On July 30, 2025, the Regulation respecting prompt payments and the prompt settlement of disputes with regard to construction work (hereinafter the “Regulation”) was published in the Gazette officielle du Québec. Since September 8, 2025, the Regulation has been coming into force gradually,1 in response to requests from some involved the construction industry. The Regulation applies to the majority of construction contracts concluded with public bodies covered by the Act respecting contracting by public bodies (chapter C-65.1, r. 8.01) (hereinafter the “ACPB”). The Regulation aims to fix chronic payment delays in the construction industry by establishing binding standards to speed up the payment process for contractors and subcontractors involved in public contracts covered by the ACPB. It also introduces a rapid dispute resolution process. The Regulation thus complements An Act mainly to promote Québec-sourced and responsible procurement by public bodies, to reinforce the integrity regime of enterprises and to increase the powers of the Autorité des marchés publics.2 The following is a summary of some of the Regulation’s key provisions. Cases of application and exclusions The Regulation applies to all public construction contracts and subcontracts subject to the ACPB, with the following exceptions:3 contracts entered into in an emergency because of a threat to the safety of persons or property contracts entered into for the purpose of activities on foreign soil of a delegation general, a delegation or another form of representation of Québec abroad a monetary claim to compensate for a loss of profit, productivity or a business opportunity that a contractor considers it has suffered because of a change relating to the scope of the work specified in a public contract or public subcontract, or to the conditions for its performance Deadlines and schedule imposed by the Regulations The Regulation establishes a rigid payment request, refusal and payment schedule: Request for payment4 Sent by the general contractor to the public body: 1st day of the month Sent by the subcontractor to the general contractor: 25th day of the month Refusal to pay5 Sent by the general contractor to the subcontractor: 21st day of the month Sent by the public body to the general contractor: Last day of the month Payment deadline (if applicable)6 By the public body to the general contractor: Last day of the month By the general contractor to the subcontractor: 5th day of 2nd month From a subcontractor to another: 10th day of 2nd month If the subcontracting chain has more than two subcontracting levels, the payment deadline is extended by five days for each additional level. These deadlines are intended make the payment process uniform and predictable. It is possible for parties to amend their requests after they have been sent.7 Request for payment A request for payment must be in writing and contain the following information : the name and address of the contractor and the contact information of the representative of the contractor the number of the public contract a detailed description of the work carried out, the expenses incurred and any other element for which a sum of money is claimed the periods associated with elements claimed a breakdown of the total amount claimed8 If the public body requires the presentation of supporting documents with a request for payment from a contractor party to a contract, it must include such condition in the contract and specify which documents are required. The same principle applies to subcontracts between contractors and their subcontractors.9 Importantly, the public body may allow the contractor to amend the request for payment to correct any deficiency, except for requests rendered invalid by the date on which they were sent. If no question of invalidity has been raised with the contractor before the deadline to indicate a refusal to pay, the payment request will be deemed valid.10 Refusal to pay A refusal to pay must be expressed in a written notice containing the following information: the part of the total amount claimed that is refused a description of the work, expenses or elements of the request for payment to which the refusal applies the grounds for the refusal and the contractual or legal provisions on which they are based11 The refusal of a request for payment cannot be based solely on the fact that the work carried out is the result of a change to the contract and that, when the request for payment was sent, the value of the change had yet to be agreed on or determined.12 Payments and withholdings In certain circumstances, the public body may withhold any sum claimed by the contractor: A sum sufficient to cover any reservations for apparent defects or poor workmanship in the work.13 A sum sufficient to repair any damage caused by the general contractor or a subcontractor to the work.14 A sum previously paid to the general contractor for work performed by one of its subcontractors to ensure that the latter’s claims are paid by the general contractor or to enable the public body to pay these claims itself. This right to withhold exists regardless of whether the subcontractor can invoke a legal hypothec on the construction or not.15 A sum sufficient to pay the claims of persons other than the contractor’s subcontractors can invoke a construction legal hypothec on the work and who have given notice of their contract to the contractor, for work completed or the materials or services supplied after the notice was given.16 Up to 10% of the sum owed to ensure performance of the contract, provided that this possibility and its terms are stipulated in the contract. A general contractor may, in turn, withhold sums from its subcontractors, provided that a written agreement allows this and that the withholding does not exceed the withholding applied to the contractor by the public body. Each level of subcontracting can avail itself of this right, with the necessary modifications.17 All sums payable to the contractor if it has not provided all closeout documents, including the certificate issued by the CNESST in accordance with the law and final acquittances from subcontractors.18 Except in the last two cases, a general contractor may offer the public body sufficient security in lieu of the withholding, such as a bond or a letter of guarantee from a bank. In turn, the general contractor may deduct from a payment owed to one of its subcontractors an amount representing the sum claimed by that subcontractor for work, where that work has been identified in a notice of refusal issued by another debtor in the contracting chain. To avail itself of this right, the contractor must first have sent the subcontractor a copy of the notice of refusal on which it is relying.19 Subcontractors, for their part, must send the notice of deduction to their own subcontractors, if any, within two days of receiving the notice.20 In all cases, the Regulation provides for the release of the deductions applied when the conditions for release are met. Prompt dispute settlement The Regulation introduces a dispute settlement process by which the parties have recourse to a third-person decider after having attempted to settle the dispute amicably.21 Initiated by a “request for intervention,” the process is intended to be rapid, with decisions to be made within 50 days of the designation of the third-person decider.22 More specifically, this mechanism provides for the following stages and deadlines: Stages Time allowed Request for intervention 90 days after work accepted or completed* Other contracting party’s response 5 days Designation of the third-person decider 5 days Outline of claims by applicant 5 days Detailed response from other contracting party 15 days Decider’s decision 50 days from the designation date (this period may be extended for a maximum of 15 days) Payment, if any 20 days after decision rendered *    In the case of a contract between a general contractor and a public body, the request for intervention must be notified to the other contracting party no later than 90 days after the date on which the work was accepted without reservation, or, if accepted with reservation, the date on which the public body declares that it is satisfied with the repairs or corrections made to the work. In the case of a subcontract, the request for intervention must be notified no later than 90 days from the date the work the parties agreed on is completed.23 The Regulation also provides for the following: One dispute, one request for intervention – Although a request for intervention can relate to one dispute alone, a party cannot dissociate the constituting elements of the dispute in order to file multiple requests or otherwise act to abuse the right to have recourse to a third-person decider. Choice of third-person decider – Only persons whose names appear in the register kept by the Minister of Justice under the Regulation may act as third-person deciders. It is up to the party proposing a third-person decider to ensure that the person is available. In the event of disagreement, the parties draw lots. Procedure – As long as they ensure that the procedure is equitable and complies with the principle of proportionality, the third-person decider can conduct the intervention according to the procedure they determine. Also, unless the third-person decider decides otherwise, the proceedings are conducted orally, whereas testimony is given by way of a written affidavit. No lawyers – Parties cannot be represented by a lawyer during proceedings, although a lawyer may advise them. Confidentiality – The entire intervention remains confidential, subject to agreement between the parties or legal obligations. Third-person decider’s fees – As a general rule, the third-person decider’s fees are allocated equally between the parties (50-50), although the third-person decider may depart from this allocation if they consider that a party’s actions during the intervention were harmful, in particular because of abusive conduct or failure to meet deadlines. The third-person decider’s fees are capped according to the value of the dispute. Conclusion This new compulsory scheme now imposes, for cases covered, a prompt payment process and speeds up the settlement of disputes arising during the performance of the majority of public construction contracts. It will have major repercussions on the practices of contractors, subcontractors and public bodies alike. The imposition of the strict deadlines by the Regulation could require contractors and subcontractors to improve their internal processes to better process payment requests and properly document potential claims. Although the Regulation is intended to simplify and accelerate payments, some contractors and subcontractors may find it difficult to meet the imposed deadlines, especially in large-scale projects involving many stakeholders, as delays are likely to be passed on from one level of subcontractor to another. Whether this system will be successful will depend on the ability of the parties to quickly adapt to the new requirements and to make effective use of the third-person decider to resolve disputes. If you have any questions or need advice, we invite you to contact a member of our specialized construction law team at Lavery. Section 94 of the Regulation. SQ, 2022, c. 18. Sections 32 and 33 of the Regulation. Section 5 of the Regulation. Section 10 of the Regulation. Section 15 of the Regulation. Sections 7 and 8 of the Regulation. Section 5 of the Regulation. Section 6 para. 1 of the Regulation. Section 6 of the Regulation. Section 11 of the Regulation. Section 12 para. 1 of the Regulation. Section 22 of the Regulation. Section 23 of the Regulation. Section 25 of the Regulation. Section 26 of the Regulation. Section 20 of the Regulation. Section 28 of the Regulation. Section 16 of the Regulation. Section 16 of the Regulation. Sections 34 to 76 of the Regulation. Section 63 of the Regulation. Section 34 of the Regulation.

Introduction On July 11, 2024, the Court of Appeal1 rendered a decision that, for the first time, addresses the question of whether the elected domicile appearing in the Québec Enterprise Register (the “REQ”), established under the Act respecting the legal publicity of enterprises,2 can provide a basis for the Superior Court’s territorial jurisdiction within the meaning of article 41(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.3 Upholding the decision rendered by the Superior Court,4 the Court of Appeal answered that it cannot. The Facts On April 25, 2023, Promark Electronics Inc. and Electrical Components International Inc. (collectively, “Promark”) filed a claim for damages against Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. (“BRP”) in the judicial district of Montréal, alleging that a letter of agreement had been terminated and related purchase orders cancelled. On June 22, 2023, BRP raised a declinatory exception asking the court to issue an order transferring the case to the judicial district of Bedford, where its head office is located. Promark argued that filing its claim in the judicial district of Montréal was warranted because of BRP’s elected domicile indicated in the REQ, which corresponded to the office of its counsel located in Montréal. On September 5, 2023, the Honourable Tiziana Di Donato, J.S.C. (the “Judge”) allowed BRP’s declinatory exception and issued an order referring the case to the judicial district of Bedford. On November 10, 2023, the Honourable Stephen W. Hamilton, J.C.A., granted leave to appeal the Judge’s decision, indicating that the courts have never settled the question of whether the domicile elected under section 33 ALPE is sufficient to make paragraph 3 of article 41 of the C.C.P. apply. He added that it appeared to him that the lower courts had rendered contradictory judgments in this regard.5 The Trial Judgement The Judge began by pointing out that, generally, for a purely personal action, the judicial district of the defendant’s domicile is the natural forum (article 41(1) C.C.P.) and that, in the case of a corporation, the domicile would be that of its head office. The Judge further clarified this principle by explaining that, where more than one judicial district has jurisdiction, the plaintiff may institute its proceedings before another court having territorial jurisdiction (article 42 C.C.P.), provided that it establishes that it is entitled to make such an election. In support of its contestation to the declinatory exception, Promark argued that it was entitled to institute the proceedings in the judicial district of Montréal because BRP had elected its domicile under the ALPE, and that, consequently, that district constituted an “elected domicile” under article 41(3) C.C.P., which reads as follows: So far as public order permits, the court of the defendant’s elected domicile, or the court designated by an agreement between the parties other than a contract adhesion, also has territorial jurisdiction. [Our emphasis] To render her decision, the Judge determined that article 41(3) C.C.Q. should be interpreted using modern rules of statutory interpretation, adding in particular that it is useful to refer to prior provisions of a law to ascertain the legislature’s intent. The Judge thus revisited the legislative history of article 41 C.C.P., affirming that it essentially restates the prior law, in particular article 68 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR c. C-25, which provided in paragraph 1, subparagraph 1 that “. . . a purely personal action may be instituted: (1) [b]efore the court of the defendant’s real domicile or, in the cases contemplated by article 83 of the Civil Code, before that of his elected domicile.” Although paragraph 3 of article 41 C.C.P. no longer specifically refers to article 83 of the Civil Code of Québec (the “C.C.Q.”)6 the Judge, following an interpretive analysis, found that said article still applies to determine whether a party has elected domicile, and stressed the fact that the election of domicile must be express and unequivocal. The Judge added that election of domicile is the exception and must be interpreted restrictively.  As for the scope of an election of domicile under the ALPE, the Judge pointed out that subsection 33(1) ALPE indicates that a business may elect domicile and appoint a person to “receive documents for the purposes of this Act.” Article 98(5) ALPE also indicates that the domicile elected by a business under the ALPE is intended to inform third parties of the address where the business wishes to receive documents “for the purposes of this Act.” The Judge was thus of the opinion that sections 33(1) and 98(5) ALPE, as drafted, cannot have the scope that Promark seeks to ascribe to them, as they are clear and they do not need to be interpreted. In the case of an election of domicile under the ALPE, the purpose of the election is to provide an address where documents can be sent to the business, unless there is specific evidence to the contrary. For these reasons, the Judge allowed the declinatory exception and referred the case to the judicial district of Bedford. The Judgement on Appeal From the outset, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Judge did not commit a reviewable error: (1) the domicile elected for purposes of attributing territorial jurisdiction under article 41 (3) C.C.P. is the domicile designated by the parties for the execution of their agreement within the meaning of article 83 C.C.Q., and (2) the domicile elected under the ALPE is elected for the purposes of applying the ALPE (para. 23). The Court of Appeal is of the opinion that the Judge’s decision is consistent with what the legislature had prescribed in article 68 of the former Code of Civil Procedure and upholds stability in the law, which is particularly important in matters of jurisdiction. After analyzing the parliamentary debates surrounding the enactment of article 41 C.C.P. and the Commentaires de la ministre de la justice, the Court indicated that there is a presumption of the survival of the existing legal rule and that, contrary to what the appellants claimed, the wording of article 41 C.C.P. and articles 33 and 98 ALPE do not give the courts territorial jurisdiction other than that of the defendant’s domicile. The removal of the reference to article 83 C.C.Q. in article 41 C.C.P. does not constitute a clear indication of the legislature’s intent to set aside the requirements of article 83 C.C.Q., under which, for the purposes of determining territorial jurisdiction, the parties must establish the elected domicile in their agreement. On that basis, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs and confirmed the Judge’s reasoning that territorial jurisdiction of the courts under article 41(3) C.C.P. is established based on the election of domicile made under article 83 C.C.Q., and not on the election of domicile made by a corporation under the ALPE, whereby a business elects a domicile for the purposes of the application of that law. Conclusion This case serves as a reminder that the C.C.Q. establishes the general law in our province. It is therefore important to refer to it when interpreting other laws enacted by the Quebec legislature. Because the legislature is “deemed to know its legislative fabric as well as the existing law,”7 the Court cannot interpret a given law—such as the ALPE—in a way that would amend a substantive statutory provision of general application—in this case, the C.C.Q.—where there is no clearly expressed intention to that effect. Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2024 QCCA 906 CQLR, c. P-44.1 (the “ALPE”) CQLR, c. C-25.01 (the “C.C.P.”) Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2023 QCCS 3405 Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2023 QCCA 1427, para. 8 83. “The parties to a juridical act may, in writing, elect domicile with a view to the execution of the act or the exercise of the rights arising from it. Election of domicile is not presumed.” Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2024 QCCA 906, para. 24

Introduction On June 14, 2024, the Superior Court of Québec issued a decision1 interpreting section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, which came into force in 2019. This provision gives a person interested in participating in the awarding process the opportunity to file a preliminary complaint about a requirement in the tender documents that they believe does not ensure the honest and fair treatment of tenderers. To our knowledge, this is the first time a court has considered the impact on a claim for damages for loss of profits2 when an unsuccessful tenderer fails to comply with this relatively new provision  The Superior Court concluded that a tenderer’s failure to submit a complaint in a timely manner should be considered as [translation] “a form of fin de non-recevoir, or at the very least, a break in the chain of causation between the alleged fault and the damages claimed” (paragraph 40). Facts The dispute at hand pitted Transport Martin Forget Inc. (“Transport Forget”) against the Municipality of Saint-Alexis (the “Municipality”). On May 6, 2019, the Municipality issued a call for tenders for a snow clearing and salting contract. Transport Forget submitted the lowest bid, which was $150,000 below that of the winning tenderer. Transport Forget was excluded from the call for tenders given its failure to comply with the tender specifications requiring it to provide a Régie du bâtiment du Québec (“RBQ”) licence number, together with an attestation that its licence was in good standing. Further to the Municipality’s refusal to award the contract to Transport Forget, it claimed $300,000 in damages for alleged loss of profits. Transport Forget believed that its tender was compliant, that the RBQ licence requirement imposed by the Municipality was frivolous and unreasonable, that the Municipality failed to uphold the principle of equal treatment of tenderers and that the complaint process provided for in section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec did not deprive it of its rights. As for the Municipality, it considered the irregularity in Transport Forget’s tender to be major and Transport Forget’s failure to comply with the complaint process concerning this requirement—both reasonable and in the public interest—was fatal to its legal action. The evidence showed that the RBQ licence number provided in Transport Forget’s tender was invalid and that Transport Forget deliberately chose not to renew said licence before submitting its tender, as it was unsure as to whether it would win the bidding process and wished to avoid needlessly paying the $1,000 annual fee required for the licence renewal. Applicable principles In order to determine the outcome of this dispute, the Court analyzed the case based on the decision in Tapitec,3 a landmark ruling in tendering matters. It reiterated the Court’s view that the decisive factor in determining whether an irregularity is minor or major is the equal treatment of tenderers. It also pointed out that municipalities can set out conditions aimed at limiting the number of tenderers, provided that this is done for an important and legitimate purpose. As for section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, the Court viewed it as a mechanism for monitoring all contracts awarded by public bodies which is designed to establish a process to ensure compliance with the principles of integrity needed to protect the public interest. According to the Court, the legislator’s intention is also to protect small municipalities such as the one in question (with a population of approximately 1,500) from potential legal action following the opening of tenders by ensuring that issues concerning the principle of equal treatment of tenderers are resolved prior to the tendering process. Tenderers that fail to comply with this requirement will not be entitled to claim damages for loss of profits, as in this case, except where there has been fraud or blatant bad faith, as in cases of collusion. The purpose of the provision in question is to prevent a tenderer that is aware of the requirements set out in the tender documents from contesting such requirements after the fact. Decision The Court found that the requirement to hold an RBQ licence number was a condition intended to limit the number of tenderers, which the Municipality was entitled to do. Although the Court recognized that there is no correlation between being able to perform snow clearing operations and holding an RBQ licence, it accepted the evidence that this condition was an appropriate and quick way for the Municipality to ascertain the credibility and organizational skills of tenderers, which was a important and legitimate objective. The Court therefore concluded that this requirement of the tender specifications was neither frivolous nor arbitrary. The Court considered the irregularity in Transport Forget’s tender to be major. Although the obligation to hold a valid RBQ licence is neither a requirement of public policy nor a substantive requirement, it is intended precisely to proscribe the lack of seriousness shown by Transport Forget when it opted not to pay the renewal fees for its RBQ licence before submitting its tender. The Municipality exercised its administrative discretion in a reasonable manner and ensured that all tenderers were treated equally. The Court found that the Municipality was right to reject Transport Forget’s tender. Although the Court dismissed the claim, it did nevertheless consider section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec. In the Court’s view, Transport Forget could have lodged a preliminary complaint about the validity of the condition imposed by the Municipality to hold an RBQ licence. Doing so would have given the Municipality the opportunity to amend its call for tenders before the opening of tenders. Transport Forget’s failure to do this rendered its claim for damages inadmissible. Commentary Tenderers for public calls for tenders issued by a municipality must be aware of section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec4 and understand how to apply it in a timely manner. As demonstrated by the Superior Court’s interpretation of this section in the judgment in question, an unsuccessful tenderer that has not complied with the complaint process set out in said section and who intends to sue for damages for an alleged loss of profits could have their claim turned down on grounds of a fin de non-recevoir. Transport Martin Forget Inc. c. Municipalité de Saint-Alexis, 2024 QCCS 2208 We came across the decision in Sintra inc. c. Municipalité de Noyan, 2019 QCCS 4293 (CanLII), which also deals with this provision, but in the context of an application for an interim injunction from the lowest tenderer attempting to prevent the awarding of the contract to a third party: the Court dismissed the claim, in particular because the tenderer had not lodged a complaint about the process provided for the awarding of the contract, in accordance with section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, and concluded that the prima facie case requirement had not been met. Tapitec c. Ville de Blainville 2017 QCCA 317 We would also like to draw your attention to section 573.3.1.4 of the Cities and Towns Act, which is identical to section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec. We have not found any decisions interpreting this section, so we urge tenderers to be cautious and comply with the complaint process applicable to calls for tenders issued by cities and towns, to avoid having their claim turned down on grounds of a fin de non-recevoir.

The year 2018 has been an important one for case law regarding injunctions: the Supreme Court of Canada and the Court of Appeal of Quebec each rendered decisions that redefined certain parameters for the issuing of a interlocutory injunction. R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. On February 9, 2018, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a unanimous decision in R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.1 The most significant aspect of this decision is that the Court redefines the serious issue to be tried criterion when it comes to a mandatory interlocutory injunction, which is an injunction that orders the defendant to do something, as opposed to a prohibitive injunction, which orders the defendant to refrain from doing something. An accused was found guilty of first degree murder of a minor, following which the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (“CBC”) published information on its website that revealed the identity of the victim. A ban prohibiting the publishing, broadcasting, or transmission in any way of any information that could identify the victim was ordered under section 486.4(2.2) of the Criminal Code, at the Crown’s request. CBC refused to remove the information from its website, and the Crown filed an application to have CBC declared guilty of criminal contempt and to obtain an interlocutory injunction ordering the removal of the information from CBC’s website. The first judge dismissed the Crown’s application, concluding that it had not met its burden with regard to the criteria for obtaining a mandatory interlocutory injunction. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted the injunction. The Supreme Court explains that, when it comes to mandatory interlocutory injunctions, the applicant must demonstrate more than the serious issue to be tried, as established by the decision RJR—MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General).2 The threshold to be applied is a “strong prima facie case,” which requires the applicant to establish “[...] a strong likelihood on the law and the evidence presented that, at trial, the applicant will be ultimately successful in proving the allegations set out in the originating notice”.3 The two other criteria for issuing an interlocutory injunction (irreparable harm and balance of convenience) remain the same. The Court specifies that the modified test only applies to mandatory interlocutory injunctions, explaining that an interlocutory injunction framed in prohibitive language may nevertheless require the defendant to take positive action. For example, ordering that CBC stop transmitting the information that established the identity of the victim would require positive action on the part of CBC, that is, to take measures to remove the information from its website. The Court emphasizes the importance of looking past the form and the wording used, in order to determine the real essence of the order sought. Pointing out the discretionary nature of the decision to issue an interlocutory injunction and the duty of deference with regard to intervention on the part of appeal courts, the Court allows the appeal and restores the decision of the chambers judge, concluding that the Crown had not demonstrated a strong prima facie case of criminal contempt. In fact, since section 486.4(2.2) of the Criminal Code could be reasonably interpreted as only prohibiting publications transmitted after the publication ban, the Crown could not establish that it had a strong likelihood to succeed at trial. Groupe CRH Canada inc. c. Beauregard          On June 21, 2018, the Court of Appeal rendered a decision in Groupe CRH Canada inc. c. Beauregard,4 which will surely often be cited, since it redefines the relationship that exists between the three criteria for the issuance of an interlocutory injunction. The respondents, waterfront residents near Chemin de la Butte-aux-Renards (the “Road”), commenced legal proceedings to seek an interlocutory and permanent injunction and damages to stop truck traffic on the Road. The Road was the only access road that enables trucks to obtain supplies from the stone quarry operated by the appellant CRH Canada Group Inc. (“CRH”), and from manufacturing facilities for products related to asphalting, which belonged to the appellant Bau-Val Inc. (“Bau-Val”). The impleaded party, KPH Turcot, was awarded the design-build contract for the Turcot project and would receive its supplies from the CRH quarry, which led to increased traffic on the Road since the spring of 2016. The Superior Court issued an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the operation of trucks in the evenings and at night (from 5:30 p.m. to 6:29 a.m.), limiting the operation of trucks on weekends to three Saturdays per year, and restricting the operation of trucks during the day. Among the grounds of appeal raised, the appellants claimed that the chambers judge did not consider the balance of convenience after having concluded that the respondents met the prima facie case criterion. First, the Court clarifies the fact that there is no true distinction to make between determining if there is a serious issue to be tried and a prima facie case: it is essentially sufficient for the application to be neither frivolous nor vexatious. It should be noted that the Court does not refer to the decision R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. decision rendered a few months earlier, which redefined this criterion for mandatory interlocutory injunctions. This could probably be explained by the fact that the Court of Appeal had before it an application to issue a prohibitive interlocutory injunction for which it must have been of the opinion that the new criterion established by the Supreme Court of Canada did not apply. With regard to the second criterion, the Court recalls the wording used in article 511 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which codifies interlocutory injunctions: prejudice must be serious or irreparable, which means to that an injunction can be issued even if the prejudice can be compensated monetarily, if and so long as the prejudice is “serious.” The most significant aspect of this decision is the analysis carried out by the Court with regard to the balance of convenience criterion. The Court comes to the firm conclusion that a judge who has before him an application for interlocutory injunction must analyze the balance of convenience criterion, even if the applicant demonstrates a strong prima facie case. This conclusion seems to contradict a number of precedents, including the landmark case of James Bay Development Corporation v. Chief Robert Kanatewat,5 which was to the effect that the balance of convenience should not be analyzed if the applicant demonstrates a strong prima facie case. [14]      At the interlocutory injunction stage these rights are apparently either (a) clear, or (b) doubtful, or (c) non-existent: (a) If it appears clear, at the interlocutory stage, that the Petitioners have the rights which they invoke then the interlocutory injunction should be granted if considered necessary in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 752 C.P. (b) However, if at this stage the existence of the rights invoked by the Petitioners appears doubtful then the Court should consider the balance of convenience and inconvenience in deciding whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted. (c) Finally if it appears, at the interlocutory stage, that the rights claimed are non-existent then the interlocutory injunction should be refused. The Court indicates that even if there were a violation of an objective legislative standard of public order, the criterion of the balance of convenience must still be analyzed and could be used as an argument against the application of the standard. It is clear that this change made by the Court is a major one: henceforth, the applicant is never exempt from demonstrating that the balance of convenience criterion is in the his favour, even if said applicant demonstrates a strong prima facie case. The Court provides two cases in which judges may discontinue their analyses of the prima facie case criterion: [our translation] “(a) when the applicant does not meet the preliminary condition of the  "prima facie case" or the "serious issue to be tried", such that the application may be denied for this reason; and (b) when the case is based on a pure question of law” (para. 77). Finally, the Court briefly mentions that, in Quebec, it is possible for judges to discontinue their analyses based on the prima facie case criterion for cases in which the interlocutory injunction is aimed at enforcing contractual obligations. The Court does not elaborate more on this obiter, which can be applied in Quebec, where specific performance is the default remedy for not performing a contractual obligation, and not an exception, as it is in common law. On the basis of its analysis of the balance of convenience, the Court partially allows CRH’s appeal, quashing the injunction which limited the operation of trucks during the day on weekdays. With regard to Bau-Val, as the first judge acknowledged that the traffic generated was minimal, the  injunction was quashed.  Conclusion Litigants parties must be familiar with these two decisions that redefine the criteria required for issuing an interlocutory injunction.   2018 SCC 5 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC). The Court’s reasons were delivered by the Honourable Justice Brown. para. 17 2018 QCCA 1063 (CanLII) [1975] C.A. 166