of abusive proceedings may, in addition to applying to have the proceedings declared abusive, claim the reimbursement of reasonable legal fees it has paid.5 This is precisely what Citadelle did and what it obtained. AllConstructions irresponsibly managed its dispute with its subcontractor. It made arguments based only on unverified assumptions, even though the evidence set out in the application was relatively solid and complete. As a victim of abuse of procedure, Citadelle was granted a reimbursement of its legal fees in addition to the sums that it was owed by AllConstructions. Court file No. 760-22-011912-204 Royal Lepage commercial inc. c. 109650 Canada ltd., 2007 QCCA 915 El-Hachem c. Décary, 2012 QCCA 2071 2741-8854 Québec inc. c. Restaurant King Ouest, 2018 QCCA 1807 (CanLII) Only extrajudicial fees deemed reasonable are reimbursed in full. The factors considered in establishing a total reasonable amount are summarized in paragraph 32 of the case at hand and are cited from Groupe Van Houtte inc. c. Développements industriels et commerciaux de Montréal inc., 2010 QCCA 1970, and Iris Le Groupe visuel (1990) inc. c. 9105-1862 Québec inc., 2021 QCCA 1208

In Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Entertainment Software Association1 (the “SOCAN Decision”), the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the obligation to pay a royalty for making a work available to the public on a server, where it can later be streamed or downloaded. At the same time, it clarified the applicable standard of review for appeals where administrative bodies and courts share concurrent first instance jurisdiction and revisited the purpose of the Copyright Act2and its interpretation in light of the WIPO Copyright Treaty3. The Supreme Court also took the opportunity to reiterate the importance of the principle of technological neutrality in the application and interpretation of the Copyright Act. This reminder can also be applied to other artistic mediums and is very timely in a context where the digital visual arts market is experiencing a significant boom with the production and sale of non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”). In 2012, Canadian legislators amended the Copyright Act by adopting the Copyright Modernization Act4. These amendments incorporate Canada’s obligations under the Treaty into Canadian law by harmonizing the legal framework of Canada’s copyright laws with international rules on new and emerging technologies. The CMA introduced three sections related to “making [a work] available,” including section 2.4(1.1) of the CMA. This section applies to original works and clarifies section 3(1)(f), which gives authors the exclusive right to “communicate a work  to the public by telecommunication”: 2.4(1.1) Copyright Act. “For the purposes of this Act, communication of a work or other subject-matter to the public by telecommunication includes making it available to the public by telecommunication in a way that allows a member of the public to have access to it from a place and at a time individually chosen by that member of the public.” Before the CMA came into force, the Supreme Court also found that downloading a musical work from the Internet was not a communication by telecommunication within the meaning of section 3(1)(f) of the CMA5, while streaming was covered by this section.6 Following the coming into force of the CMA, the Copyright Board of Canada (the “Board”) received submissions regarding the application of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act. The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (“SOCAN”) argued, among other things, that section 2.42.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act required users to pay royalties when a work was published on the Internet, making no distinction between downloading, streaming and cases where works are published but never transmitted. The consequence of SOCAN’s position was that a royalty had to be paid each time a work was made available to the public, whether it was downloaded or streamed. For each download, a reproduction royalty also had to be paid, while for each stream, an additional performance royalty had to be paid. Judicial history The Board’s Decision7 The Board accepted SOCAN’s interpretation that making a work available to the public is a “communication”. According to this interpretation, two royalties are due when a work is published online. Firstly,  when the work is made available to the public online, and secondly, when it is streamed or downloaded. The Board’s Decision was largely based on its interpretation of Section 8 of the Treaty, according to which the act of making a work available requires separate protection by Member States and constitutes a separately compensable activity. Federal Court of Appeal’s Decision8 Entertainment Software Association, Apple Inc. and their Canadian subsidiaries (the “Broadcasters”) appealed the Board’s Decision before the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”). Relying on the reasonableness standard, the FCA overturned the Board’s Decision, affirming that a royalty is due only when the work is made available to the public on a server, not when a work is later streamed. The FCA also highlighted the uncertainty surrounding the applicable review standard in appeals following Vavilov9 in cases where administrative bodies and courts share concurrent first instance jurisdiction. SOCAN Decision The Supreme Court dismissed SOCAN’s appeal seeking the reinstatement of the Board’s Decision. Appellate standards of review The Supreme Court recognized that there are rare and exceptional circumstances that create a sixth category of issues to which the standard of correctness applies, namely concurrent first instance jurisdiction between courts and administrative bodies. Does section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act entitle the holder of a copyright to the payment of a second royalty for each download or stream after the publication of a work on a server, making it publicly accessible? The copyright interests provided by section 3(1) of the Copyright Act The Supreme Court began its analysis by considering the three copyright interests protected by the Copyright Act, or in other words, namely the rights provided for in section 3(1): to produce or reproduce a work in any material form whatsoever; to perform the work in public; to publish an unpublished work. These three copyright interestsare distinct and a single activity can only engaged one of them. For example, the performance of a work is considered impermanent, allowing the author to retain greater control over their work than reproduction. Thus, “when an activity allows a user to experience a work for a limited period of time, the author’s performance right is engaged. A reproduction, by contrast, gives a user a durable copy of a work”.10 The Supreme Court also emphasized that an activity not involving one of the three copyright interests under section 3(1) of the Copyright Act or the author’s moral rights is not protected by the Copyright Act. Accordingly, no royalties should be paid in connection with such an activity. The Court reiterated its previous view that downloading a work and streaming a work are distinct protected activities, more precisely  downloading is considered reproduction, while streaming is considered performance. It also pointed out that downloading is not a communication under section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act, and that making a work available on a server is not a compensable activity distinct from the three copyright interests.11 Purpose of the Copyright Act and the principle of technological neutrality The Supreme Court criticized the Board’s Decision, opining that it violates the principle of technological neutrality, in particular by requiring users to pay additional fees to access online works. The purpose of the CMA was to “ensure that [the Copyright Act] remains technologically neutral”12 and thereby show, at the same time, Canada’s adherence to the principle of technological neutrality. The principle of technological neutrality is further explained by the Supreme Court: [63] The principle of technological neutrality holds that, absent parliamentary intent to the contrary, the Copyright Act should not be interpreted in a way that either favours or discriminates against any form of technology: CBC, at para. 66. Distributing functionally equivalent works through old or new technology should engage the same copyright interests: Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326, at para. 43; CBC, at para. 72. For example, purchasing an album online should engage the same copyright interests, and attract the same quantum of royalties, as purchasing an album in a bricks-and-mortar store since these methods of purchasing the copyrighted works are functionally equivalent. What matters is what the user receives, not how the user receives it: ESA, at paras. 5-6 and 9; Rogers, at para. 29. In its summary to the CMA, which precedes the preamble, Parliament signalled its support for technological neutrality, by stating that the amendments were intended to “ensure that [the Copyright Act] remains technologically neutral”. According to the Supreme Court, the principle of technological neutrality must be observed in the light of the purpose of the Copyright Act, which does not exist solely for the protection of authors’ rights. Rather, the Act seeks to strike a balance between the rights of users and the rights of authors by facilitating the dissemination of artistic and intellectual works aiming to enrich society and inspire other creators. As a result, “[w]hat matters is what the user receives, not how the user receives it.”13 Thus, whether the reproduction or dissemination of the work takes place online or offline, the same copyright applies and leads to the same royalties. What is the correct interpretation of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act? Section 8 of the Treaty The Supreme Court reiterated that international treaties are relevant at the context stage of the statutory interpretation exercise and they can be considered without textual ambiguity in the statute.14 Moreover, wherethe text permits, it must be interpreted so as to comply with Canada’s treaty obligations, in accordance with the presumption of conformity, which states that a treaty cannot override clear legislative intent.15 The Court concluded that section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act was intended to implement Canada’s obligations under Section 8 of the Treaty, and that the Treaty must therefore be taken into account in interpreting section 2.4(1.1) of the Act. Although Section 8 of the Treaty gives authors the right to control making works available to the public, it does not create a new and protected “making available” right that would be separately compensable. In such cases, there are no “distinct communications” or in other words, “distinct performances”.16 Section 8 of the Treaty creates only two obligations: “protect on demand transmissions; and give authors the right to control when and how their work is made available for downloading or streaming.”17 Canada has the freedom to choose how these two objectives are implemented in the Copyright Act, either through the right of distribution, the right of communication to the public, the combination of these rights, or a new right.18 The Supreme Court concluded that the Copyright Act gives effect to the obligations arising from Section 8 of the Treaty through a combination of the performance, reproduction, and authorization rights provided for in section 3(1) of the Copyright Act, and by respecting the principle of technological neutrality.19 Which interpretation of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act should be followed? The purpose of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act is to clarify the communication right in section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act by emphasizing its application to on-demand streaming. A single on-demand stream to a member of the public thus constitutes a “communication to the public” within the meaning of section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act.20 Section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act states that a work is performed as soon as it is made available for on-demand streaming.21 Therefore, streaming is only a continuation of the performance of the work, which starts when the work is made available. Only one royalty should be collected in connection with this right: [100] This interpretation does not require treating the act of making the work available as a separate performance from the work’s subsequent transmission as a stream. The work is performed as soon as it is made available for on-demand streaming. At this point, a royalty is payable. If a user later experiences this performance by streaming the work, they are experiencing an already ongoing performance, not starting a new one. No separate royalty is payable at that point. The “act of ‘communication to the public’ in the form of ‘making available’ is completed by merely making a work available for on?demand transmission. If then the work is actually transmitted in that way, it does not mean that two acts are carried out: ‘making available’ and ‘communication to the public’. The entire act thus carried out will be regarded as communication to the public”: Ficsor, at p. 508. In other words, the making available of a stream and a stream by a user are both protected as a single performance — a single communication to the public. In summary, the Supreme Court stated and clarified the following in the SOCAN Decision: Section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act does not cover download of a work. Making a work available on a server and streaming the work both involve the same copyright interest to the performance of the work. As a result, only one royalty must be paid when a work is uploaded to a server and streamed. This interpretation of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act is consistent with Canada’s international obligations for copyright protection. In cases of concurrent first instance jurisdiction between courts and administrative bodies, the standard of correctness should be applied. As artificial intelligence works of art increase in amount and as a new market for digital visual art emerges, driven by the public’s attraction for the NFT exchanges, the principle of technological neutrality is becoming crucial for understanding the copyrights attached to these new digital objects and their related transactions. Fortunately, the issues surrounding digital music and its sharing and streaming have paved the way for rethinking copyright in a digital context. It should also be noted that in decentralized and unregulated digital NFT markets, intellectual property rights currently provide the only framework that is really respected by some market platforms and may call for some degree of intervention on the part of the market platforms’ owners. 2022 SCC 30. R.S.C. (1985), c. C-42 (hereinafter the “Copyright Act”). Can. T.S. 2014 No. 20, (hereinafter the “Treaty”). S.C. 2012, c. 20 (hereinafter the “CMA”). Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34. Rogers Communications Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35. Copyright Board of Canada, 2017 CanLII 152886 (hereinafter the “Board’s Decision”). Federal Court of Appeal, 2020 FCA 100 (hereinafter the “FCA’s Decision”). Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. SOCAN Decision, par. 56. Ibid, para. 59. CMA, Preamble. SOCAN Decision, para. 70, emphasis added by the SCC. Ibid, paras. 44-45. Ibid, paras. 46-48. Ibid, paras. 74-75. Ibid, para. 88. Ibid, para. 90. Ibid, paras. 101 and 108. Ibid, paras. 91-94. Ibid, paras. 95 and 99-100.

Employers subject to the personalized rate or retrospective rate regime know how important it is to control the costs related to occupational injury cases in order to limit the impact on their annual premiums. One way to attain this objective is to apply for a transfer of costs under section 326 of the Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases. Indeed, the CNESST may, “on its own initiative or on the application of an employer, impute the cost of benefits payable by reason of an industrial accident to the employers of one, several or all units if the imputation under the first paragraph would have the effect of causing an employer to support unduly the cost of benefits due by reason of an industrial accident imputable to a third person or unduly burdening an employer.” Traditionally, in cases involving the undue burdening of an employer, the CNESST would not process applications for transfers of costs under section 326 as long as the end date of the transfer period remained unknown. This could be detrimental to an employer’s cash flow, especially if the application remained unprocessed and the situation continued to exist over several months, even worse, for years. The recent Corporation d’Urgences-santé1 decision could, in certain circumstances, provide employers with a tool to convince the CNESST to render decisions without an end date for the transfer period. In this file, where Lavery Lawyers represented the employer, the worker could not be temporarily assigned to light duties because of his caregiver status. At the time of the hearing, the employee was still acting as a caregiver and the Tribunal was not in a position to know when the impediment might end. When asked to rule on its jurisdiction and powers, the Tribunal accepted our proposal that the transfer be granted, but that it remains the CNESST’s responsibility to determine the end date of the transfer period. The tribunal ruled that such date ultimately corresponds to the date on which the worker ceases to be incapable of undergoing temporary light-duty assignment due to his caregiver status.   Thus, in its decision, the Tribunal recognizes the employer’s right to benefit from a transfer of costs since January 1, 2022, as a result of the employee’s caregiver status. This allows the employer to reduce immediately its financial burden up and until the CNESST renders a decision to establish the date of the occurrence of the event giving rise to the end of the transfer. This is the first decision to be rendered on the issue. It opens the door to a number of possibilities, including requiring the CNESST to make a ruling on a cost transfer application before the full transfer period can be determined. However, this type of application with the CNESST will require case-by-case analysis, as certain conditions must be met for the application to be admissible.  If you are dealing with a similar situation requiring special attention, do not hesitate to contact a member of our labour law department specializing in workers’ compensation matters. They will be able to assist you with any questions relating to the management of these cases, whether or not they are the object of litigation. 2022 QCTAT 4634

On June 23, 2022, Bill C-19 received Royal Assent. The bill was introduced by the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and resulted in amendments to the Copyright Act1 that will come into force on December 30, 2022, further to an order in council issued earlier this week. Bill C-19, or An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on April 7, 2022, and other measures, was tabled on April 28, 2022, by the federal government following the release of the 2022 budget. This bill essentially follows up on the commitments the government made in its annual budget. In the 2022 budget, the federal government said it wanted to make changes to the Copyright Act. It announced a legislative amendment to meet its obligation under the Canada-United-States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) to extend the general term of copyright protection from 50 years to 70 years after the death of the author. Like the United States and Mexico, Canada has committed to a copyright protection term that is not less than the life of the author, plus 70 years following the natural person’s death.   Section 6 of the Copyright Act currently stipulates that copyright protection lasts for the author’s lifetime and an additional 50 years after their death. The section will now read as follows: Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Act, the term for which copyright subsists is the life of the author, the remainder of the calendar year in which the author dies, and a period of 70 years following the end of that calendar year. [emphasis added]. The term of copyright is also extended to 70 years after the death of the author or the last surviving co-author in the case of posthumous works and collaborations. Finally, Bill C-19 clarifies that legislative amendments to the Copyright Act do not reactivate copyrights that expired before the effective date of the amendments. [1] RSC 1985, c C-42.

While the Canadian government has said it intends to pass legislation dealing with cybersecurity (see Bill C-26 to enact the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act), many companies have already taken significant steps to protect their IT infrastructure. However, the Internet of Things is too often overlooked in this process. This is in spite of the fact that many devices are directly connected to the most important IT infrastructure for businesses. Industrial robots, devices that control production equipment in factories, and devices that help drivers make deliveries are just a few examples of vulnerable equipment. Operating systems and a range of applications are installed on these devices, and the basic operations of many businesses and the security of personal information depend on the security of the devices and their software. For example: An attack could target the manufacturing equipment control systems on the factory floor and result in an interruption of the company’s production and significant recovery costs and production delays. By targeting production equipment and industrial robots, an attacker could steal the blueprints and manufacturing parameters for various processes, which could jeopardize a company’s trade secrets. Barcode scanners used for package delivery could be infected and transmit information to hackers, including personal information. The non-profit Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) has released a list of the top ten security risks for the Internet of Things.1 Leaders of companies that use this kind of equipment must be aware of these issues and take measures to manage these risks. We would like to comment on some of the risks which require appropriate policies and good company governance to mitigate them. Weak or unchangeable passwords: Some devices are sold with common or weak initial passwords. It is important to ensure that passwords are changed as soon as devices are set up and to keep tight control over them. Only designated IT personnel should know the passwords for configuring these devices. You should also avoid acquiring equipment that does not allow for password management (for example, a device with an unchangeable password). Lack of updates: The Internet of Things often relies on computers with operating systems that are not updated during their lifetime. As a result, some devices are vulnerable because they use operating systems and software with known vulnerabilities. Good governance includes ensuring that such devices are updated and acquiring only devices that make it easy to perform regular updates. Poor management of the fleet of connected devices: Some companies do not have a clear picture of the Internet of Things deployed in their company. It is crucial to have an inventory of these devices with their role in the company, the type of information they contain and the parameters that are essential to their security. Lack of physical security: Wherever possible, access to these devices should be protected. Too often, devices are left unattended in places where they are accessible to the public. Clear guidelines should be provided to employees to ensure safe practices, especially for equipment that is used on the road. A company’s board of directors plays a key role in cybersecurity. In fact, the failure of directors to monitor risks and to ensure that an adequate system of controls is in place can expose them to liability. Here are some elements of good governance that companies should consider practising: Review the composition of the board of directors and the skills matrix to ensure that the team has the required skills. Provide training to all board members to develop their cyber vigilance and equip them to fulfill their duties as directors. Assess cybersecurity risks, including those associated with connected devices, and establish ways to mitigate those risks. The Act to modernize legislative provisions respecting the protection of personal information sets out a number of obligations for the board of directors, including appointing a person in charge of the protection of personal information, having a management plan and maintaining a register of confidentiality incidents. For more information, you can read the following bulletin: Amendments to Privacy Laws: What Businesses Need to Know (lavery.ca) Lastly, a company must at all times ensure that the supplier credentials, passwords and authorizations that make it possible for IT staff to respond are not in the hands of a single person or supplier. This would put the company in a vulnerable position if the relationship with that person or supplier were to deteriorate. See OWASP top 10