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July 14, 2022

Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations: Impact on Businesses

On June 20, 2022, the federal government registered regulations that, as the name implies, prohibit (or restrict, in some cases) the manufacture, import and sale of certain single-use plastics that pose a threat to the environment. The Regulations will come into force on December 20, 2022, with the exception of certain provisions taking effect in the following months.1 Manufacturing, importing and selling certain single-use plastic products made entirely or partially of plastic, such as foodservice ware, checkout bags and straws, will be soon be prohibited. This regulation is expected to affect more than 250,000 Canadian businesses that sell or provide single-use plastic products, primarily in the retail, food service, hospitality and healthcare industries. The following is a comprehensive list of items that will be prohibited: Single-use plastic ring carriers designed to hold and carry beverage containers together2; Single-use plastic stir sticks designed to stir or mix beverages or to prevent liquid from spilling from the lid of its container3; Single-use plastic foodservice ware (a) designed in the form of a clamshell container, lidded container, box, cup, plate or bowl, (b) designed to serve or transport ready-to-eat food or beverages without further preparation, and (c) made from certain materials4; Single-use plastic checkout bags designed to carry purchased goods from a business and (a) whose plastic is not a fabric, or (b) whose plastic is a fabric that will break or tear, as the case may be, (i) if it is used to carry 10 kg over a distance of 53 m 100 times; (ii) if it is washed in accordance with the washing procedures specified for a single domestic wash in the International Organization for Standardization standard ISO 6330, as amended from time to time5; Single-use plastic cutlery that is formed in the shape of a fork, knife, spoon, spork or chopstick that either (a) contains polystyrene or polyethylene, or (b) changes its physical properties after being run through an electrically operated household dishwasher 100 times6; Single-use plastic straws that either (a) contain polystyrene or polyethylene, or (b) change their physical properties after being run through an electrically operated household dishwasher 100 times7. The main exceptions Single-use flexible plastic straws Single-use flexible plastic straws, i.e. those with a corrugated section that allows the straw to bend and maintain its position at various angles,8 may be manufactured and imported9. These flexible straws may also be sold in any of the following circumstances: The sale does not take place in a commercial, industrial, or institutional setting10. This exception means that individuals can sell these flexible straws. The sale is between businesses in packages of at least 20 straws.11 The sale is made by a retail store of a package of 20 or more straws to a customer who requests it without the package being displayed in a manner that permits the customer to view the package without the help of a store employee12; The sale of straws is between a retail store and a customer, if the straw is packaged together with a beverage container and the packaging was done at a location other than the retail store13; The sale is between a care facility, such as a hospital or long-term care facility, and its patients or residents14. The export of single-use plastic items - All the manufactured single-use plastic items listed above may be manufactured, imported or sold for export15. That said, any person who manufactures or imports such items for export will be required to keep a record of certain information and documents as appropriate for each type of plastic manufactured item16. Records of the information and documents will have to be kept for at least five years in Canada17. Conclusion: an opportunity to rethink common practices In the short term, businesses will need to start thinking about how they will replace the plastic manufactured items they use. To help businesses select alternatives to single-use plastic items, the federal government has released its Guidance for selecting alternatives to the single-use plastics in the proposed Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations.18 According to this document, the aim should be to reduce plastics. Businesses may begin by considering whether a single-use plastic should be replaced or no longer provided. Only products that perform essential functions should be replaced with non-plastic equivalents. Stir sticks and straws can be eliminated most of the time. Another way to reduce waste is to opt for reusable products and packaging. Businesses are invited to rethink their products and services to provide reusable options. Reusable container programs (i.e. offering customers the option of using their own reusable containers) are a reuse option that businesses may want to consider, in particular to reduce the amount of plastic food containers. Only where reusable products are not feasible should businesses substitute a single-use plastic product with a recyclable single-use alternative. Businesses in this situation are encouraged to contact local recycling facilities to ensure that they can successfully recycle products at their end of life. Ultimately, charging consumers for certain single-use substitutes (e.g. single-use wooden or moulded fibre cutlery) may also discourage their use. Ibid, s. 1 Ibid, s. 3 Ibid, s. 6 Polystyrene foam, polyvinyl chloride, plastic containing black pigment produced through the partial or incomplete combustion of hydrocarbons or oxo-degradable plastic; Ibid. This standard is entitled Textiles – Domestic washing and drying procedures for textile testing; Ibid. Ibid. Ibid, ss. 4 and 5. Ibid, s. 1. Ibid, s. 4. Ibid, para. 5(2). Ibid, para. 5(3). Ibid, para. 5(4); According to Guidance for selecting alternatives to the single-use plastics in the proposed Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations, the goal is to ensure that people with disabilities who need flexible single-use plastic straws continue to have access to them at home and can carry them to restaurants and other premises. Ibid, para. 5(5). Ibid, para. 5(6). Ibid, para. 2(2). Ibid., s. 8 Ibid, para. 9(1). https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/managing-reducing-waste/consultations/proposed-single-use-plastics-prohibition-regulations-consultation-document.html

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April 14, 2021

Loss of personal information: The Superior Court dismisses a class action

On March 26, 2021, the Superior Court rendered a decision dismissing a class action against the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (“IIROC”) on the loss of personal information of thousands of Canadian investors.1 The lack of evidence of compensable injury and IIROC’s diligent behaviour are the main reasons for the dismissal of the class action. The Facts On February 22, 2013, an inspector working for IIROC forgot his laptop computer in a public place. The computer, which contained the personal information of approximately 50,000 Canadians, was never found. The information had originally been collected by various securities brokers who were under inspection by IIROC. Mr. Lamoureux, whose personal information was on the computer, brought a class action on behalf of all persons whose personal information was lost in the incident. He claimed compensatory damages for the stress, anxiety and worries associated with the loss of personal information, as well as compensation for the injury associated with the identity theft or attempted identity theft of members. He also claimed punitive damages for unlawful and intentional infringement of the right to privacy protected by the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. On this point, the members claimed that IIROC had been reckless and had delayed in notifying affected persons and brokers, as well as relevant authorities. Decision The class action is dismissed in its entirety. Compensatory damages The Superior Court started by acknowledging IIROC’s admission that it was at fault for the loss of the computer, and that the computer was not encrypted as it should have been to comply with IIROC policies. With respect to compensatory damages, the Court reiterated the principle according to which the existence of fault does not presume the existence of injury; each case must be analyzed on the basis of the evidence.2 In this case, the injury alleged by the members can be summarized as follows: They suffered worry, anger, stress and anxiety about the incident. They were forced to monitor their financial accounts, and in particular their credit cards and bank accounts. They were inconvenienced and wasted time in having to deal with credit agencies and ensuring that their personal information was protected. They felt shame and suffered delays caused by identity checks on their credit applications attributable to flags on their files. In its analysis, the Court held that, apart from the fact that the members were generally troubled by the loss of their personal information, there was no evidence of any particular and significant difficulties related to their mental state. Relying on Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd.,3 the Court reiterated that “the law does not recognize upset, disgust, anxiety, agitation or other mental states that fall short of injury.” If the injury is not serious and prolonged, and is limited to ordinary discomforts and fears that are inherent to life in society, it does not constitute compensable injury. In this case, the Court found that the negative feelings experienced as a result of the loss of personal information did not rise above the level of ordinary discomforts, anxieties and fears that people living in society routinely accept. Having to monitor one’s personal accounts more closely does not qualify as a compensable injury, as the courts equate this practice with that of [translation] “a reasonable person who protects their assets.”4 The Court also considered the fact that IIROC provided members with free credit monitoring and protection services. It thus concluded that, in this respect, there was no injury to compensate. Finally, the experts who were mandated to analyze the circumstances and wrongful use of the investors’ personal information found that there was no clear indication of wrongful use of the information by a person or group of persons, although evidence of wrongful use of personal information is not necessary to assert a claim. Punitive damages The plaintiff, on behalf of the members of the class action, also sought punitive damages on the grounds that IIROC had been reckless in its handling of the incident. To analyze IIROC’s diligence, the Court noted the following facts. IIROC launched an internal investigation in the week that followed that of February 22, 2013, the date on which the computer was lost. On March 4, 2013, the investigation revealed that the computer likely contained the personal information of thousands of Canadians. IIROC filed a police report. On March 6, 2013, it mandated Deloitte to identify what personal information was lost and who were the affected persons and brokerage firms, and to help it manage the risks and obligations associated with the loss of the personal information. On March 22, 2013, Deloitte informed IIROC that the computer contained “highly sensitive” and “increased sensitivity” information about thousands of Canadian investors. On March 27, 2013, IIROC notified the Commission d’accès à l’information du Québec and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. On April 8 and 9, 2013, IIROC met with representatives of the affected brokerage firms, and simultaneously mandated credit agencies to implement safeguards for investors and brokerage firms. IIROC also set up a bilingual call center, issued a press release about the loss of the computer and sent a letter to affected investors. The Court also accepted expert evidence according to which IIROC’s response was consistent with industry best practices, and that the measures put in place were appropriate in the circumstances and consistent with other responses to similar incidents. In light of the evidence, the Court concluded that the loss of the unencrypted laptop computer and the resulting violation of the right to privacy were isolated and unintentional. It therefore dismissed the claim for punitive damages. The outcome is that IIROC was not reckless: it rather acted in a timely manner. Comments This decision introduces a basis for analyzing the diligent conduct of a company should the personal information that it holds be compromised, and confirms that a prompt and diligent response to a security incident can safeguard against a civil suit. It also confirms that the mere loss of personal information, no matter how sensitive, is not in itself sufficient to justify financial compensation, and that it must be proven that injury was suffered. Furthermore, ordinary annoyances and temporary inconveniences do not constitute compensable injury, and monitoring financial accounts is not exceptional, but is rather considered the standard practice expected of a reasonable person protecting their assets. At the time of writing this bulletin, the time limit for appeal has not expired and the plaintiff has not announced whether he intends to appeal the judgment. Lamoureux v. Organisme canadien de réglementation du commerce des valeurs mobilières (OCRCVM), 2021 QCCS 1093. Sofio v. Organisme canadien de réglementation du commerce des valeurs mobilières (OCRCVM), 2014 QCCS 4061, paras. 21 and 22. Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27 [2008] 2 SCR 114. Lamoureux v. Organisme canadien de réglementation du commerce des valeurs mobilières, 2021 QCCS 1093, para. 73.

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July 31, 2019

A Decision of Interest to the Entertainment Industry

Is an event organizer responsible for an artist’s late appearance? Context is key, answers the Superior Court’s, as it dismisses the application for authorization to institute a class action against Gestion Evenko Inc.1 regarding Travis Scott’s late appearance at the Osheaga Music and Arts Festival in the summer of 2018. Overview of the first class action on this topic in Quebec. Background The Osheaga Festival, organized by the defendant, Evenko, is a huge celebration dedicated to music and visual arts where artists of all genres perform for three days on the many outdoor stages set up in Parc Jean-Drapeau on Notre-Dame Island. Rapper Travis Scott was on the lineup for the evening of August 3, 2018. His performance was scheduled from 9:45 p.m. to 10:55 p.m. on the River stage. Wishing to attend this performance, the plaintiff, who had purchased a weekend pass, went to the venue at 8:45 p.m. Unfortunately, Travis Scott was held up at customs that evening. The sequence of events can be summarized as follows. At 9:55 p.m., Evenko displayed a first message on the site’s giant screens indicating that the show was delayed for a reason beyond its control. At 10:15 p.m., Evenko broadcast a second message, both on the giant screens and on Twitter, indicating that Travis Scott had been delayed at customs and was on his way to Notre-Dame Island. At 10:30 p.m., the plaintiff left the premises; she claimed that she did not believe Evenko's messages, feared a curfew and found the crowd aggressive. At 10:40 p.m., Evenko broadcast a third message on the giant screens confirming that Travis Scott had arrived on the island. At 10:55 p.m., Evenko broadcast a fourth message announcing to festival-goers that the show was about to begin. The show started at 11:00 p.m. and ended around 11:40 p.m. An application for authorization to institute a class action was filed the next day. The plaintiff sought to represent nearly 50,000 festival-goers who, in her opinion, suffered prejudice attributable to Evenko. She claimed that Travis Scott’s 90-minute delay constituted a breach of contract by Evenko such that all members of the group should obtain a refund equivalent to the value of a daily pass. The Decision In carrying out the analysis required by section 575 of the C.C.P., Justice André Prévost concluded that the alleged facts did not appear to justify the conclusions sought. The application for authorization to institute a class action was therefore dismissed. From the outset, the Court questioned some of the allegations in the application: for example, the plaintiff’s assertion that [translation] “Travis Scott’s performance was the main consideration in the contract with Evenko” seems incompatible with the fact that she purchased a three-day pass (paras. 51, 56); similarly, there was no evidence to support her claim that the crowd was aggressive (para. 54). However, it is mainly two deficiencies in the legal syllogism that led the Court to conclude that the application for authorization did not establish an arguable case or a reasonable prospect of success (para. 66). First, the Court refused to reduce the Osheaga Festival experience to a single performance, even that of a headliner. Rather, it described the event as [translation] “a comprehensive experience [...] whose interest lies in the multiplicity and simultaneity of cultural experiences” (para. 48). In fact, in addition to the invited musical, cultural and circus artists, there are various activities, fairs, cruises and awards ceremonies, to name but a few (para. 48). The Court pointed out that all documents relating to Osheaga’s programming and schedule contain one or more of the following warnings: “Schedule and lineup subject to change” or “Artists and schedule subject to change” (para. 47). These warnings are a strong indication that such delays are far from unusual or, in the words of the Court, [translation] “this is not exceptional for those acquainted with the cultural milieu” (para. 57). In this context, Evenko cannot be found to be at fault. The Court continued its analysis, adding that, even if it were found to be at fault, which is not the case, the situation did not result in any compensable damage: Citing Sofio2 and Mustapha3, the Court pointed out that mere annoyance is not prejudice, and that, in fact, [translation] “there is no evidence that Travis Scott’s delayed performance caused a more serious inconvenience than what is usual for people attending festivals of this nature” (para. 65). In short, in the context of a multi-genre festival, an artist appearing late does not necessarily constitute compensable prejudice and does not automatically amount to the promoter’s failure to fulfil its obligations. What It Means The decision is important to the entertainment industry in that it recognizes that major event organizers sometimes deal with unforeseen circumstances and they are allowed reasonable leeway to adapt to them. Of course, each situation will be particular, but a well-informed promoter will make sure to indicate that changes are possible in its documentation. The decision also recognizes that a comprehensive cultural experience is more than the sum of its parts: a single artist appearing late does not cast a pall on the entire event. This conclusion is likely to apply to many other industries: Osheaga is a typical example of a set of distinct and simultaneous performances, but the same characterization can be given to all the rides in an amusement park or all the individual sections of a zoological garden. Our partners, Myriam Brixi and Laurence Bich-Carrière have successfully represented Evenko's interests in this case. Le Stum c. Gestion Evenko inc., 2019 QCCS 2422. The time limit for appeal expired on July 22, 2019. Sofio c. Organisme canadien de réglementation du commerce des valeurs mobilières (OCRCVM), 2015 QCCA 1820. Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., [2008] 2 SCR 114, 2008 SCC 27.

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March 1, 2019

Once Upon a Time in the West: Redwater, its Trustee, and the Environmental Arm of the Law

In a decision handed down on January 31, 2019, the Supreme Court ordered that a bankrupt oil and gas company fulfil its obligation to reclaim abandoned oil wells before paying any creditors. This decision has since sparked conflicting reactions across the country: first, because it gives clear precedence to environmental protection in the event of bankruptcy, and second, because of the influence it will likely have over business decisions in industries where environmental risks are involved. Moreover, the concrete impact this decision will have in Quebec, where environmental laws have recently undergone major reforms, remains to be seen. Background Redwater Energy Corp. is a publicly traded Alberta oil and gas company that obtained financing for part of its operations from Alberta Treasury Branches (“ATB”) in 2013. The latter held a security interest over Redwater’s assets. In 2014, Redwater experienced financial difficulties which resulted in its inability to fulfil its obligations to ATB, its primary secured creditor. In 2015, Redwater was placed under receivership. At that time, Redwater’s assets consisted of 127 oil and gas properties—wells, pipelines and facilities—and their corresponding licences obtained in 2009. Said licences were granted by the Alberta Energy Regulator (“AER”), subject to an obligation to reclaim wells and facilities as prescribed to make them environmentally safe. However, at the time Grant Thornton was appointed as its receiver, 72 of Redwater’s licensed wells and facilities were depleted and burdened with environmental liabilities in terms of abandonment and land reclamation, such that Redwater’s liabilities exceeded the value of the wells and facilities that were still producing. Upon being advised that Redwater was placed under receivership, the AER notified Grant Thornton that despite the receivership, it was under the legal obligation to fulfil abandonment and reclamation obligations for all licensed assets prior to distributing funds or finalizing any proposal to creditors. Grant Thornton replied that it was not taking possession and control of Redwater’s valueless facilities and that it therefore had no obligation to fulfil the environmental obligations associated with these renounced assets (the “Environmental Obligations”). In the summer of 2015, in response to Grant Thornton's reply, the AER issued abandonment orders under two Alberta laws directing Redwater to suspend the operation of the renounced assets, abandon them in accordance with the AER's rules and regulations, and obtain the reclamation certificates required by law. In the fall of 2015, a bankruptcy order was issued for Redwater and Grant Thornton was appointed as trustee. The AER filed an application to order Grant Thornton to comply with its Environmental Obligations before making any distribution to Redwater’s creditors, but the application judge and the majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal agreed with Grant Thornton and refused to issue the orders sought. In their view, agreeing with the AER would be tantamount to ignoring the orderly and equitable distribution scheme set out in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”). The AER appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court. On January 31, 2019, in a 5-2 majority decision, the Supreme Court allowed the AER’s appeal. 1- The trustee’s personal liability The first question the Court reviewed was whether section 14.06(4) of the BIA allows a trustee to escape the obligations imposed by Alberta law with respect to the reclamation of oil and gas facilities. Essentially, this question raises the fundamental issue of whether the BIA is in operational conflict with provincial laws. Section 14.06(4) of the BIA provides that the trustee is not personally liable for any failure to comply with any order to remedy any environmental condition or damage affecting a bankrupt property if the trustee abandons or renounces any right to the property in question. The majority of the Court interpreted this provision in a restrictive manner and concluded that, even if the trustee is not held personally liable, the bankrupt estate's assets remain subject to the order to remedy any environmental damage. Thus, the value of the bankrupt's assets must be used to fulfil its Environmental Obligations. 2- The notion of “provable claim” Grant Thornton further argued that, even if the bankrupt’s assets were to be used to fulfil Environmental Obligations, these should be paid as “provable claims” of an ordinary creditor, in other words, neither a secured nor a preferred creditor. Thus, the question of whether the AER could demand that Redwater’s Environmental Obligations be fulfilled before the value of the assets could be distributed to its creditors involves the concept of “claims provable in the bankruptcy” as defined by the BIA. One of the objectives of the BIA is to ensure the equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s property among creditors who have a “provable claim.” Said distribution is done according to a very precise order, established by law. However, if a claim is not “provable” within the meaning of the BIA, it nonetheless continues to be binding on the bankrupt and must be paid regardless of the distribution scheme provided for under the BIA. According to the Supreme Court in the 2012 AbitibiBowater1decision, a “provable claim” exists if three requirements are met: There must be a debt, liability or an obligation to a “creditor”; The debt, liability or obligation must be incurred before the debtor becomes bankrupt; and It must be possible to attach a monetary value to the debt, liability or obligation. If any one of these requirements is not met, there is no “provable claim.” Applying this analytical framework to the situation at hand, the majority of the Court determined that the AER is not a “creditor” within the meaning of the first requirement. According to the Court, the people of Alberta would ultimately benefit if Redwater and other companies like it met their Environmental Obligations: the province itself would not be gaining a financial advantage. Thus, the AER, when seeking to enforce Redwater’s public duties, is not a creditor within the meaning of the law. This was sufficient to conclude that its claim was not a “provable claim” subject to the distribution scheme provided for under the BIA2. The result, according to the Supreme Court, is that compliance with Environmental Obligations prevails over the payment of any provable claims of secured, preferred and unsecured creditors in the form of a first charge3. This conclusion does not conflict with the priority scheme under the BIA, nor does it contradict the goal of maximizing the realizable value of the assets, because all of Redwater’s valuable assets were subject to Environmental Obligations in any case. Such a decision raises several questions. First, as Justice Côté points out in her dissenting reasons, it may sometimes be difficult to know when the regulator is not acting in the public interest, suggesting that such a regulator can never be a creditor within the meaning of the law. Second, the adopted interpretation is likely to have consequences, in particular on the financing industry for companies exploiting natural resources. Faced with the existence of first charges that could remain unknown for a long time, lenders that finance the activities of such companies may have to reconsider the conditions under which they agree to finance them because of the increased risk of having the value of their investment or guarantees reduced. 3- What about the effects of this judgment in Quebec? It is particularly difficult to say with certainty what the effects of this decision will be in Quebec given the current legislative context in the areas of activity in question. Quebec legislation has undergone major reforms recently (in mid-2017 for the environment and at the end of 2018 for petroleum ressources) both in terms of environmental protection and the management of natural resources. The structure of the law, the conditions for obtaining operating licences and drilling authorizations and the powers of public authorities (in particular those of the ministers) have been changed to such an extent that we believe caution should be exercised before drawing hasty conclusions. In the case analyzed by the Supreme Court, the legislation in question, which made site remediation an obligation under the licenses issued, defined remediation to include decontamination. While this conclusion can apparently be drawn from the legislative structure applicable to mining operations, it is less obvious to do so with respect to petroleum resources development in Quebec. Moreover, although Quebec has legislative provisions to ensure that soil decontamination work is carried out in certain situations under division IV of the Environment Quality Act, the obligations to produce a characterization study, prepare a rehabilitation plan and carry out decontamination work do not apply in all cases. Although solely the production of a characterization study and a rehabilitation plan are required in some cases (cessation of activities), decontamination is only mandatory for the resumption of other activities, unless ordered by the Minister. Therefore, in cases where land decontamination is not a mandatory condition under the law, we must consider whether or not decontamination work otherwise performed may or may not qualify as “provable claims” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. Thus, we should be careful before affirming that the Supreme Court’s decision in this case will automatically apply to Quebec in all situations. Analyzing situations on a case-by-case basis (as the Supreme Court said, incidentally) is the way forward, and understanding the Supreme Court's decision in the Redwater case properly will certainly be key. 4- Conclusion The Redwater decision raises diametrically opposed reactions depending on the audience. Some welcome the Supreme Court's effort to support provincial authorities responsible for overseeing environmental matters by adopting an interpretation of federal and provincial legislation that is broad, flexible and imbued with cooperative federalism. The Court's message that bankruptcy is not a licence to ignore environmental rules and that trustees are bound by valid provincial laws is also appreciated. Others, however, object to the business consequences that could result from this decision for companies operating in areas of activity that involve environmental risks, because access to financing may be more difficult. Where the full value of the assets is likely to be used to ensure compliance with environmental obligations, insolvency professionals who rely on the value of the assets to cover their own professional feess may be discouraged from accepting mandates when environmental issues are involved. Some are also concerned that companies in difficulty will abandon their assets to governments rather than attempting to restructure, thereby increasing the social burden of these problematic assets - a result that the majority decision seemed to want to avoid. In Quebec, as we pointed out above, the powers exercised and orders issued will require careful review to determine their immediate or potential regulatory or monetary nature. In the first case, Redwater suggests that a trustee would be forced to comply in accordance with the value of the assets, while, in the second case, the provincial authority's claim would be considered subordinate to the rights of secured and preferred creditors in the distribution scheme provided for in the BIA. Newfoundland and Labrador v. AbitibiBowater Inc. [2012] 3 SCR 443, 2012 SCC 67 (CanLII) However, the Court analyzed the third requirement set out in Abitibi and concluded that it is not possible to attach a monetary value to the debt in question, as it was not sufficiently certain that the organization would perform the work or claim its reimbursement. The dissenting judges concluded the contrary on this point. Which the Court equates with the one under section 14.06(7) of the BIA that the organization could not avail itself of in this case.

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