Transportation and Transportation Infrastructure

In a strategic move to bolster domestic production of critical minerals, President Donald Trump has invoked the Defense Production Act (DPA). He signed an executive order aiming to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign sources, particularly China, which dominates the global rare earth minerals market. This market dominance poses economic and security risks for countries reliant on these materials for advanced technologies, such as the U.S. and Canada. The executive order leverages the DPA to provide financing, loans, and investment support for domestic processing of rare earth elements (REEs) and critical rare earth elements (CREEs). REEs are profoundly valuable and are essential in the manufacture of electronics (e.g., microchips, semiconductors, and essentially any product with a computer chip).  This initiative seeks to enhance national security by ensuring a stable supply of materials essential for technologies ranging from batteries to defense systems. Standard NdFeB magnets, without terbium (Tb) or dysprosium (Dy), cannot be used in high-temperature applications such as in electric vehicles (EV) critical components.  The production of high-value pre-magnetic REE alloys, requires the purchase of separated Tb and Dy oxides from China. Recent concerns about future supplies of REEs have now narrowed chiefly to the heavy rare earth elements (HREEs). Essentially, all of the world's HREEs are currently sourced from the south China ion-adsorption clay deposits.  The ability of those deposits to maintain and increase production is uncertain, particularly in light of environmental degradation associated with some mining and extraction operations in the region. As the U.S. intensifies efforts to secure its mineral supply chains, Canada, rich in mineral resources, has an opportunity to strengthen its position as a key supplier. However, Canada must also navigate its own strategic interests, ensuring that domestic extraction and processing capabilities remain competitive. REE mineral deposits typically contain appreciable levels of radioactive elements such as thorium (Th) and uranium (U), making the extraction of REE values environmentally challenging.  Novel processes for the extraction and separation of REE values in high yield and purity, with an environmentally cleaner design and overcoming the technical and economic limitations of the existing commercial processes, are of commercial interest. Additionally, diversifying export markets beyond the U.S. could shield Canada from potential shifts in American policy while strengthening its role as a global player in the critical minerals industry. As the Trump administration’s directive underscores the strategic importance of CREEs and the necessity to develop resilient supply chains, we can expect more news in the upcoming months from the U.S. regarding its efforts to lessen its dependence on other countries in the mining industry. Stay tuned!

Quebec has set ambitious energy transition and industrial decarbonization targets. The shift to greener practices has to be taken in a context where our energy consumption could rapidly grow under the combined effect of a number of factors, such as the reindustrialization of our economy, population growth, transport electrification and the potential for artificial intelligence to consume vast amounts of energy. Investing in the development of energy infrastructure is therefore critically important, as an abundance of energy is key to economic prosperity. The problem is that public finances are already stretched to the limit with the need to renovate our aging infrastructure, among other things. Encouraging private equity investment is thus vital, and tax incentives can be very effective in this respect. The American example In 2022, the United States passed its Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), with the goal of stimulating investment in the renewable energy sector, in particular. More specifically, the IRA altered or created a number of tax credits to encourage private investment.1 Over the past two years, US businesses have announced a total of almost US$276 billion in new investments in clean energy generation and the capturing or elimination of carbon dioxide and other forms of industrial decarbonization, an increase of 34% on the two years previous.2 The IRA is effective in that it takes the respective situations of various energy sector stakeholders into account in a creative, flexible and pragmatic way, especially where taxation is involved. Energy project promoters often have to wait many years for their projects to generate income and profits, even though the banks and other investment funds they solicit financing from can be presumed to be operating profitable businesses. The tax losses that occur in the years during which such projects are designed and built are therefore of little interest to developers, but of immediate interest to investors. And so, a tax equity market has emerged, in which businesses subject to taxes can invest in the shares of entities set up to develop such projects so as to benefit from tax credits and faster depreciation. Typically, the entity that cashes in the investment and develops the project distributes 99% of income, losses and tax credits to investors until a predetermined return is achieved. Once that return is achieved, the investor’s share of the benefits decreases, and the developer has the option of buying out the investor’s residual share. The IRA has transformed how federal clean energy tax credits are monetized, and it is now possible to buy and sell such credits without having to make a long-term investment. For businesses, this new way of doing things is an additional and attractive way to participate in the growing tax credit market.3 In 2023, the volume of the tax equity market for American projects was around US$20 to 21 billion, up about US$18 billion from the previous year.4 It appears that the trend will continue. It is estimated that the value of the current market, which is particularly attractive to banks, is set to double to US$50 billion a year by 2025.5 The equivalent of flow-through shares The Quebec and Canadian tax deductions mechanism that most closely resembles the US tax equity market is probably flow-through shares. Through these, businesses in the mining and renewable energy sectors can transfer their mining exploration expenses and other expenses—specifically designated as eligible—to investors, who can then deduct them from their own taxable incomes.6 These businesses can thus issue shares at a higher price than they would receive for common shares to finance their exploration and development operations. Investors are willing to pay a higher price in return for the tax deductions afforded by the eligible expenses incurred by the issuing businesses, which can amount to a maximum of 120% of the equity invested in the shares.7 Investors can also claim a 15% or 30% federal tax credit. However, because tax incentives cannot be transferred, our mechanism is more rigid than the American one, and it can only be applied to mineral exploration and development expenses and certain specific expenditures related to renewable energy and energy conservation projects, such as electricity generation using renewable sources like wind, solar energy and geothermal energy.8 With ambition and innovation comes the need to take action Quebec could draw inspiration from the IRA to increase the attractiveness of flow-through shares and broaden their scope of application, thereby creating a new tool to finance the energy transition. The renewable energy sector is similar to the mining sector in many respects, not least in terms of the considerable amount of capital required to build the infrastructure needed to operate a mine or energy generation facility. The flow-through share mechanism, which is well-established and popular with investors,9 could be just as successful in our energy transition context. Making such incentives easier to transfer would also drive the emergence of a market similar to the US tax equity market. A number of Québec flagship companies, such as Hydro-Québec,10 Innergex11 and Boralex,12 are also very ambitious when it comes to developing large-scale energy projects. They face major financing challenges, as do those in the industrial decarbonization and infrastructure renewal sectors. Innovation is necessary to meet these challenges and make the transition to a more sustainable, but just as prosperous, world, and to do so in good time.13 Link Rhodium Group and MIT’s Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR), Clean Investment Monitor, link Brandon Hill, How to take advantage of tax credit transferability though the Inflation Reduction Act, Thomson Reuters Institute, April 16, 2024, link Allison Good, Renewables project finance to keep pace in 2024, but tax equity rule looms, S&P Global, January 12, 2024, link Lesley Hunter and Mason Vliet, The Risk Profile of Renewable Energy Tax Equity Investments, American Council on Renewable Energy, December 2023, link Link, page in French only Link Link Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada, Flow-through shares & the mineral exploration tax credit explained, link Link Link Link The authors would like to acknowledge the participation and the work done by Sophie Poirier in this publication

Introduction On June 14, 2024, the Superior Court of Québec issued a decision1 interpreting section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, which came into force in 2019. This provision gives a person interested in participating in the awarding process the opportunity to file a preliminary complaint about a requirement in the tender documents that they believe does not ensure the honest and fair treatment of tenderers. To our knowledge, this is the first time a court has considered the impact on a claim for damages for loss of profits2 when an unsuccessful tenderer fails to comply with this relatively new provision  The Superior Court concluded that a tenderer’s failure to submit a complaint in a timely manner should be considered as [translation] “a form of fin de non-recevoir, or at the very least, a break in the chain of causation between the alleged fault and the damages claimed” (paragraph 40). Facts The dispute at hand pitted Transport Martin Forget Inc. (“Transport Forget”) against the Municipality of Saint-Alexis (the “Municipality”). On May 6, 2019, the Municipality issued a call for tenders for a snow clearing and salting contract. Transport Forget submitted the lowest bid, which was $150,000 below that of the winning tenderer. Transport Forget was excluded from the call for tenders given its failure to comply with the tender specifications requiring it to provide a Régie du bâtiment du Québec (“RBQ”) licence number, together with an attestation that its licence was in good standing. Further to the Municipality’s refusal to award the contract to Transport Forget, it claimed $300,000 in damages for alleged loss of profits. Transport Forget believed that its tender was compliant, that the RBQ licence requirement imposed by the Municipality was frivolous and unreasonable, that the Municipality failed to uphold the principle of equal treatment of tenderers and that the complaint process provided for in section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec did not deprive it of its rights. As for the Municipality, it considered the irregularity in Transport Forget’s tender to be major and Transport Forget’s failure to comply with the complaint process concerning this requirement—both reasonable and in the public interest—was fatal to its legal action. The evidence showed that the RBQ licence number provided in Transport Forget’s tender was invalid and that Transport Forget deliberately chose not to renew said licence before submitting its tender, as it was unsure as to whether it would win the bidding process and wished to avoid needlessly paying the $1,000 annual fee required for the licence renewal. Applicable principles In order to determine the outcome of this dispute, the Court analyzed the case based on the decision in Tapitec,3 a landmark ruling in tendering matters. It reiterated the Court’s view that the decisive factor in determining whether an irregularity is minor or major is the equal treatment of tenderers. It also pointed out that municipalities can set out conditions aimed at limiting the number of tenderers, provided that this is done for an important and legitimate purpose. As for section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, the Court viewed it as a mechanism for monitoring all contracts awarded by public bodies which is designed to establish a process to ensure compliance with the principles of integrity needed to protect the public interest. According to the Court, the legislator’s intention is also to protect small municipalities such as the one in question (with a population of approximately 1,500) from potential legal action following the opening of tenders by ensuring that issues concerning the principle of equal treatment of tenderers are resolved prior to the tendering process. Tenderers that fail to comply with this requirement will not be entitled to claim damages for loss of profits, as in this case, except where there has been fraud or blatant bad faith, as in cases of collusion. The purpose of the provision in question is to prevent a tenderer that is aware of the requirements set out in the tender documents from contesting such requirements after the fact. Decision The Court found that the requirement to hold an RBQ licence number was a condition intended to limit the number of tenderers, which the Municipality was entitled to do. Although the Court recognized that there is no correlation between being able to perform snow clearing operations and holding an RBQ licence, it accepted the evidence that this condition was an appropriate and quick way for the Municipality to ascertain the credibility and organizational skills of tenderers, which was a important and legitimate objective. The Court therefore concluded that this requirement of the tender specifications was neither frivolous nor arbitrary. The Court considered the irregularity in Transport Forget’s tender to be major. Although the obligation to hold a valid RBQ licence is neither a requirement of public policy nor a substantive requirement, it is intended precisely to proscribe the lack of seriousness shown by Transport Forget when it opted not to pay the renewal fees for its RBQ licence before submitting its tender. The Municipality exercised its administrative discretion in a reasonable manner and ensured that all tenderers were treated equally. The Court found that the Municipality was right to reject Transport Forget’s tender. Although the Court dismissed the claim, it did nevertheless consider section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec. In the Court’s view, Transport Forget could have lodged a preliminary complaint about the validity of the condition imposed by the Municipality to hold an RBQ licence. Doing so would have given the Municipality the opportunity to amend its call for tenders before the opening of tenders. Transport Forget’s failure to do this rendered its claim for damages inadmissible. Commentary Tenderers for public calls for tenders issued by a municipality must be aware of section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec4 and understand how to apply it in a timely manner. As demonstrated by the Superior Court’s interpretation of this section in the judgment in question, an unsuccessful tenderer that has not complied with the complaint process set out in said section and who intends to sue for damages for an alleged loss of profits could have their claim turned down on grounds of a fin de non-recevoir. Transport Martin Forget Inc. c. Municipalité de Saint-Alexis, 2024 QCCS 2208 We came across the decision in Sintra inc. c. Municipalité de Noyan, 2019 QCCS 4293 (CanLII), which also deals with this provision, but in the context of an application for an interim injunction from the lowest tenderer attempting to prevent the awarding of the contract to a third party: the Court dismissed the claim, in particular because the tenderer had not lodged a complaint about the process provided for the awarding of the contract, in accordance with section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, and concluded that the prima facie case requirement had not been met. Tapitec c. Ville de Blainville 2017 QCCA 317 We would also like to draw your attention to section 573.3.1.4 of the Cities and Towns Act, which is identical to section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec. We have not found any decisions interpreting this section, so we urge tenderers to be cautious and comply with the complaint process applicable to calls for tenders issued by cities and towns, to avoid having their claim turned down on grounds of a fin de non-recevoir.

Two Montréal landmarks have proudly hosted some of the city’s most memorable sporting events. The Olympic Stadium (Figure 1) and the IGA Stadium, which have been and remain quintessential in our sporting history, are in need of renovations so that sports fans can continue to “raise the roof” for years to come. Figure 1: The Olympic Stadium: A prominent feature of the Montréal skyline. These stadiums may be iconic, but the issues with their roofing systems—or lack thereof—have plagued the Montréal news for over 30 years. It is estimated that installing a retractable roof over the centre court at IGA stadium could cost $70 million, and replacing the Olympic Stadium’s roof and support ring, no less than $870 million.1 These projects may be considered priorities,2 but the skyrocketing construction and renovation costs are already causing a stir.3 And to make matters worse, the problem will not be solved definitively, as the lifespan of the new Olympic Stadium roof is estimated at 50 years.4 These projects are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to our sports infrastructure. According to the Minister responsible for Sport, Recreation and Outdoors, Isabelle Charest, “This is a huge endeavour. A good part of the infrastructure could use some work and revamping. And in some cases, we need new infrastructure, period.”5 In other words, the needs are varied and many. Investing in charming small, local skating rinks, multi-purpose municipal sports facilities and even towering stadiums used by professional sports leagues is essential to fostering physical well-being and keeping the population healthy ... or simply entertained. Mindful of the importance of physical activity as well as voters’ appreciation for sports, the Quebec government invested $300 million in the Programme d’aide financière aux infrastructures récréatives, sportives et de plein air (PAFIRSPA, financial aid program for recreational, sporting and outdoor activity infrastructure).6 One component of this program provides financing for up to two-thirds of the cost of renovating, upgrading, building or developing sports and recreational facilities, up to a maximum amount of $20 million per project. Applicants seeking financing from the program had to submit their applications by December 5, 2023. While the PAFIRSPA may seem ambitious, the projects it covers are obviously far less expensive than modern professional sports arenas, which have become true engineering and technological marvels over the years. The cost of building Tottenham Hotspur Stadium in London in 2019, for instance, has been estimated at £1.1 billion,7 which itself is a pittance compared to the US$5.5 billion needed to build the SoFi Stadium in Los Angeles, where the football teams Rams and the Chargers have been playing since 2023.8 As in most situations, money matters when it comes to sports infrastructure. A winning financing strategy is not everything—it’s the only thing. In this first instalment of our series of articles on sports law, we will focus on sports infrastructure financing and examine what lies beneath the surface, as we begin to uncover the challenges, strategies and issues. The Rules of the Game Sports infrastructure financing lies at the crossroads of the entertainment business and the public interest, and it differs from other types of financing in a number of ways. On one hand, the public’s ever-growing appetite for sporting events over the years has spawned numerous colossal projects requiring financing packages similar to those for public or industrial infrastructure projects of the same scale. On the other, the economic benefits and social impact of projects of various sizes often warrant the use of public funds, and the involvement of local communities may be imperative in the case of facilities where utility takes precedence over profitability. In addition, a wide range of financing mechanisms can be used, depending not only on the sums involved, but also on the identity of the infrastructure owners. For the purposes of this article, we will consider financing in relation to three types of ownership: (i) wholly private, (ii) public and private, and (iii) wholly public. We will be taking a closer look at specific financing options and associated issues in our next sports law article. Wholly Private Ownership Financing This refers to infrastructure owned by a private entity and operated by a private administrator, which may or may not be the same entity. One example is the Bell Centre (Figure 3), privately owned by Groupe CH, which is in turn owned by the Molson family and other investors. Figure 3: The 2022 National Hockey League Draft was held at the Bell Centre. This type of ownership usually involves wholly private financing, with the owner injecting the funds required to carry out the desired work. According to media reports, the owner of the Bell Centre invested $100 million in 2015 to renovate it.9 This amount came from Groupe CH and its investors alone. Needless to say, with this type of ownership, any kind of financing is possible, including shareholder equity investment, the issuance of bonds to private subscribers and all forms of bank debt. Combining several of these options is not at all uncommon. In the case of debt financing in particular, making lenders feel as comfortable as possible can be a challenge, and the magnitude of this challenge will depend on the amounts involved. Just how profitable a project will be hinges on whether it can be completed at the agreed-upon cost and whether it will be a commercial success once completed. Generally speaking, using a project’s assets as collateral will not be enough to get lenders on board, and they will require other forms of security, such as shareholder guarantees, fixed-price or capped construction contracts, or the involvement of subordinated lenders. When economic spinoffs are expected to benefit the community, public authorities can also be called upon to guarantee part of the loan repayment or offer various forms of public funding, including forgivable loans, thus reducing the risk assumed by lenders. Efforts to reduce the risk incurred by lenders should, in theory, result in significantly lower financial costs, or in some cases, in obtaining the required financing. Other projects rely on government procurement. Olympique Lyonnais became the first French professional soccer club to be listed on the stock exchange in 2007, when the club’s shares were put up for sale on the Euronext market in Paris. The funds raised in this way were put towards the club’s development projects, including the financing of its new stadium, which opened in January 2016. This financing package consisted of a combination of equity (including proceeds from stock issues), bank loans, traditional bonds and mandatory convertibles.10 Other supplementary yet substantial financing arrangements, such as naming rights agreements, may be used to enhance financing packages. Under such an agreement, a company can acquire naming rights to an arena for a predetermined period, generally between 3 and 20 years, in consideration of a substantial sum of money. In 2017, Scotiabank agreed to pay $800 million over 20 years to rename the building that houses the Toronto Maple Leafs hockey club the “Scotiabank Arena.”11 In addition to renaming facilities, it is possible to sell perimeter advertising or solicit individual donors to purchase a plaque bearing their name at the entrance to a field, in rows or in the bleachers. Read our latest bulletin on this topic Promoters’ financial models are routinely enhanced by other creative revenue streams, including catering concessions, box rental agreements or preferred memberships, parking spaces, boutiques and advertising. Other sources of income include leasing agreements for various uses of the facilities. Some manufacturers in the sports field construction industry even offer financing packages whereby the purchase and installation can be paid for in monthly, quarterly or annual installments, thus reducing the amount of debt or investment required. Signing the relevant contracts before building or renovating the facilities improves the financing package for the project and increases its chances of success. Public ownership financing Ownership of infrastructure by a public entity, regardless of whether it is operated by a private entity or not, can have a significant bearing on the options available and the type of financing selected. Public and private ownership involves an owner from the public sector and a private administrator. The Videotron Centre in Québec City (Figure 4), home of the Québec Remparts hockey club of the Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League, is an example of this type of ownership. It is owned by Québec City and managed by Quebecor Media. Figure 4: The Videotron Centre in Québec City, inaugurated on September 8, 2015. Generally speaking, infrastructure owned and operated in this way is financed jointly using public and private funds. Although the Videotron Centre has not required major renovation work so far, the initial construction of the stadium is an example of public-private financing. It cost a total of $370 million to build. A sum of $185 million came from the Quebec government, and $15.4 million from J’ai ma place, an organization set up specifically to finance the Videotron Centre using funds from the Quebec population. Québec City provided the remaining $169.6 million, which included the $33 million that Quebecor Media paid in 2015 to acquire naming rights (which was transferred to its subsidiary Videotron for an undisclosed sum), $50 million in cash and $86.3 million in the form of a bank loan. Public ownership means that the sports infrastructure is owned and administered by one or more public entities. In such cases, standard-sized infrastructure can generally be financed entirely using public funds. This is where Quebec’s PAFIRSPA, mentioned above, comes in. For more costly projects, including a public entity in the ownership group—be it public and private or wholly public—opens the door to a range of options. In the United States, this includes using municipal taxes or issuing municipal bonds to finance infrastructure. Construction of the Barclays Center in Brooklyn, New York, which began in 2010 and was completed in 2012, was financed in part by tax-exempt municipal bonds issued by the Brooklyn Arena Local Development Corporation, an entity formed by an agency of the State of New York for financing purposes.12 Nearly 500 million U.S. dollars were raised, covering a significant portion of the arena’s construction costs, as part of a larger redevelopment effort known as Pacific Park Brooklyn (formerly Atlantic Yards). The Barclays Center is now home to the Brooklyn Nets basketball team of the National Basketball Association. We will conclude our overview with a few words on public-private partnerships (PPPs), which are particularly well suited to high-cost infrastructure projects. Under a PPP, the government or another public entity partners with a private company to develop a public infrastructure or services project. PPPs combine the resources, expertise and capabilities of the public and private sectors to deliver projects that benefit the community. PPPs take many different forms and can cover a wide range of activities, from project design and construction to operation and, in some cases, financing. In the design-build-finance (DBF) model, for example, the PPP includes the design, construction and financing of the infrastructure. Bidders participating in the call for proposals must include a project financing package in their proposal. The private company ultimately selected for the project will be responsible for both the design and construction, as well as the initial or ongoing financing of the project. Bidders must therefore negotiate with financial institutions before being awarded the construction contract in order to include a financing package in their proposal. These financial institutions will then closely monitor how the loaned funds are used and how the project is managed. The private company selected at the end of the call for proposals must therefore make undertakings both to the public authority and to its lenders concerning deadlines, construction costs and financing costs as soon as the contract is awarded. This is why the DBF model generally allows for greater efficiency in executing projects, certainty over construction costs and better management of financial risks. One example is the Stade de France, a stadium that can accommodate 81,338 spectators in a football or rugby configuration and was built for the 1998 FIFA World Cup in France. It is located in Saint-Denis, Seine-Saint-Denis, and is owned by the French government, which awarded a 30-year concession contract expiring in 2025 to the Vinci-Bouygues consortium, as part of a scheme almost identical to today’s PPP schemes. Conclusion The investments required for certain multipurpose amphitheatres and other sports facilities are comparable to those for transport infrastructure, energy projects or industrial plants. This, of course, means that sports infrastructure projects can also rely on a similar set of financing packages, along with a few additional ones specific to sports, such as sponsorship advertising in all its forms. Public authorities are more likely to get involved in projects that include ownership by a public entity or have a major social impact. This opens the door to a wide range of financing packages, tailored to each project’s specific needs. Having now covered the basics, we look forward to examining some of these packages in greater detail in future articles. Zacharie Goudreault, Le toit fixe proposé pour le Stade olympique déchire les experts, link TVA Sports, Stade IGA : le toit doit être une priorité pour Montréal selon Legault, Le journal de Québec, August 13, 2023, link Philippe Teisceira-Lessard, Le cauchemar continue, La Presse, July 27, 2023, link Goudreault, op. cit. Gabriel Côté, Québec investit 300 M$ pour les infrastructures sportives, Le journal de Québec, June 19, 2023, link link link Christopher Palmeri, Rams Owner Stan Kroenke Debuts His $5.5 Billion Dream Stadium, Bloomberg, September 10, 2020, link Maxime Bergeron, 100 millions investis au Centre Bell, La Presse, October 14, 2015, link Bouclage du financement du stade des Lumières, Décideurs, August 7, 2013, link link; Pete Evans, Scotiabank pays big for arena naming rights, but did it break the bank?, CBC News, September 4, 2017, link link