Alain Y. Dussault Partner, Lawyer and Trademark Agent

Bureau

  • Montréal

Phone number

514 397-7485

Fax

514 871-8977

Bar Admission

  • Québec, 1998

Languages

  • English
  • French

Profile

Partner | Lawyer - Trade-mark Agent

Alain Y. Dussault is a partner, lawyer and trade-mark agent in Lavery’s intellectual property group. He practices mainly in intellectual property litigation and has extensive experience in patents, trade-marks, copyrights and industrial designs litigations.

He acted in several high-profile intellectual property litigations, including multijurisdictional litigation for clients in various industries, such as: pharmaceutical, food, electronics, forest and entertainment.

He has represented prestigious clients in complex litigation before the Québec Courts, Federal Courts and the Supreme Court of Canada. He regularly advises his clients regarding the registration, the management and the protection of their intellectual property.

Alain has acquired considerable experience in anti-counterfeiting matters, including the execution of Anton Piller orders. He regularly represents several multinational companies in the field of fashion, cosmetics and consumer products.

His extensive knowledge of IP law, as well as his accessibility and his practical approach, are particularly appreciated by his clients.

Publications

  • Les recours douaniers – Le projet de loi C-8: la fin de « Canada sans frontières » en propriété intellectuelle; Développements récents en propriété intellectuelle, 2014, Éditions Yvon Blais
  • “Canada strengthens the protection of copyright and trademark rights with the enactment of new border enforcement measures”, Newsletter GGData, January 14, 2015
  • “Bill C-56 : A greater role for customs officers in combating counterfeiting”, Technology and intellectual Property Bulletin, April 2013

Distinctions

  • The Canadian Legal LEXPERT® Directory in the field of Intellectual Property, since 2019
  • The Best Lawyers in Canada in the field of Intellectual Property since 2020
Best Lawyers 2022 Lexpert 2022

Education

  • LL.B., Université de Montréal, 1997 

Boards and Professional Affiliations

  • Canadian Bar Association
  • Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC)
  • Regroupement des praticiens en marques (RPM)
  • Association des Praticiens du droit des Marques et des Modèles (APRAM)
  • Member of the Board of Directors for Les Grands Ballets Canadiens, 2010 to 2014
  • Fund-Raiser President, Musée des Maîtres et Artisans du Québec, 2004
  • College of Patent Agents and Trademark Agents (CPATA)
  1. Can an Idea, Style or Method Be Protected Under the Copyright Act?

    Ahead of the 2021 holiday season, as children dream about the toys that Santa Claus will bring them, let’s take a look back at a landmark decision that reviews what is copyrightable under the Copyright Act. As visual artist Claude Bouchard (“Bouchard”) learned from the outcome of her legal action against Ikea Canada (“Ikea”),1 the Copyright Act2 does not protect the ideas, styles or methods developed and used by artists to create their works, even if their work is exhibited in museums and marketed internationally. From 1994 to 2005, Bouchard sold in a Montreal’s Unicef store soft toys that she designed based on children’s drawings. In September 2014, Ikea held a drawing competition for children and made 10 soft toys from the winning entries, marketed as part of the “Sogoskatt” collection. A portion of the profits were donated to UNICEF. Originally, Bouchard was seeking a monetary award against UNICEF and Ikea for copying her toys, alleging that they had used, in particular, her idea, her original style and her methods. In 2018, the Superior Court ruled on the case for the first time, dismissing the legal action against UNICEF based on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations.3 UNICEF’s immunity from suits is in this case absolute since Bouchard’s legal action is directly related to the organization’s mission.4 In January 2021, Justice Patrick Buchholz of the Superior Court put an end to the dispute between Bouchard and Ikea, dismissing the legal action for infringement of Bouchard’s works based on the Copyright Act as being ill-founded, destined to fail and unreasonable, thus opening the door to its dismissal for abuse of process.5 Why was Bouchard’s infringement action ill-founded? The Court first examined the arguments put forward by Ikea to the effect that two essential elements giving rise to the infringement action6 could not be demonstrated by Bouchard: There is no evidence that Ikea had access to Bouchard’s work.7 There is no evidence that Ikea reproduced a substantial part of the plaintiff’s work. Therefore, Ikea argues that there was no infringement of the copyright of Bouchard, who was seeking a monopoly on an idea, style or method, which is not protected under the Copyright Act8 Lack of access to Bouchard’s works The Court did not accept Ikea’s first argument that there was a lack of access to Bouchard’s works. It ascertained that the proceedings were at a too preliminary stage to make a determination.9 The Honourable Justice Buchholz pointed out that section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not [our translation] “a free pass to bypass the judicial process and prematurely set aside otherwise allowable claims” when the evidence is still incomplete.10 The Court also noted the seriousness of the links between Ikea and UNICEF, which may have made access to Bouchard’s works possible and likely.11 In this context, only a hearing on the merits could have clarified the question of access to Bouchard’s works by making it possible to test, more precisely, the credibility of the witnesses at trial.12 Lack of reproduction of a substantial part of the work Bouchard alleged that the toys designed by Ikea incorporate eight essential features of her soft toy concept, namely [our translation]: Round eyes cut from non-fraying fabrics and sewn around the edges; Thinly cut linear mouths sewn into non-fraying fabrics; iii. Polyester fibre stuffing; iv. The toy is proportionate to the size of children’s hands; v. Soft toy faithful to the child’s drawing; vi. Child’s name and age on the tag; vii. Everything is solid (head, body, legs, and tail), in the same plane and stuffed; viii.  Use of textiles, plush, and the original colours of the drawings.”13 However, the Court accepted Ikea’s second argument that Ikea’s soft toys did not reproduce a substantial part of Bouchard’s work. Since Bouchard’s works and Ikea’s works did not share a resemblance, this means that a substantial part of the works was not reproduced.14 How to determine if a “substantial part” of a work has been reproduced? Under the Copyright Act, copyright, “in relation to a work, means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof”.15 The Supreme Court defined “substantial part” of the work in the Cinar decision,16 stating that it is a flexible notion to be interpreted based on the facts. The assessment is holistic and qualitative in nature. The criteria to be used by the courts to determine whether there has been a reproduction of a “substantial part” of a work are as follows: The originality of the work, which must be protected under the Copyright Act;17 The part “represents a substantial portion of the author’s skill and judgment”;18 The nature of the two works as a whole, without looking at isolated passages;19 “[T]he cumulative effect of the features copied from the work”.20 Although there are some similarities between the Bouchard and Ikea soft toys, the soft toys are completely different and do not look the same because they are designed from the drawings of different children. Bouchard even admitted that [our translation] “a toy made from a unique child’s drawing is in itself a unique toy”.21 Can the Copyright Act protect an idea, a concept or a body of work? Bouchard instead claimed that Ikea illegally reproduced her idea, concept, style or methods.22 She ultimately argued that Ikea did not copy a specific work, but instead copied her “work” in a broader sense.23 Bouchard’s arguments highlight issues that often come up in the court system and demonstrate a misunderstanding of what is protected by copyright. Copyright of an idea, concept, style or method In 2004, the Supreme Court pointed out that copyright protects the expression of ideas in a work and not the ideas themselves.24 Justice Buchholz rightly pointed out that an artist can be inspired by another artist without infringing the rights protected by the Copyright Act. He noted, for example, that if styles were protected, Monet could not have painted in the Impressionist style.25 The Court also noted that the soft toys made by Bouchard correspond to a generic style dictated by safety standards for the manufacture and sale of toys.26 Thus, the Copyright Act does not offer any protection for ideas, concepts, styles or manufacturing methods and techniques. Copyright of an artistic legacy, corpus, or collection The Court specified that the Copyright Act does not protect a body of work or an artistic legacy, but rather each individual work.27 Bouchard c. Ikea Canada, 2021 QCCS 1376. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42. Bouchard c. Ikea Canada, 2018 QCCS 2690. Idem, para. 24–25. Section 51, Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR c. C-25.01. Section 2, “infringing”, Copyright Act. Bouchard c. Ikea Canada, supra, note 1, para. 16–17. Idem, para. 15. Idem, para. 34. Idem, para. 28. Idem, para. 37–39. Idem, para. 40. Idem, para. 49. Idem, para. 55. Section 3, Copyright Act. Cinar Corporation v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73, para. 26, 35–36. Idem, para. 26. Idem. Idem, para. 35. Idem, para. 36. Bouchard c. Ikea Canada, supra, note 1, para. 53. Idem, para. 56. Idem, para. 69. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, para. 8. Idem, para. 67. Toys Regulations, SOR/2011-17, adopted under the Canada Consumer Product Safety Act, S.C. 2010, c. 21, s. 29, 31–32. Bouchard c. Ikea Canada, supra, note 1, para. 69–71.

    Read more
  2. Winkler v. Hendley: The Federal Court applies a subjective standard to the notion of “history”

    “Historical facts”1 are not protected by copyright. Referring to the Storming of the Bastille or the Battle of the Plains of Abraham will not get an author sued in Federal Court, but must these events have really happened to be considered “historical facts”? The Federal Court recently ruled on this issue in Winkler v. Hendley.2 In its decision, the Federal Court stated that if an author presents their literary work as a history book,3 as long as this assertion is plausible, the events that they describe must be treated as “historical facts” even if they are not. Therefore, the author cannot claim originality when an assessment is made of whether there has been a substantial taking of their work. Originality remains only in the selection and arrangement of the facts. Background This case deals with the following three books written about the Donnelly family, whose crimes made headlines in late 19th century Ontario: The Black Donnellys (hereinafter referred to as The Black Donnellys), a history book published in 1954 by Thomas P. Kelley (hereinafter referred to as Kelley); Vengeance of the Black Donnellys (hereinafter referred to as Vengeance), a work of fiction published in 1962 by Kelley (the same author); and  The Black Donnellys: The Outrageous Tale of Canada’s Deadliest Feud (hereinafter referred to as The Outrageous Tale), a history book published in 2004 by Nate Hendley (hereinafter referred to as Hendley). John Winkler (hereinafter referred to as Winkler), Kelley’s heir and copyright holder, accused Hendley of copying, in The Outrageous Tale, a substantial part of both The Black Donnellys and Vengeance. He argued that both works are fiction, as many of the events described in them are objectively false. Winkler claimed that Hendley repeated the same mistakes in his work. He also asserted that Hendley copied the structure, tone, theme, atmosphere and dialogue in his telling of events. For his part, Hendley admitted that he referred to both of Kelley’s literary works when writing The Outrageous Tale. However, he contended that The Black Donnellys should be considered a history book, as Kelley originally described and presented it as such. Given that “historical facts” are not protected by the Copyright Act4 (the “Act”), Hendley denied having copied Kelley’s work and claimed that The Outrageous Tale is an original literary work. In support of their motions for summary judgment, both parties filed affidavits. In addition, Winkler filed two expert reports. The first compared excerpts from The Black Donnellys and Vengeance to excerpts from The Outrageous Tale.The second was an analysis of the factual nature of The Black Donnellys. The Federal Court’s findings were as follows: Facts that are credibly presented by the author as historically factual must be excluded from copyright protection. Therefore, the author cannot claim originality when an assessment is made of whether there has been a substantial taking of their work. Hendley did not infringe Winkler’s copyright on The Black Donnellys by referring to “historical facts” without copying the structure, tone, theme, atmosphere or dialogue used in presenting them in The Outrageous Tale. Hendley did not infringe Winkler’s copyright on Vengeance, although he did copy various aspects of a fictional character in The Outrageous Tale in a non-literal way.This copying does not concern a substantial part of the literary work Vengeance whenviewed as a whole. Facts that are credibly presented by the author as historically factual must be considered as such The Federal Court ruled that The Black Donnellys was a history book, and, for all intents and purposes, considered it to be an account of “historical facts.” First, the Court relied on Kelly’s statement that he presented The Black Donnellys as “The True Story of Canada’s Most Barbaric Feud” when it was published.5 Second, the Court referred to the introduction in the original 1954 edition in which Kelly stated that the information that he used was gathered from old newspapers, police and court records, trips to the area, and other “unimpeachable sources.”6 The Court determined that it did not have to consider the conclusions of the expert report that the work was “two-thirds fiction.” The law is not a tool to ensure the accuracy of various historical accounts, and its role is not to decide between them based on an objective standard.7 Thus, the notion of “historical facts” must necessarily include those that the author plausibly presents as such.8 The Court has therefore introduced a subjective standard in the assessment of the factual nature of history books. The Federal Court found that Hendley was justified in relying on the version of events presented in The Black Donnellys. The purpose of the law is to maintain a balance between, on the one hand, protecting the talent and judgment of authors and, on the other hand, allowing ideas and material to remain in the public domain for all to build upon. To allow Kelley to present something as a “historical fact” and then allow Winkler to sue another author on the grounds that such “historical fact” is false would unduly impede the flow of ideas and disturb this fair balance.9In short, Winkler cannot seek to refute the historical nature of Kelley’s book and claim copyright over the fabricated facts it contains.10 Given that they are considered “historical facts,” Winkler cannot claim originality as part of the assessment of whether there has been a copying of a substantial part of his work. Hendley did not copy a substantial part of Kelley’s work The Federal Court reiterated that the law protects original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work. Thus, copyright protection exists whether a literary work is a history book or a piece of fiction. However, in the case of a history book, the protection does not extend to “facts of history” or their chronological sequence.11 The originality of Kelley’s work lies solely in the means of expression and thus in the selection and arrangement of facts. Consequently, the Court analyzed the copying of structure, tone, theme, atmosphere and dialogue in the telling of “historical facts,” not the facts themselves. The Supreme Court advocated a holistic and comprehensive approach to determining whether a substantial part of a plaintiff’s work was copied by a defendant.12 However, given the format of the expert report, the Federal Court found it necessary to analyze every single excerpt and then assess whether their cumulative effect amounted to a substantial copying of each of Kelley’s works.13 A) The Outrageous Tale does not amount to a reproduction of a substantial part of The Black Donnellys The Federal Court concluded that the expert report did not demonstrate any significant similarities in the comparison of some twenty excerpts from The Black Donnellys with allegedly analogous excerpts from The Outrageous Tale. Winkler alleged that the mere copying of fictional events in The Outrageous Tale constituted an unauthorized reproduction. The Court rejected this argument because to consider The Black Donnellys a history book implies that the “historical facts” it contains are not part of the originality of the work.14 Consequently, the Federal Court excluded the 20 or so excerpts because they merely mentioned the same “historical facts.”15  As for the excerpts that show some significant similarities, the Federal Court criticized the expert’s method of analyzing isolated words out of context to demonstrate greater similarities between the two texts. Instead, the Court chose to rely on more complete passages taken directly from the works to assess similarities in the selection and arrangement of facts.  The reproduction of fictional events is more easily detectable. Indeed, describing the same “historical facts” means that some significant similarities are inevitable. The Federal Court said the following regarding the description of a street battle:   In the foregoing passage, the linguistic similarity—references to Flanagan, the gun, the road, the 17 men—are all important parts of the factual aspect of the event. There may be a vast number of ways in which to recount facts. However, it would be difficult if not impossible to describe an event in which Flanagan, carrying a shotgun, went down the road with 17 men without using those terms. Here, the lack of copyright in “facts,” whether actually factual or simply asserted to be factual, becomes particularly important. If these descriptions of a fight were found in two works of fiction, there would be a stronger case that copying these elements contributed to a substantial taking. In a work of nonfiction, these factual elements are not part of the work’s originality.16 The Federal Court rejected the allegations of copying in the other passages based on the same argument. It concluded that the analysis carried out on the structure, tone, theme, atmosphere and dialogue of the work does not demonstrate that Hendley copied in The Outrageous Tale any substantial part of The Black Donnellys.  The decision is surprising in that the protection given to works under copyright and the assessment of whether there has been a substantial taking of the work should be objective: Was a substantial part of the first work copied in the second work in terms of quality? A fact is either historical or it is not. That an author may reasonably believe that such fact is historical should not affect the originality of the first work, nor should it affect the issue of “substantial taking” in the second work. While one understands that the judge was trying to achieve a fair outcome, one might question whether the legal means adopted were adequat For the purposes of this text, “historical facts” refer to events of a factual nature. 2021 FC 498 In this text, the notion of “history book” refers to a work of “history,” understood as the branch of knowledge that studies the past and seeks to reconstruct “historical facts.”  R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42 Winkler v. Hendley, supra note 2, para. 72 Id., para. 73 Id., para. 96 Id., para. 92 Id., para. 92 Id., para. 92 Id., para.  56 Cinar Corporation v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73; Copyright Act, supra note 6, s. 3  Id., para. 113 Winkler v. Hendley, supra note 2, para. 58 Id. Id., para. 122

    Read more
  3. The Doctrine of File Wrapper Estoppel in Canada: The Court of Appeal Hands Down its Decision

    In December 2018, section 53.1 was added to the Patent Act (the “Act”) allowing reference to be made to communications exchanged with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (“CIPO”) during the prosecution of an application with respect “[...]to the construction of a claim.” This concept is more commonly known as “file wrapper estoppel.” Salient points Expert evidence regarding how to construe the claims of a patent is not required in order to determine whether infringement has occurred. In a motion for summary judgment, the responding party must put its best foot forward and cannot simply contest the motion on the grounds that the moving party’s evidence is insufficient. File wrapper estoppel applies when rebutting a representation made by the patentee; however, only communications with CIPO are accepted, not those with a foreign patent office. There are several substantive issues yet to be resolved with respect to the file wrapper estoppel doctrine in Canada. In September of 2019, the Federal Court rendered its first decision concerning section 53.1 of the Act in Canmar Foods Ltd v. TA Foods Ltd.1 The decision was appealed, and, on January 20, 2021, the Federal Court of Appeal rendered its first judgment on the application of said section, and thus on the file wrapper estoppel doctrine in Canada.2 Background Canmar Foods Ltd. (“Canmar”) holds a patent on a method for roasting seeds used to produce vegetable oil (the “Patent”). The method claimed in the Patent consists of four steps, including heating the oil seed to a certain temperature in a “stream of air” and transferring the heated oil seed into an “insulated or partially insulated roasting chamber or tower.”  During the prosecution of the Patent application, the steps of heating in a “stream of air” and transferring the seeds in the manner mentioned above was added to the Patent claims by amendment in order to limit the scope of the claims. During the prosecution of the Patent application in Canada, Canmar referred to amendments that were “substantially the same” as those made during prosecution of the corresponding U.S. patent application in response to novelty and obviousness objections that had been raised by the examiner. After the Patent was obtained, Canmar sued TA Foods Ltd. (“TA”) for infringement thereof. TA filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the method it used did not include either the step of heating the seeds in a “stream of air” or the step of transferring them into an “insulated or partially insulated roasting chamber or tower.” In support of the motion for summary judgment, the parties both filed affidavits. However, no expert evidence was filed regarding the construction of the claims of the Patent by a person of ordinary skill in the art, a “POSITA.” The Federal Court found that: Expert evidence regarding how to construe the claims of a patent is not required in order to determine whether infringement has occurred. In a motion for summary judgment, the responding party must put its best foot forward and cannot simply contest the motion on the grounds that the moving party’s evidence is insufficient. Section 53.1 of the Act applies because, in contesting the motion for summary judgment, Canmar advanced a construction of the claims that would have the effect of nullifying the amendments made during the prosecution of the patent application. Exceptionally, the prosecution history of the U.S. patent could be relied upon because Canmar made reference thereto during the prosecution of the application for the Canadian Patent. In light of the prosecution history of the U.S. patent, the steps of heating the seeds in a “stream of air” and transferring the heated oil seed into an “insulated or partially insulated roasting chamber or tower” were found to be essential elements of the claims of the Canmar Patent. Even without reference to the prosecution history of the U.S. patent, the Court would have found that these elements were essential. The Court of Appeal upheld the Federal Court’s decision, but pointed out that the judge erred in law by referring to the prosecution history of the U.S. patent. Thus, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Federal Court had jurisdiction to construe the claims of the Patent and that expert evidence regarding a POSITA’s construction was not necessary in this case. The Court of Appeal nevertheless issued the following warning: Of course, the judge who dispenses with expert evidence will do that at his or her own peril, and it is not a practice that should be lightly countenanced. Claims must always be construed in an informed and purposive way, and it is only in the clearest of cases that judges should feel confident enough to construe the claims of a patent as they would be understood by a skilled person, without the help of any expert evidence. The Court of Appeal also criticized Canmar for failing to produce reply evidence with respect to the infringement. Specifically, the Court states that Canmar should have put its best foot forward, for example by submitting a claim construction that could lead even theoretically to a finding of infringement. In the absence of such evidence, the judge committed no palpable and overriding error in granting the motion for summary judgment.  However, the Court of Appeal found that by referring to the prosecution history of the U.S. patent, the Federal Court judge erred in law.  After a detailed review of American and British case law on file wrapper estoppel, the Federal Court of Appeal stated: I agree with the appellant that courts should be wary to extend the detailed language of section 53.1, which is specific about the communications being limited to those with the Canadian Patent Office. The legislation is carefully tailored, and it would go against statutory interpretation principles to try to go beyond its original intent. There are also public policy reasons for treading carefully in allowing extrinsic evidence. Opening the door to allowing foreign patent prosecution history into the analysis might lead to overly contentious and expensive litigation. It should be noted that the Court of Appeal then qualified the above statement as follows: Yet, whether the doctrine of incorporation by reference should formally be treated as an exception to the general prohibition on foreign prosecution files, is a question best left for another day. (…) There is nothing in the prosecution file of the ’376 Patent that identifies with any detailed particularity what specific “written communication” from the US prosecution history is incorporated and where that written communication can be found. It is virtually certain that if Canmar had amended its claims and filed with the Canadian patent office the same response that it filed with the U.S. patent office, that response could have been invoked under section 53.1 of the Act. Nevertheless, in such a case, the response in question would unambiguously form part of the Canadian file. On the other hand, if, instead of filing the U.S. response, the applicant had only referred to it in express terms, would section 53.1 of the Act have applied? This is a question that another court will likely have to answer. The Court of Appeal nonetheless dismissed the appeal because the trial judge had found that even without reference to the prosecution history of the U.S. patent, the Federal Court would have concluded that the elements in question were essential. The Court of Appeal found no manifestly unreasonable error in this part of the Federal Court’s judgment. Nor did the Court of Appeal rule on the question as to whether patent prosecution history can be raised solely to rebut an inconsistent construction made by the patentee, or whether it can be referred to whenever claim construction is called into question: The emphasis, therefore, is not so much on the rebuttal of a particular representation, but rather on the interpretive process itself. As the Court stated in Bauer Hockey, “there is no need to identify a particular representation and rebuttal every time a reference is made to the prosecution history. It is simply integrated in the interpretive process” (at para. 65). The resolution of this dispute is best left for another day, as the facts of this case clearly meet the more restricted interpretation of section 53.1 and do not require a broader reading of that section. More germane to the resolution of the case at bar is whether this new provision allows for the consideration of foreign prosecution files. This issue is more than just a theoretical discussion point. In fact, in a recent decision, the Federal Court3 found that section 53.1 was not applicable since the file wrapper was not raised to rebut the patentee’s claim construction. This is because the patent owner had left it to its exclusive licensee to allege infringement.  Therefore, although the patentee was eventually made a party to the proceedings (only because invalidity of the patent had been alleged), the claim construction that the defendant wanted to rebut was not made by the patentee, but rather by its exclusive licensee. Thus, unlike Judge Manson in Canmar, Judge Barne in Allergan adopted a much more restrictive interpretation of section 53.1 of the Act.  This debate regarding the file wrapper estoppel doctrine will continue and will most likely go all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. Stay tuned! Canmar Foods Ltd. v. TA Foods Ltd. 2019 FC 1233 Canmar Foods Ltd. v. TA Foods Ltd. 2021 FCA 7 Allergan Inc. v. Sandoz Canada Inc. et al. 2020 FC 1189.

    Read more
  4. The Court of Appeal Adds a Few More Shades to Canada’s Grey Market

    In Canada, as elsewhere in the world, intellectual property owners have made numerous attempts to control their distribution channels through trademark law, copyright law, or exclusive contracts, without much success. However, in a recent decision (Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. c. Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd.,1 hereinafter referred to as “Costco”), the Court of Appeal of Quebec found that Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. had committed the fault of contractual interference in a situation involving the grey market, also known as “grey marketing.” This decision calls into question a long series of decisions on the legality of the grey market and the principle of free competition, which is well established in Quebec law.2 The grey market is defined as follows: Goods that are imported contrary to the wishes of the copyright holder or an authorized importer in a specific territory. It refers to goods which, as a general rule, are legitimately marketed in the foreign market, but whose presence in the local market is clouded by allegations of infringement. For this reason it is referred to as the ‘grey market’ in contrast to the black market, in which copyright is infringed, and the white market, where there is no copyright infringement.1 The Court of Appeal for Ontario recently confirmed that grey marketing is a legal way of buying genuine branded products abroad and reselling them in competition with a local distributor of the foreign manufacturer.3 In Costco, Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd. (“Simms”) imported and distributed high-end clothing to retailers in Canada. In 2006, Simms entered into an exclusive distribution agreement with Rock & Republic Enterprise Inc. (“R & R”) for the distribution of R & R’s denim line, ready-to-wear clothing, and accessories. R & R jeans were not only high-end; they were also in high demand, selling for between $250 and $325 a pair. In November 2009, Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. (“Costco”) was approached by a distributor who offered to sell it R & R jeans at a very low price. The evidence shows that R & R knew that those jeans would end up in the Canadian market— R & R would sell to a first distributor who would then sell to a second distributor, who would in turn sell to Costco. Thus, Costco bought R & R jeans through two intermediaries and offered them to its customers for $98.99. Simms sent a formal notice to Costco demanding that it cease selling the R & R jeans, alleging that it was the exclusive distributor and that the jeans Costco was selling were counterfeit. After checking with its distributor, Costco received a letter from R & R confirming that the jeans were genuine products. Costco’s distributor added that R & R “are already dealing with the mad distributor” and asked Costco to “please [not] release this letter to the distributor”.4 With this letter in hand, Costco answered Simms that the jeans were genuine products acquired on the grey market, and that it was entitled to sell them in Canada. In July 2010, Simms sent a second formal notice to Costco, reiterating that it had exclusive distribution rights to R & R jeans in Canada. Simms then instituted proceedings against R & R and Costco, but R & R filed for bankruptcy. At trial, the Superior Court judge held Costco liable for damage caused to Simms as of November 2009, when it had received the first formal notice.5 According to the judge, Costco chose to ignore the existence of the exclusive distribution agreement between Simms and R & R, adopting a position of wilful blindness, whereas it should have inferred, based on its distributor’s behaviour, that an exclusive distribution agreement did indeed exist and that R & R was breaching it. Costco was ordered to pay the sum of $361,005.44 in damages to Simms. Costco was also ordered to pay exemplary punitive damages of $500,000.00 as a result of the gravity of its fault of contractual interference and the effect on Simms’ reputation on the Canadian market. The Court of Appeal of Quebec upheld the Superior Court’s decision and held Costco liable. Contractual interference and the notion of fault In Quebec civil law, under the principle of relativity of contracts, contractual obligations and undertakings may bind only the contracting parties. The fault of contractual interference is an exception to this principle. In the 1975 decision Trudel v. Clairol,6 which dealt with a form of grey market, the Supreme Court of Canada defined the fault of contractual interference as “an act of dishonesty to be associated knowingly with a breach of contract.”7 Simply put, to justify granting remedy for contractual interference, a plaintiff must show: “The existence of a contract and valid contractual obligations that the third party allegedly contravened”;8 “The constituent elements of the fault of a third party,” which are: “the third party’s knowledge of the contractual rights; incitement to or participation in the breach of the contractual obligations; and bad faith or disregard for the interests of others.”9 In Costco, the Court of Appeal specified that “receipt of a copy of the contract by the third party or even that the exclusivity clause was read by the third party”10 is not required to find that the third party committed a fault, and that the analysis of the third party’s knowledge of the contract is contextual.11 In this regard, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the formal notice of November 2009 was not ambiguous, given that Simms’ assertion that it was the exclusive distributor of R & R products was “clear and require[d] no interpretation”.12 It added that Costco’s conduct was not that of a normally prudent and diligent person, and that it had adopted a position of wilful blindness by continuing to sell R & R jeans even though R & R’s letter concerning its rights was not signed and predated the request for confirmation. In the Court of Appeal’s opinion, these facts combined with the formal notice should have been sufficient to conclude that there was indeed a breach of contract.13 Although the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge did not impose an additional burden on Costco to inform itself,14 the introduction of the notion of “wilful blindness” makes the situation highly subjective. The Superior Court judge wrote: [186] Costco relies on the fact that they were dealing with a trusted intermediary. Costco has filed no evidence that it was ever advised that, in fact, R & R had “resolved promptly” the matter with Simms. Accordingly, there was no reason for Costco to believe it could ignore the cease and desist letters. [187] Costco allowed itself to limit its focus to the issue of authenticity of the Product despite being put on notice by Simms that the up-front issue with Simms was the EDA (Exclusive Distribution Agreement). If Costco was not prepared to deal directly with Simms to resolve the issue, it needed to have the issue of the EDA asked and answered by R & R. Costco failed to do either. [188] […] Ms. Janek on behalf of Costco was at fault in not seeking: (a) some confirmation emanating from R & R that they knew the goods were being sold in Canada by Costco and (b) that there was no Simms EDA that would prevent such sales. […] 15 [Our emphasis] The Court of Appeal appears to agree with the trial judge’s reasoning. Echoing the Superior Court’s analysis quoted above, the Court explained: [61] Not only did Costco not obtain the confirmations demanded by Ms. Janek, it also chose to ignore information it received indicating that Simms was the exclusive Canadian distributor of R & R products [...].16 Even though no duty to inquire exists, Costco was criticized for having settled for questionable answers to its request for confirmation from the distributor and R & R that the goods were genuine and that they could be sold in Canada.   Would the ruling have been different if Costco had only asked R & R to confirm that the goods in question were genuine, while also asking its distributor whether it was bound by a contractual obligation not to sell in Canada?  If the answer is yes, the Court of Appeal’s conclusions make little sense. If, as the Court of Appeal stated, Costco had no duty to inquire, its mistake was to have inquired to R & R directly about Costo’s right to sell the jeans in Canada and it actually would have been preferable for it to ask as few questions as possible.  If a minimal duty to inquire had indeed existed, what should Costco have done? The Superior Court judge concluded on the basis of facts proven at trial that Costco should have obtained a letter signed by the owner of the trademarks in question confirming or denying Simms’ exclusive rights. The Court of Appeal appears to agree, adding that: [66] There is no question here of ambiguity or interpretation regarding Simms’ exclusivity that would have prevented Costco from understanding its scope or extent, but only of Costco’s knowledge of its existence.17 Thus, the Costco decision seems to create a duty to inquire that must be fulfilled to avoid a fault of contractual interference. However, the scope of this duty remains vague. Free competition and the grey market If such duty to inquire is interpreted broadly, it would be possible for an intellectual property right holder to arrange its distribution network in such a way as to make it difficult for a third party to claim ignorance of contractual restrictions with respect to exclusivity in a given territory. At trial, Costco alleged that the R & R jeans that it was selling at a low price had been legitimately acquired on the grey market and that it was entitled to sell them. With respect to the grey market, in Consumers Distributing Co. v. Seiko18 the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he concepts of restraint of trade and free competition [...] would be battered because of an implied recognition of a right of an individual marketing a product to entail and control the sale of identical personal property, however legitimately acquired, of another person.”19 In the present case, the Superior Court determined that Costco could not exonerate itself by alleging its right to purchase and resell grey market goods, as the contract between R & R and Simms was a juridical fact that was opposable to Costco.20 Did the particular facts of this case affect both the outcomes in Superior Court and the Court of Appeal? Certainly, but given that a contract is a juridical fact that is opposable to third parties; that such third parties have a form of duty to inquire about such juridical facts; and that one cannot be wilfully blind, the combination of these decisions seems to give greater weight to honouring contracts than to the principle of free competition.21 Is this a particularity of Quebec civil law (as opposed to common law)? How far does the duty to inquire go following the receipt of a formal notice? What degree of ambiguity is required for a party to claim that it has no knowledge of contractual obligations? The Canadian Courts will likely have to shed more light on the various legal shades of grey in the coming years. 2020 QCCA 1331. Free competition is a well-established principle in civil law. In Excelsior (L’), compagnie d’assurance-vie c. Mutuelle du Canada (La), compagnie d’assurance vie, the Court of Appeal recognized free competition as [TRANSLATION] “a fundamental principle to the organization of economic activities [...] subject to its legislative or regulatory framework.” Thus, competition is unique in that it can voluntarily cause harm to others without constituting a fault. Competition is only considered a fault if it is illicit or unfair; that is, if dishonest practices are used. Excelsior (L’), compagnie d’assurance-vie c. Mutuelle du Canada (La), compagnie d’assurance vie, [1992] R.J.Q. 2666 (C.A.), p. 30. Mars Canada Inc. v. Bemco Cash & Carry Inc., 2016 ONSC 7201, para. 7; conf. 2018 ONCA 239. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. c. Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd., supra note 1, para. 18. Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd. c. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd., 2017 QCCS 5058. [1975] 2 SCR 236. Id., p. 241. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. c. Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd., supra note 1, para. 51. Id. para. 50. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. c. Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd., supra note 1, para. 57. Id. Id. para. 58. Id. para. 64; Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd. c. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd., supra, note 6, para. 181 to 183. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. c. Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd., supra note 1, para. 64. Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd. c. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd., supra note 6, para. 186–188. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. c. Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd., supra note 1, para. 61. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. c. Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd., supra note 1, para. 66. 1984 1 SCC 583. Id., p. 584. Simms Sigal & Co. Ltd. c. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd., supra note 6, para. 94 and 214. Excelsior (L’), compagnie d’assurance-vie c. Mutuelle du Canada (La), compagnie d’assurance vie, [1992] R.J.Q. 2666 (C.A.), p. 30.

    Read more
  1. The Best Lawyers in Canada 2023 recognize 67 lawyers of Lavery

    Lavery is pleased to announce that 67 of its lawyers have been recognized as leaders in their respective fields of expertise by The Best Lawyers in Canada 2023. The following lawyers also received the Lawyer of the Year award in the 2023 edition of The Best Lawyers in Canada: René Branchaud : Natural Resources Law Chantal Desjardins : Intellectual Property Law Bernard Larocque : Legal Malpractice Law Patrick A. Molinari : Health Care Law   Consult the complete list of Lavery's lawyers and their fields of expertise: Josianne Beaudry : Mergers and Acquisitions Law / Mining Law Laurence Bich-Carrière : Class Action Litigation / Corporate and Commercial Litigation / Product Liability Law Dominic Boivert : Insurance Law (Ones To Watch) Luc R. Borduas : Corporate Law / Mergers and Acquisitions Law Daniel Bouchard : Environmental Law Laurence Bourgeois-Hatto : Workers' Compensation Law René Branchaud : Mining Law / Natural Resources Law / Securities Law Étienne Brassard : Equipment Finance Law / Mergers and Acquisitions Law / Real Estate Law Jules Brière : Aboriginal Law / Indigenous Practice / Administrative and Public Law / Health Care Law Myriam Brixi : Class Action Litigation Benoit Brouillette : Labour and Employment Law Richard Burgos : Mergers and Acquisitions Law / Corporate Law Marie-Claude Cantin : Insurance Law / Construction Law Brittany Carson : Labour and Employment Law Eugene Czolij : Corporate and Commercial Litigation France Camille De Mers : Mergers and Acquisitions Law (Ones To Watch) Chantal Desjardins : Intellectual Property Law Jean-Sébastien Desroches : Corporate Law / Mergers and Acquisitions Law Raymond Doray : Privacy and Data Security Law / Administrative and Public Law / Defamation and Media Law Christian Dumoulin : Mergers and Acquisitions Law Alain Y. Dussault : Intellectual Property Law Isabelle Duval : Family Law Chloé Fauchon : Municipal Law (Ones To Watch) Philippe Frère : Administrative and Public Law Simon Gagné : Labour and Employment Law Nicolas Gagnon : Construction Law Richard Gaudreault : Labour and Employment Law Danielle Gauthier : Labour and Employment Law Julie Gauvreau : Intellectual Property Law Michel Gélinas : Labour and Employment Law Caroline Harnois : Family Law / Family Law Mediation / Trusts and Estates Marie-Josée Hétu : Labour and Employment Law Alain Heyne : Banking and Finance Law Édith Jacques : Energy Law / Corporate Law Pierre Marc Johnson, Ad. E.  : International Arbitration Marie-Hélène Jolicoeur : Labour and Employment Law Isabelle Jomphe : Intellectual Property Law Guillaume Laberge : Administrative and Public Law Jonathan Lacoste-Jobin : Insurance Law Awatif Lakhdar : Family Law Bernard Larocque : Professional Malpractice Law / Class Action Litigation / Insurance Law / Legal Malpractice Law Myriam Lavallée : Labour and Employment Law Guy Lavoie : Labour and Employment Law / Workers' Compensation Law Jean Legault : Banking and Finance Law / Insolvency and Financial Restructuring Law Carl Lessard : Workers' Compensation Law / Labour and Employment Law Josiane L'Heureux : Labour and Employment Law Despina Mandilaras : Construction Law / Corporate and Commercial Litigation (Ones To Watch) Hugh Mansfield : Intellectual Property Law Zeïneb Mellouli : Labour and Employment Law Patrick A. Molinari : Health Care Law André Paquette : Mergers and Acquisitions Law Luc Pariseau : Tax Law Ariane Pasquier : Labour and Employment Law Jacques Paul-Hus : Mergers and Acquisitions Law Hubert Pepin : Labour and Employment Law Martin Pichette : Insurance Law / Professional Malpractice Law Élisabeth Pinard : Family Law François Renaud : Banking and Finance Law / Structured Finance Law Judith Rochette : Insurance Law / Professional Malpractice Law Ian Rose FCIArb : Director and Officer Liability Practice / Insurance Law Chantal Saint-Onge : Corporate and Commercial Litigation (Ones To Watch) Éric Thibaudeau : Workers' Compensation Law André Vautour : Corporate Governance Practice / Corporate Law / Information Technology Law / Intellectual Property Law / Technology Law Bruno Verdon : Corporate and Commercial Litigation Sébastien Vézina : Mergers and Acquisitions Law Yanick Vlasak : Corporate and Commercial Litigation Jonathan Warin : Insolvency and Financial Restructuring Law These recognitions are further demonstration of the expertise and quality of legal services that characterize Lavery’s professionals.

    Read more
  2. The Best Lawyers in Canada 2022 recognize 68 lawyers of Lavery

    Lavery is pleased to announce that 68 of its lawyers have been recognized as leaders in their respective fields of expertise by The Best Lawyers in Canada 2022. Lawyer of the Year   The following lawyers also received the Lawyer of the Year award in the 2022 edition of The Best Lawyers in Canada: Caroline Harnois: Family Law Mediation Bernard Larocque: Professional Malpractice Law   Consult the complete list of Lavery's lawyers and their fields of expertise: Josianne Beaudry : Mining Law / Mergers and Acquisitions Law Dominique Bélisle : Energy Law Laurence Bich-Carrière : Class Action Litigation René Branchaud : Mining Law / Natural Resources Law / Securities Law Étienne Brassard : Mergers and Acquisitions Law / Real Estate Law / Equipment Finance Law Dominic Boisvert: Insurance Law (Ones To Watch) Luc R. Borduas : Corporate Law Daniel Bouchard : Environmental Law Jules Brière : Administrative and Public Law / Health Care Law Myriam Brixi : Class Action Litigation Benoit Brouillette : Labour and Employment Law Richard Burgos : Corporate Law / Mergers and Acquisitions Law Marie-Claude Cantin : Construction Law / Insurance Law Charles Ceelen-Brasseur : Corporate Law (Ones To Watch) Eugène Czolij : Corporate and Commercial Litigation / Insolvency and Financial Restructuring Law Chantal Desjardins : Intellectual Property Law Jean-Sébastien Desroches : Corporate Law / Mergers and Acquisitions Law Michel Desrosiers : Labour and Employment Law Raymond Doray, Ad. E : Administrative and Public Law / Defamation and Media Law / Privacy and Data Security Law Christian Dumoulin : Mergers and Acquisitions Law Alain Y. Dussault : Intellectual Property Law Isabelle Duval : Family Law Chloé Fauchon: Municipal Law (Ones To Watch) Philippe Frère : Administrative and Public Law Simon Gagné : Labour and Employment Law Nicolas Gagnon : Construction Law Richard Gaudreault : Labour and Employment Law Danielle Gauthier : Labour and Employment Law Julie Gauvreau : Intellectual Property Law Michel Gélinas : Labour and Employment Law Caroline Harnois : Family Law / Family Law Mediation / Trusts and Estates Marie-Josée Hétu : Labour and Employment Law Alain Heyne : Banking and Finance Law Édith Jacques : Corporate Law / Energy Law Pierre Marc Johnson, Ad. E., G.O.Q., MSRC : International Arbitration Marie-Hélène Jolicoeur : Labour and Employment Law Isabelle Jomphe : Intellectual Property Law Guillaume Laberge: Administrative and Public Law Jonathan Lacoste-Jobin: Insurance Law Awatif Lakhdar: Family Law Bernard Larocque: Class Action Litigation / Insurance Law / Professional Malpractice Law Myriam Lavallée: Labour and Employment Law Guy Lavoie: Labour and Employment Law / Workers’ Compensation Law Jean Legault: Banking and Finance Law / Insolvency and Financial Restructuring Law Carl Lessard: Labour and Employment Law / Workers' Compensation Law Josiane L'Heureux: Labour and Employment Law Hugh Mansfield : Intellectual Property Law Zeïneb Mellouli : Labour and Employment Law Patrick A. Molinari, Ad.E., MSRC : Health Care Law André Paquette: Mergers and Acquisitions Law Luc Pariseau : Tax Law Jacques Paul-Hus : Mergers & Acquisitions Law Ariane Pasquier : Labour and Employment Law Hubert Pepin : Labour and Employment Law Martin Pichette : Insurance Law / Professional Malpractice Law Élisabeth Pinard : Family Law François Renaud : Banking and Finance Law Marc Rochefort : Securities Law Judith Rochette : Professional Malpractice Law Ian Rose : Director and Officer Liability Practice / Insurance Law Éric Thibaudeau: Workers' Compensation Law Philippe Tremblay : Construction Law / Corporate and Commercial Litigation Jean-Philippe Turgeon : Franchise Law André Vautour : Corporate Law / Energy Law / Information Technology Law / Intellectual Property Law / Private Funds Law / Technology Law Bruno Verdon : Corporate and Commercial Litigation Sébastien Vézina : Mergers and Acquisitions Law Yanick Vlasak : Corporate and Commercial Litigation Jonathan Warin : Insolvency and Financial Restructuring Law

    Read more
  3. 29 partners from Lavery ranked in the 2021 edition of The Canadian Legal Lexpert Directory

    Lavery is proud to announce that 29 partners are ranked among the leading practitioners in Canada in their respective practice areas in the 2021 edition of The Canadian Legal Lexpert Directory. The following Lavery partners are listed in the 2021 edition of The Canadian Legal Lexpert Directory: Asset Securitization Brigitte Gauthier Aviation (Regulation & Liability) Louis Charette Class Actions Myriam Brixi Louis Charette Construction law Nicolas Gagnon Corporate Commercial law Jean-Sébastien Desroches Yves Rocheleau André Vautour Corporate Finance & Securities Josianne Beaudry René Branchaud Corporate Tax Audrey Gibeault Employment Law Marie-Josée Hétu, CIRC Guy Lavoie Family Law Elisabeth Pinard Infrastructure Law Jean-Sébastien Desroches Intellectual Property Chantal Desjardins Isabelle Jomphe Alain Y. Dussault Insolvency & Financial Restructuring Yanick Vlasak Labour Relations Michel Desrosiers Richard Gaudreault Simon Gagné Danielle Gauthier, CHRP Michel Gélinas Marie-Josée Hétu, CIRC Guy Lavoie Zeïneb Mellouli Litigation - Commercial Insurance Bernard Larocque Judith Rochette Litigation - Product Liability Louis Charette Mergers & Acquisitions Jean-Sébastien Desroches Mining Josianne Beaudry René Branchaud Sébastien Vézina Occupational Health & Safety Éric Thibaudeau Property Leasing Richard Burgos Workers' Compensation Guy Lavoie Carl Lessard Éric Thibaudeau The Canadian Legal Lexpert Directory is the most comprehensive publication to legal talent in the country and it identifies leading practitioners in over 60 separate practice areas and leading law firms in over 40 practice areas. It is a reference guide for Canadian and foreign corporate counsels and law firms in need of specialized legal services in Canada. For more information, please visit Lexpert’s website at: http://www.lexpert.ca/directory.

    Read more
  4. The Best Lawyers in Canada 2021 recognize 64 lawyers of Lavery

    Lavery is pleased to announce that 64 of its lawyers have been recognized as leaders in their respective fields of expertise by The Best Lawyers in Canada 2021. The following lawyers also received the Lawyer of the Year award in the 2021 edition of The Best Lawyers in Canada: René Branchaud : Natural Resources Law Raymond Doray, Ad. E : Administrative and Public Law  Édith Jacques : Energy Law André Vautour : Technology Law Consult the complete list of Lavery's lawyers and their fields of expertise : Pierre-L. Baribeau : Labour and Employment Law Josianne Beaudry : Mining Law / Mergers and Acquisitions Law Dominique Bélisle : Energy Law Laurence Bich-Carrière : Class Action Litigation René Branchaud : Mining Law / Natural Resources Law / Securities Law Étienne Brassard : Mergers and Acquisitions Law Luc R. Borduas : Corporate Law Daniel Bouchard : Environmental Law Jules Brière : Administrative and Public Law / Health Care Law Myriam Brixi : Class Action Litigation Benoit Brouillette : Labour and Employment Law Richard Burgos : Corporate Law / Mergers and Acquisitions Law Marie-Claude Cantin : Construction Law / Insurance Law Louis Charette : Aviation Law / Insurance Law / Product Liability Law / Transportation Law Eugène Czolij : Corporate and Commercial Litigation / Insolvency and Financial Restructuring Law Chantal Desjardins : Intellectual Property Law Jean-Sébastien Desroches : Corporate Law / Mergers and Acquisitions Law Michel Desrosiers : Labour and Employment Law Raymond Doray, Ad. E : Administrative and Public Law / Defamation and Media Law / Privacy and Data Security Law Christian Dumoulin : Mergers and Acquisitions Law Alain Y. Dussault : Intellectual Property Law Philippe Frère : Administrative and Public Law Nicolas Gagnon : Construction Law Richard Gaudreault : Labour and Employment Law Danielle Gauthier : Labour and Employment Law Julie Gauvreau : Intellectual Property Law Michel Gélinas : Labour and Employment Law Caroline Harnois : Family Law / Family Law Mediation / Trusts and Estates Jean Hébert : Insurance Law Alain Heyne : Banking and Finance Law Édith Jacques : Corporate Law / Energy Law Pierre Marc Johnson, Ad. E., G.O.Q., MSRC : International Arbitration Marie-Hélène Jolicoeur : Labour and Employment Law Isabelle Jomphe : Intellectual Property Law Jonathan Lacoste-Jobin : Insurance Law Awatif Lakhdar : Family Law Bernard Larocque : Class Action Litigation / Insurance Law / Professional Malpractice Law Guy Lavoie, CRIA : Labour and Employment Law / Workers’ Compensation Law Jean Legault : Banking and Finance Law / Insolvency and Financial Restructuring Law Guy Lemay, CRIA : Class Action Litigation / Labour and Employment Law Carl Lessard : Labour and Employment Law / Workers' Compensation Law Hugh Mansfield : Intellectual Property Law Zeïneb Mellouli : Labour and Employment Law Patrick A. Molinari, Ad.E., MSRC : Health Care Law Luc Pariseau : Tax Law Jacques Paul-Hus : Mergers & Acquisitions Law Ariane Pasquier : Labour and Employment Law Louis Payette, Ad. E. : Banking and Finance Law Hubert Pepin : Labour and Employment Law Martin Pichette : Insurance Law / Professional Malpractice Law Élisabeth Pinard : Family Law François Renaud : Banking and Finance Law Marc Rochefort : Securities Law Judith Rochette : Professional Malpractice Law Ian Rose : Director and Officer Liability Practice / Insurance Law Raphaël H. Schachter , c.r., Ad. E. : Criminal Defence Gerald Stotland : Family Law / Family Law Mediation Philippe Tremblay : Construction Law / Corporate and Commercial Litigation Jean-Philippe Turgeon : Franchise Law André Vautour : Corporate Law / Energy Law / Information Technology Law / Intellectual Property Law / Private Funds Law / Technology Law Bruno Verdon : Corporate and Commercial Litigation Sébastien Vézina : Mergers and Acquisitions Law Yanick Vlasak : Corporate and Commercial Litigation Jonathan Warin : Insolvency and Financial Restructuring Law

    Read more