Master Policies and Insurance Certificates: Beware of Discrepancies

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M’abonner

September 24, 2026

Chambers 2027: Lavery's expertise recognized

We are pleased to announce that Lavery has once again been recognized in the 2027 edition of Chambers in the following sectors: Energy and Natural Resources: Mining Law (Nationwide – Canada, Band 3) Insurance: Dispute Resolution (Nationwide – Canada, Band 5) Intellectual Property (Nationwide – Canada, Band 4) Corporate and Commercial Law (Québec, Band 3) Labour and Employment Law (Québec, Band 2) These recognitions are further demonstration of the expertise and quality of legal services that characterize Lavery's professionals. Nine lawyers have been recognized as leaders in their respective areas of practice in the 2027 edition of the Chambers Global guide. Areas of expertise in which they are recognized: Myriam Brixi – Dispute Resolution; Class Actions: Defence (Nationwide – Canada, Up and Coming) Brittany Carson – Labour and Employment (Québec, Up and Coming) Nicolas Gagnon – Construction (Nationwide – Canada, Band 2) Richard Gaudreault – Labour and Employment (Québec, Band 4) Édith Jacques – Commercial Law (Québec, Band 5) Marie-Hélène Jolicoeur – Labour and Employment (Québec, Band 4) Béatrice Ngatcha – Intellectual Property (Nationwide – Canada, Band 4) Martin Pichette – Insurance: Dispute Resolution (Nationwide – Canada, Band 3) Camille Rioux – Labour and Employment (Québec, Associates to Watch) About Chambers Since 1990, Chambers and Partners' ranks the best law firms and lawyers across 200 jurisdictions throughout the world. The lawyers and law firms profiled in Chambers are selected following through a rigorous process of research and interviews with a broad spectrum of lawyers and their clients. The final selection is based on clearly defined criteria such as the quality of client service, legal expertise, and commercial astuteness. About Lavery Lavery is the leading independent law firm in Québec. Its more than 200 professionals, based in Montréal, Québec City, Sherbrooke and Trois-Rivières, work every day to offer a full range of legal services to organizations doing business in Québec. Recognized by the most prestigious legal directories, Lavery professionals are at the heart of what is happening in the business world and are actively involved in their communities. The firm's expertise is frequently sought after by numerous national and international partners to provide support in cases under Québec jurisdiction.

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October 5, 2026

Cybersecurity and post-quantum cryptography: burying your head in the sand in a quantum world

The cryptographic mechanisms that currently secure digital transactions, communications and signatures may become vulnerable with the advent of sufficiently powerful quantum computers. For businesses, the issue is no longer merely technological: it also affects governance, contracts, information protection and migration planning. Understanding post-quantum cryptography Imagine spending an entire week without transmitting sensitive information over the internet—no banking, no checking health records and no shopping online. Everyday transactions rely in particular on cryptographic mechanisms that: protect the confidentiality and integrity of information; authenticate individuals and systems; and secure digital signatures. However, the advent of sufficiently powerful quantum computers could compromise some of these mechanisms and consequently undermine a key pillar of our current digital security. Cryptography brings together the techniques used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information, authenticate individuals and systems and secure digital signatures. It plays a role in particular when a browser displays a padlock icon, someone electronically signs a document or a company transmits confidential data. Many of these mechanisms rely on public-key cryptography, which uses a pair of mathematically linked keys: a public key and a private key. These keys derive their security from mathematical problems that would take conventional computers an astronomical amount of time to solve. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer, however, could solve some of these problems in virtually no time. As a result, widely used mechanisms, such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, will no longer offer adequate protection. The immediate nature of the quantum threat Currently, only prototype quantum computers exist, and it is still difficult to predict exactly when they will become commercially viable or when major corporations and nation-states will use them. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security nonetheless estimates that a quantum computer capable of posing a threat to current mechanisms could emerge as early as 2030, while acknowledging the uncertainty surrounding this timeline.1 In August 2024, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology released its first three standards establishing cryptographic algorithms capable of withstanding this threat.2 For organizations, the issue is therefore not merely knowing when the threat will materialize, but determining what steps to take today to keep their information and systems secure into the future. Post-quantum cryptography refers to methods designed to resist attacks from both conventional computers and future quantum computers. From a mathematical standpoint, resistant algorithms exist, but many IT systems have yet to adopt them. The threat of “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” The most pressing threat can be summed up by the phrase “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later.” A threat actor can intercept and store encrypted data today, then attempt to decrypt it once sufficient quantum capacity becomes available. Information that retains its value or sensitivity over several years, such as trade secrets, financial data, strategic information and privileged communications, is therefore at the greatest risk.3 The level of urgency depends on each organization's specific technological infrastructure. Key considerations include how long information must remain confidential and the time required to replace vulnerable mechanisms. According to Canadian best practices in the field, some systems have product lifetimes of 15 to 30 years, and a cryptographic migration can itself take several years.4 An organization can therefore fall behind long before a cryptographically relevant quantum computer ever reaches the market. Why businesses rely on their suppliers for the transition Most organizations do not develop replacement cryptographic solutions themselves. Instead, they rely on their software, cloud service, hardware, certificate and cybersecurity vendors. Such reliance does not make planning pointless—on the contrary. It shifts the focus toward governance, procurement and contracts. When it comes to contracts, organizations must assess these risks right now, particularly the allocation of liability between the contracting parties. Ideally, technology service contracts should specify whether the provider or the client bears the risks associated with using technologies that fall short on quantum security. Achieving balanced risk allocation requires open dialogue: Client organizations must ask the right questions and technology providers must be transparent about the limits of their systems. The federal government has begun its transition to post-quantum cryptography The federal government is no longer treating post-quantum cryptography as just a research topic. In June 2025, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security published a roadmap to migrate the Government of Canada’s unclassified systems. Among other milestones, the document establishes an initial departmental plan and a first progress report starting in April 2026, the migration of high-priority systems by the end of 2031, and the migration of all other relevant systems by the end of 2035.5 A Security Policy Implementation Notice, which took effect in October 2025, reinforces these requirements and compels relevant federal institutions to demonstrate measurable progress.6 While these milestones do not apply directly to private businesses, they can still indirectly affect federal contractors. Since April 1, 2026, in-scope federal contracts with a digital component must incorporate clauses that support post-quantum cryptography and cryptographic agility, among other requirements.7 Federal directives make clear that orderly migration requires governance, inventories, prioritization, financial planning, procurement policies and coordination with vendors. Moreover, the post-quantum transition is by no means confined to the federal government. In September 2026, Canada joined a call to action from the G7 Cyber Security Working Group urging public and private organizations to adopt a phased, risk-based transition. Canadian guidelines likewise recommend that organizations begin preparing before large-scale solutions are rolled out.8 Legal implications for Quebec businesses No Quebec statute expressly requires private businesses to use any specific post-quantum algorithm or complete a migration according to the federal timeline. Instead, Quebec law establishes functional and technologically neutral obligations, which require the adequacy of the selected measures to be assessed in context. Protection of personal information and reasonable security measures The Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector requires businesses to take reasonable security measures, taking into account, in particular, the sensitivity, purpose, quantity and distribution of the information and the medium on which it is stored. It also mandates a privacy impact assessment for projects to acquire, develop or overhaul information systems or electronic service delivery systems that process personal information.9 For an organization that retains sensitive information with a lifespan of several years, such as banking information or Social Insurance Numbers, the quantum threat may become a material factor when assessing whether existing security measures are reasonable. Document integrity and confidentiality of transmissions The Act to establish a legal framework for information technology follows the same approach, requiring in particular that the integrity of a document be maintained throughout its life cycle. For instance, where the information contained in a document is declared by law to be confidential, section 34 requires that it be protected by means appropriate to the mode of transmission.10 Documentation explaining the mode of transmission and the measures taken to protect confidentiality must also be readily available to prove compliance. Rather than mandating specific technologies, the law sets outcome-based obligations, in particular safeguarding document integrity and information confidentiality. Civil liability and the state of knowledge As Quebec legal scholars emphasize, security measures only matter in the eyes of the law if they actually work.11 Accordingly, official publications and technical standards—while not giving rise to a civil obligation on their own—can help establish the state of knowledge, the foreseeability of the risk and recognized industry practices.12 An organization’s liability regarding its data protection obligations must be assessed according to the general rules of civil liability.13Liability would turn primarily on whether the organization acted with prudence and diligence at the relevant time, taking into account: the knowledge available at the time; the sensitivity of the protected information; the lifespan of its systems; and the availability of alternative solutions. Using a cryptographic mechanism that could soon become vulnerable may constitute a civil fault in light of current knowledge. Connected devices and reasonable security expectations Similar considerations could apply to manufacturers, distributors and suppliers of connected devices. Under the Civil Code of Québec, factors include the safety that a person is normally entitled to expect and the state of knowledge at the time the item was manufactured, distributed or supplied. Given these criteria, a product’s reasonably expected capacity to receive security updates could form part of the circumstances weighed when assessing a potential safety defect.14 Practical steps for businesses to prepare now Preparing does not call for an immediate overhaul of all existing mechanisms. Rather, it requires developing cryptographic agility—the ability to identify and replace cryptographic mechanisms without having to rebuild the underlying systems from scratch. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security recommends a number of practical measures in particular:15 Inventory cryptographic assets. The inventory should cover internal and client-facing systems, certificates, authentication mechanisms, digital signatures, network equipment and cloud services. Special attention should be paid to legacy, custom-built or hard-to-update systems. Establish priorities. Organizations should identify information that must remain confidential over the long term and systems whose modification or replacement will require several years. Engage vendors. Organizations should obtain their vendors’ post-quantum roadmaps to determine whether the transition can be completed through updates or if it will require acquiring new products. Applicable standards, support lifecycles and impacts on interoperability should also be verified. Align contracts and procurement. New agreements could include, as appropriate, terms governing security updates, end-of-support notifications, the adoption of standardized mechanisms, cooperation during migration and the allocation of associated costs. Not all organizations face the same level of exposure. However, immediate attention is warranted where a business retains sensitive information over multiple years, operates systems that are difficult to replace or relies on vendors whose migration roadmaps remain unknown. While vendors will likely deliver the technical solutions, each organization must understand its own requirements, ask the right questions and ensure it remains agile enough to adopt these solutions when the time comes. Key takeaways: The quantum threat is already here, even if quantum computers capable of breaking certain cryptographic mechanisms are not yet widely available. The primary threat is “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later.”Data encrypted today can be intercepted, stored and decrypted in the future. The most exposed organizations are those that retain sensitive information over many years, operate systems that are difficult to replace or rely on vendors whose migration strategies are uncertain. In Quebec, there is no general obligation mandating any specific post-quantum algorithm, but businesses are bound to adopt reasonable security measures, assessed in context and in light of the state of knowledge. Preparation starts with cryptographic agility: inventorying assets and uses, prioritizing critical systems, engaging vendors and adapting contracts. CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY, “Preparing your organization for the quantum threat to cryptography (ITSAP.00.017),” February 2025, online: https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/preparing-your-organization-quantum-threat-cryptography-itsap00017 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, “NIST Releases First 3 Finalized Post-Quantum Encryption Standards,” August 13, 2024, online: https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY, supra, note 1. CANADIAN FORUM FOR DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE and CANADIAN NATIONAL QUANTUM READINESS WORKING GROUP, Canadian National Quantum-Readiness Best Practices and Guidelines, Version 04, July 10, 2024, pp. 3–7, online: https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/spectrum-management-telecommunications/sites/default/files/documents/Quantum-Readiness%20Best%20Practices%20-%20v04%20-%2010%20July%202024.pdf. CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY, Roadmap for the migration to post-quantum cryptography for the Government of Canada (ITSM.40.001), June 23, 2025, p. 13, online: https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/roadmap-migration-post-quantum-cryptography-government-canada-itsm40001. TREASURY BOARD OF CANADA SECRETARIAT, Migrating the Government of Canada to Post-Quantum Cryptography: Security Policy Implementation Notice, effective since October 9, 2025, online: https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/policies-standards/spin/migrating-government-canada-post-quantum-cryptography.html. TREASURY BOARD OF CANADA SECRETARIAT, supra, note 6, s. 6.3.1. CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY, “G7 Cybersecurity Working Group call to action on preparing for the post-quantum era,” September 3, 2026, online: https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/news-events/g7-cybersecurity-working-group-call-action-preparing-post-quantum-era?; CANADIAN FORUM FOR DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE and CANADIAN NATIONAL QUANTUM READINESS WORKING GROUP, supra, note 4, ss. 3–5. Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector, CQLR c. P-39.1, ss. 3.3 and 10. Act to establish a legal framework for information technology, CQLR, c. C-1.1, ss. 6 and 34. Éric LABBÉ, “L’efficacité technique comme critère juridique ou la manière dont les lois se technicisent,” (2004) 9-2 Lex Electronica. Éric LABBÉ, “La multiplicité des normes encadrant le contrat électronique : l’influence de la technologie sur la production des normes,” (2004) 9-2 Lex Electronica; Charles-Étienne DANIEL, “Coder son propre droit : quand la machine pousse l’humain à énoncer de nouvelles normes de gouvernance,” dans Quand la société fait son droit : la gouvernance de proximité en action, 2026, EYB2026QSD19, pp. 397–432. Civil Code of Québec, CQLR, c. CCQ-1991, s. 1457; Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector, supra, note 9, s. 10. Civil Code of Québec, supra, note 13, arts. 1468, 1469 and 1473. CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY, supra, note 1; CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY, Guidance on becoming cryptographically agile (ITSAP.40.018), May 2022, online: https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/guidance-becoming-cryptographically-agile-itsap40018.

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September 25, 2026

The provincial election: Employers, are you ready for election day?

On October 5, a provincial election will be held in Quebec. In view of this election day, we think a reminder of employers’ obligations under the Election Act1 may be appropriate. 1. Time off for voting On election day, an employer must ensure that their employees who are eligible to vote have a period of four (4) consecutive hours to go and vote during polling station opening hours, i.e., between 9:30 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.2 This period does not include the time normally allotted for meals.3 Under the Election Act, an employee is eligible to vote if they have attained 18 years of age, are a Canadian citizen, have been domiciled in Quebec for at least six (6) months, are not disqualified from voting due to a tutorship order, and are not disqualified from voting under certain other laws.4 If an employee’s normal working hours do not allow them to have this four (4) hour period, the employer must grant them the required leave. The employer has the right to determine the time of day when this leave is granted.5 Due to the employer’s management rights, the employer can modify employees’ working hours so that they have the time required to go and vote. However, the Election Act stipulates that no deduction may be made from employees’ wages. Furthermore, the employer cannot penalize employees for their absence from work during this leave.6 Note that management rights do not allow an employer to force an employee to vote in advance. Conversely, if an employee’s shift ends before 4 p.m. or begins after 1:30 p.m., the employee already has the minimum time required to vote and the employer therefore has no additional obligation toward that employee. Furthermore, it should be noted that an employee can explicitly waive their leave to exercise their right to vote, even partially.7 2. Election officiers If an employee who is a member of the election staff (an election officer) makes a written request for leave from work to allow them to perform their duties, the Election Act obliges the employer to grant this request. This leave is unpaid.8 3. Penalties The Election Act provides that an employee who believes they have been the victim of a violation of their right to four hours to vote may file a complaint with the Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (CNESST), in the same way as an employee who believes they have been the victim of a practice prohibited under the Act respecting labour standards9could do.10 The Election Act also provides for criminal sentences in the event of a violation. For example, an employer who does not allow an employee four consecutive hours to vote is liable to a fine of $5,000 to $30,000 for a first offence, and $20,000 to $60,000 for a repeat offence within ten years.11 The same penalties apply to an employer who does not allow an employee who is an election officer to be absent from work to perform their duties. They also apply to any employer who “uses his authority or his influence to incite any of his employees to refuse to become an election officer or to abandon that office after having accepted it.”12 If you have any questions, feel free to reach out to our Labour and Employment Law group. Election Act, CQLR, c. E-3.3 (the “Act”). Id., s. 333 and s. 335, par. 1. [3]Id., s. 335, par. 1. Id., s. 1. Id., s. 335, par. 2. Id., s. 335, par. 3. https://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/en/understand/understanding-voting/four-hours-to-vote/ Election Act, s. 144. Act respecting labour standards, CQLR, c. N-1.1. Election Act, s. 335, par. 4. Id., s. 556. Id.

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September 23, 2026

How to collect a debt without obtaining a judgment: Out-of-court forced execution in Quebec

Since September 1, 2026, out-of-court forced execution has, in certain cases, made it possible to collect a monetary claim in Quebec without first obtaining a judgment on the merits, provided that there is a notarial act en minute containing a clause to that effect and that the obligation in question is determined or determinable, exigible, and not excluded by law or regulation. What is out-of-court forced execution? Out-of-court forced execution is a mechanism designed to facilitate the collection of certain claims by allowing, when a notarial act exists, for the execution of certain specified monetary obligations without first having to obtain a judgment on the merits. This new mechanism, which has been in effect since September 1, 2026, promotes access to justice and helps reduce the time and costs associated with such proceedings. Out-of-court forced execution is not automatic; it must be specifically provided for in a notarial act and must relate to a clear, liquid, and exigible monetary obligation. The basis of out-of-court forced execution: Notarial acts en minute Access to this mechanism is contingent upon the inclusion, in a notarial act en minute, of a clause that complies with the requirements of the Regulation respecting the forced execution of the payment of a claim resulting from the non-performance of an obligation recorded in a notarial act, setting forth the terms and conditions for accessing out-of-court forced execution. The notary plays a crucial role, not only as a drafter but also as a public official bound by a duty to provide impartial and personalized advice, ensuring the parties’ free and informed consent. With this in mind, the automatic inclusion of a dispute resolution clause simply through the use of non-customizable templates should be avoided: the clause must reflect an informed choice that has been explained and accepted by both parties. Collaboration between the notary and the various professionals involved is therefore crucial, given the need to discuss with both parties whether it is appropriate to include such a clause. Since this provision must be agreed upon by both parties, it is important to fully understand how such a mechanism works, and to tailor the advice provided to the nature of the undertaking. Greater caution is warranted when obligations are reciprocal (with the parties alternately acting as creditors and debtors), or when the contractual mechanism may lead to the monetization of an obligation that was originally in kind, which can increase uncertainty and encourage contestation. In general, caution is also warranted when obligations are future, conditional, complex, or subject to interpretation. As for the requirements, the clause setting forth the terms and conditions for accessing out-of-court forced execution must, first and foremost, be included in the body of the notarial act en minute (and not in an appendix or an external clause). Next, the monetary obligation in question must be determined or determinable. The professional must also ensure that the monetary obligation does not fall into an excluded category by law or under the Regulation respecting the forced execution of the payment of a claim resulting from the non-performance of an obligation recorded in a notarial act. The excluded categories include, as applicable: Non-monetary obligations; Certain obligations secured by a hypothec, and those subject to another method of execution; Situations involving consumer protection; Obligations subject to arbitration; Certain obligations involving the State; and Others. The parties may also contractually exclude certain monetary obligations, provided that such exclusions are clearly stated. How does out-of-court forced execution work? Once the parties have agreed to include an out-of-court forced execution access clause, the decision to use out-of-court forced execution rests with the creditor, and the debtor may not object (section 3, Regulation respecting the forced execution of the payment of a claim resulting from the non-performance of an obligation recorded in a notarial act). The creditor may also choose another method of execution provided for in the act. However, if the notarial act requires mediation to resolve a dispute, the creditor must first comply with that requirement before using out-of-court forced execution. The debtor’s three options within the 30-day period Subsequently, a payment order is prepared by the creditor in accordance with the mandatory requirements set forth in the regulation. The payment order and related documents are then served on the debtor, which formalizes the default and triggers the strict 30-day period granted to the debtor to remedy the default. Before this deadline expires, the debtor has three options: They may pay the claim in full, which will result in the termination of the out-of-court forced execution mechanism. They may enter into a payment agreement, with or without the assistance of the bailiff, thereby suspending the out-of-court forced execution mechanism, with the possibility of reinstatement in the event of default. They may contest the payment order in the appropriate court, which also has the effect of suspending the out-of-court forced execution mechanism. However, the contestation must be served on the creditor and the bailiff, and the supporting documents must be filed within ten days of the contestation. What happens if there is no payment, no agreement, and no contestation? In the absence of full payment, and in the absence of an agreement or a contestation, the bailiff may, upon expiration of the deadline, proceed with the execution of the payment order, which, under these circumstances, acquires the enforceable status of a judgment (section 9, Regulation respecting the forced execution of the payment of a claim resulting from the non-performance of an obligation recorded in a notarial act) and all of the effects thereof. The effects associated with out-of-court forced execution are significant. An uncontested payment order carries a prescription period equivalent to that of a judgment—that is, ten years—and allows for the registration of a legal hypothec and the resulting seizures, while maintaining its rank in the collocation of creditors. The creditor remains, however, an ordinary creditor and is subject to the applicable priority rules with respect to ranking. Advantages and limitations of out-of-court forced execution for the creditor and the debtor For the creditor, out-of-court forced execution can offer greater predictability when the debt is clear, quick access to execution without having to go through the courts, and a significant reduction in collection costs. The mechanism is also advantageous because of the effects associated with an uncontested payment order. However, out-of-court forced execution has certain limitations. It should be noted that this mechanism is strictly limited to monetary obligations. If a dispute arises, it may be suspended or delayed, in which case legal action may become a possible outcome. For the debtor, out-of-court forced execution includes some valuable protections. At the time the act is signed, the debtor receives guidance from the notary to ensure that their consent is freely given and informed. This mechanism can prevent immediate legal proceedings and allows the debtor to contest the payment order within the 30-day period granted to them. Conclusion Out-of-court forced execution is a tool accessible through a notarial act en minute. It is an effective, quick, and cost-efficient process that has the potential to prevent litigation if the required conditions are met. Thus, this new measure is based on the existence of a valid notarial act en minute and determined or determinable monetary obligations that are not excluded. It is also based on strict compliance with the formalities of payment orders. At a time when it is desirable to develop solutions to facilitate better access to justice, this alternative could help alleviate the backlog in the judicial system. It will be interesting to closely monitor the implementation and future use of out-of-court forced execution, keeping in mind that it all begins with a notarial act en minute. Takeaways 1. Out-of-court forced execution does not apply to all claims. It pertains to certain monetary obligations set forth in a notarial act en minute containing a valid access clause. 2. This mechanism allows the creditor to take action without a prior judgment on the merits. After a payment order is served, the debtor has 30 days to pay, reach a settlement, or contest the order. 3. An uncontested payment order may have effects comparable to those of a judgment. In particular, it may become enforceable, trigger a 10-year prescription period, and allow for certain collection measures, subject to the applicable rules.

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September 21, 2026

Bill C-8: A new federal cyber security framework for telecommunications and critical cyber systems

Bill C-8 received royal assent on June 15, 2026. It deserves special attention. The bill marks a shift in our approach to cyber security, giving the federal government the means to respond quickly when a threat is identified. It also requires certain parties to comply with higher standards, and imposes real penalties for noncompliance. The legislation is structured around two main areas. The first strengthens the Telecommunications Act by empowering the Governor in Council and the Minister of Industry to impose specific measures through Orders in Council and Ministerial Orders. The second establishes the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (the “CCSPA”), targeting vital systems and services. With these legislative changes, cyber security is emerging from the shadows—it is becoming a matter of governance and compliance. And with the adoption of this Act, technology decisions, supplier management, and responses to cyber security incidents will need to be more robust, better regulated, and duly documented. We believe that organizations that are proactive in preparing their governance and evidence practices, as well as their contingency plans, will be more agile and more credible in the eyes of their clients and partners. That said, an important distinction must be made from the outset: the amendments to the Telecommunications Act set forth in Part 1 are now in force, whereas the CCSPA, as provided for in Part 2, will come into force following one or more Orders in Council. To date, Schedule 2 of the CCSPA, which is meant to identify the classes of designated operators and their corresponding regulatory bodies, remains blank. Key takeaways at a glance - Bill C-8 introduces: (i) the authority to issue telecommunications orders (that is, Orders in Council and Ministerial Orders); (ii) guidelines for a mandatory program for certain critical cyber systems, subject to the CCSPA coming into force and future designations; and (iii) strengthened enforcement in terms of information exchange, audits, administrative monetary penalties, and violations. Part 1 of the Act – Telecommunications: Security becomes the driving force for action Bill C-8 explicitly enshrines security in Canada’s telecommunications policy by adding the objective of “the promotion of the security of the Canadian telecommunications system.” It provides the legal basis for measures that are now designed to be direct, swift, and enforceable. An important element of the Act, both for its application and for defining the nature of the threats it addresses, is the clarification that “interference with or manipulation, disruption or degradation of a telecommunications system include actions of a technical nature that impede the operation of the telecommunications system but do not include the e?ect of lawful expression, persuasion or political debate.” The text thus expressly provides room for freedom of expression and lawful public debate. Part 1 of the Act includes a two-tier enforcement mechanism: Orders in Council and Ministerial Orders (issued by the Minister of Industry). Orders in Council The Governor in Council may issue an Order in Council if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the measure is necessary to secure the system against a threat, and that it is reasonable in relation to the gravity of that threat. Specifically, the order may: Prohibit telecommunications service providers (”TSPs”) from using the products and services provided by a specified person in, or in relation to, their networks or facilities; or Order the removal of products supplied by a specified person. Bill C-8 imposes a proportionality requirement: the scope and content must be necessary and reasonable in view of the gravity of the threat. The Order in Council takes precedence over any conflicting decisions, orders, or authorizations, including those under the Radiocommunication Act. Furthermore, the government does not bear the economic cost—no compensation is payable for financial losses attributable to the Order in Council. This is, in a sense, the “heavy artillery” of the Act. The Order in Council may also include a prohibition against disclosing its existence or all or part of its content. Before imposing such a prohibition, the Governor in Council must, in particular, consider the extent to which disclosure could undermine the objective of the order, the necessity of the prohibition in light of the nature of the threat, the possibility of limiting its scope, its impact on the transparency and accountability of the Government of Canada, and any representations made by the affected TSPs. Before issuing the order, the Governor in Council must also consider the measure’s operational impact on the affected TSPs, its financial implications, its effect on the provision of telecommunications services in Canada—including the confidentiality and security of telecommunications—as well as its potential impacts on Canadians’ privacy. Ministerial Orders The Minister of Industry may, by Ministerial Order, impose highly operational measures when they are necessary and reasonable in view of a threat. The order may, in particular: Prohibit the use of specific products or services, order the disposal of personal information, and impose conditions on the use and provision of services; Prohibit or force TSPs to terminate service agreements; Require review processes for networks, facilities, and procurement plans; Require security plans, vulnerability assessments, and mitigation measures; Require the implementation of standards; Require a backup system; Prohibit TSPs from providing services to a specified person; Order the suspension of the provision of services to a specified person for a specified period; Prohibit certain upgrades; or Order TSPs to do or refrain from doing any specified act, subject to the limitations provided for by the Act. As with Orders in Council, the minister must consider the operational and financial impacts, the effect on the provision of services—including the confidentiality and security of telecommunications—and the potential implications for the privacy of Canadians. The minister may not order the interception of a private communication or a radio-based telephone communication, nor the decryption of an encrypted private communication. The Ministerial Order also comes with a provision stating that no compensation will be paid. The Act also sets forth a specific limitation: the suspension of service to an individual may be ordered only if the order is necessary to secure the Canadian telecommunications system against a threat of a technical nature specified in the order. Like an Order in Council, a Ministerial Order may include a prohibition on disclosure. Before imposing such a prohibition, the minister must consider comparable factors, including the impact of non-disclosure on the principles of transparency and accountability of the Government of Canada. Specifics regarding the publication of orders In principle, Orders in Council and Ministerial Orders must be published in the Canada Gazette within 90 days of their issuance, but the minister making the order may specify in the text itself that it need not be published. In addition, incorporation by reference facilitates the integration of technical documents that are subject to change. We can therefore expect this process to adopt international technical standards. Collection of information by the minister Bill C-8 provides that the minister may require the disclosure of information if they have reasonable grounds to believe that it is both reasonable for the information to be provided in view of the gravity of the threat and that it is necessary. However, a confidentiality framework is in place for the information provided, particularly when it involves trade secrets or financial, commercial, scientific, or technical information. Personal information and de-identified information are also subject to protective measures. The text also provides for the exchange of information among various federal authorities, as well as with the provinces, foreign countries, or certain international organizations under written agreements. The scope and content of personal or de-identified information must be reasonable in view of the gravity of the threat. The Act also provides for the disposal of personal or de-identified information when it is no longer needed. It should also be noted that personal and de-identified information are deemed to be confidential information for the purposes of Part 1, even if they have not been expressly designated as such. Part 2 of the Act – The Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA) It is important to note that this part of the Act will not take effect until the date or dates set by Order in Council. Furthermore, its actual applicability will depend on future designations, since Schedule 2 is currently blank. The framework has therefore been adopted, but it has yet to be implemented. Key concepts: What the Act actually aims to achieve The CCSPA applies to critical cyber systems as strictly defined by the text, that is, a cyber system that, if its confidentiality, integrity or availability were compromised, could affect the continuity or security of a vital service or vital system. The definition of “cyber system” is intentionally broad. In practice, the Act is therefore not limited to a “network” in the traditional sense; it can encompass platforms, cloud environments, control systems, digital services, and interconnected technical assets, provided that if they were compromised, it could affect a vital service or system. The version of the text that has been assented to also adds the definition of “internal audit”, which is an independent and objective review conducted in accordance with internationally recognized guidance on professional internal auditing practices. This reinforces the idea that the expected compliance goes beyond simply adopting internal policies and, where necessary, requires structured assurance mechanisms. How organizations are designated A “designated” operator that controls, operates, or owns a critical cyber system is required to comply with the provisions of the CCSPA and its regulations pertaining to that cyber system. How are operators designated? First, “vital services” and “vital systems” are those listed in Schedule 1, namely: telecommunications services, interprovincial or international pipeline and power line systems, nuclear energy systems, transportation systems that are within the legislative authority of Parliament, banking systems, and clearing and settlement systems. By Order in Council, items may be modified, or added to or removed from this schedule within the scope of authority provided for by the Act. Second, the Act includes a schedule—which is currently blank—that allows for the establishment of classes of operators and regulatory bodies responsible for these vital services or systems. In practice, compliance depends on both the vital service or system in question (Schedule 1) and the operator class in which the organization is classified (Schedule 2). Cyber security programs: The foundational requirement At the heart of the CCSPA is the requirement to develop a cyber security program. After being designated through an amendment to Schedule 2, an operator must establish, within 90 days, a program relating to its critical cyber systems. This program must include measures, in accordance with the regulations, to identify and manage organizational risks (including supply chains and the use of third-party products and services), protect critical cyber systems, detect incidents and minimize their consequences, as well as any other measures required by the regulations. The program is therefore not merely a policy—it must cover the entire risk management cycle and be amenable to a “compliance” review. This will force organizations and companies to respond quickly when such a designation is made. The Act also imposes a monitoring mechanism: once the program is established, the operator must notify the relevant regulatory body in writing. The Act also requires that any such program be updated periodically. Lastly, reporting requirements apply when significant changes occur, including changes to ownership or control, supply chains, and the use of third parties. This approach transforms cyber security into a governance and maintenance requirement, rather than a one-time project. Supply chains and third parties: From assessment to mitigation The CCSPA explicitly emphasizes supply chains. Once the risks related to supply chains and third parties have been identified in the program (paragraph 9(1)(a)), the designated operator is required to mitigate them (section 15). The verb is important: it is not enough simply to “observe” or “monitor”; the law requires an active mitigation effort, which must be demonstrable. The Communications Security Establishment (the “CSE”) may develop guidelines on mitigating risks associated with supply chains and the use of third-party products and services, drawing on internationally recognized frameworks. The appropriate regulator may also provide the CSE with information—including confidential information—regarding the program or the measures taken, so that the CSE can provide advice, guidance, and services in accordance with its mandate. For organizations, this signals a convergence between regulatory requirements and technical expectations: managing suppliers, access, updates, software dependencies, and subcontractors is becoming a core component of compliance. Incident reporting: A requirement for speed and coordination The CCSPA establishes a requirement to report cyber security incidents to the CSE. Every designated operator must report any cyber security incident involving one of its critical cyber security systems within the prescribed time limits, which may not exceed 72 hours. The definition of “cyber security incident” covers an incident (including an act, omission, or circumstance) that interferes or may interfere with the continuity or security of a vital service or system, or the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a critical cyber system. After filing a report with the CSE, the operator must, without delay, notify the appropriate regulatory body and provide it with a copy of the incident report. The text specifies that these obligations do not diminish the obligations arising from the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. Cyber security guidelines: The mandatory response tool The CCSPA provides for a particularly intrusive measure: cyber security directions. By Order in Council, the government may direct any designated operator or class of operators to comply with any measure set out in the direction for the purpose of protecting a critical cyber system, but only if it has reasonable grounds to believe that the direction is necessary. Before issuing the order, the government must consider the operational impacts, public safety, privacy protection, financial impacts, and the impacts on the provision of vital services and systems. The scope and content must be reasonable in relation to the protection objective, and the operator in question is required to comply. The law also sets out two explicit limitations: the Governor in Council may not order the decryption of an encrypted private communication or the interception of a private communication or a radio-based telephone communication. In addition, a safeguard related to awareness has been put in place: an operator cannot be found guilty of contravening the direction unless they were notified of it or reasonable steps were taken to inform them of it. However, it will be important for an operator not to ignore the notifications received, even if they sometimes seem minor. The operator in question may not disclose the existence or content of a direction except to the extent necessary to comply with it. This requirement has a significant practical impact: it mandates the implementation of a “need-to-know” policy both internally and with respect to suppliers, subcontractors, insurers, and other partners. Information: Confidentiality, sharing, and removal of personal information The CCSPA establishes a comprehensive information-sharing framework, in particular to support the making, amending or revoking of directions. For purposes related to the making, amending or revoking of a direction, certain entities may collect and share information—including confidential information—with one another. The law also regulates the disclosure and use of confidential information and provides for exceptions, particularly when disclosure is required by law or necessary to protect vital services, systems, or cyber systems. “Provable” compliance The CCSPA requires the maintenance of records covering program implementation, reported incidents, steps taken to mitigate third-party risks, compliance with directions, and any other matters specified by the regulations. These documents must be kept in Canada in accordance with the terms and conditions prescribed by the regulations or, in the absence thereof, by the appropriate regulator. This requirement is central: it transforms compliance into a burden of proof. The regulatory framework provides for broad audit and enforcement powers, which are exercised by different authorities—the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, the Minister of Industry through inspectors, the Bank of Canada, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, the Canadian Energy Regulator, and the Minister of Transport—depending on the sector. The provisions governing access to premises, the examination of cyber security systems, and the reproduction and temporary seizure of documents and systems are detailed in the CCSPA. Mechanisms for internal audits and compliance orders are in place, depending on the authority. The law prohibits obstruction and the provision of false or misleading information, which underscores the importance of the quality of the information provided. The version of the text that has been assented to also adds an explicit provision: the CCSPA does not infringe upon solicitor-client privilege or the professional secrecy of lawyers or notaries. Watch out for penalties! It should be noted that the law provides for substantial administrative penalties, as well as criminal offences (including imprisonment). Executives and directors may be considered co-perpetrators of a violation or offence, as the case may be. Ongoing violations can be counted on a day-by-day basis. Under Part 2 of the Act, administrative penalties may reach $500,000 for an individual and $15,000,000 in other cases. Furthermore, certain violations constitute criminal offences that are punishable, in some cases, either through charges or summary proceedings. Depending on the nature of the violation and whether the offender is an individual, imprisonment may be possible. How we can assist you in implementing Bill C-8 In particular, we can assist you with the following: Regulatory positioning Mapping your exposure (in terms of telecommunications, vital services or systems, and your current or anticipated designation) and establishing a realistic roadmap, prioritized by risk Responding to the imposed measures Supporting the receipt, analysis, and implementation of Orders in Council, Ministerial Orders, or directions Compliance Establishing or strengthening governance, record-keeping, and internal processes (including requests for information, audits and inspections, and the traceability of decisions) Third parties and procurement Reviewing and negotiating contracts and security requirements (including incident reporting, cooperation, audits, subcontracting, corrections, and withdrawal/replacement) and documenting mitigation measures Incidents and enforcement Supporting incident response (including triage, notifications, and the preservation of evidence) and managing the risk of penalties and criminal liability, including for executives and directors Conclusion In practice, organizations that may be affected would be wise to start preparing now, even though Part 2 of the law is not yet in force. The practical scope of the Act will depend on the CCSPA coming into force, the adoption of implementation regulations, and the inclusion in Schedule 2 of the classes of operators concerned and their corresponding regulators. In the meantime, organizations that begin structuring their governance, documentation, and third-party management now will be better positioned to adapt quickly once the sector-specific requirements are clarified.

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