Family, Personal and Estate

On November 15, 2024,1 in Bouchelaghem v. Université Laval,2 Superior Court Mr. Robert Dufresne granted an application for dismissal on the grounds of res judicata and abuse. His judgment is a reminder of the importance of the presumption of judgments’ validity and stability, principles linked to the authority of res judicata. To put Mr. Justice Dufresne’s decision in context, it is important to explain plaintiff’s first recourse, which led to an initial judgment by Mr. Justice Bernard Tremblay, J.S.C., granting an initial application for dismissal.3 First recourse The plaintiff was as a doctoral student outside Canada and the United States. In July 2019, she began a residency program in family medicine. On November 24, 2020, the program’s Promotion Committee for the Faculty of Medicine decided to exclude the plaintiff from the program due to her results in the residencies completed to that date.4 On December 2, 2020, Plaintiff appealed this exclusion before the Faculty of Medicine’s Appeals Committee.5 On February 4, 2021, this committee held a hearing that ended with the Promotion Committee’s decision being upheld.6 On February 8, 2021, the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine communicated the Appeal Committee’s decision to the plaintiff.7 That same day, the plaintiff contacted the Dean to complain about the Appeal Committee’s decision.8 On February 18, 2021, the Dean reiterated to the plaintiff the contents of the Appeal Committee’s decision and informed her that the decision was final.9 All internal remedies had been exhausted. On May 17, 2022, the plaintiff filed an application against Université Laval for annulment of the final decision rendered on February 8, 2021, by the Appeal Committee, titled Demande introductive d'instance associée [à un] pourvoi en contrôle judiciaire (“Originating application associated with an appeal for judicial review”). In this 442-paragraph proceeding, she sought reinstatement in the family medicine residency program, plus damages. While a challenge to an exclusion decision must be made within a reasonable time,10 usually 30 days according to jurisprudence, the plaintiff initiated her appeal almost 15 months after her exclusion from the residency program. On September 28, 2022, the University therefore filed an application to dismiss her case, on the grounds that the delay in initiating it was unreasonable and that the plaintiff did not cite any valid exceptional circumstances in her proceedings to justify this delay.  On May 15, 2023, Mr. Justice Tremblay, J.S.C., concluded that the plaintiff’s recourse qualified as an application for judicial review and that it had been filed late.11 For these reasons, he declared the recourse inadmissible and dismissed it in its entirety, since he also considered that the damages claimed by the plaintiff arose directly from her exclusion from the residency program.12 Dissatisfied with Mr. Justice Tremblay’s decision, the plaintiff served the University with a Demande de permission d’en appeler d’un jugement mettant fin à l’instance (“Application for leave to appeal a judgment ending the proceeding”). On September 19, 2023, Ms. Justice Gagné, J.C.A., dismissed the plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal,13 thereby confirming the finality of the initial decision and giving res judicata to Mr. Justice Tremblay’s ruling. Second recourse On January 30, 2024, the plaintiff initiated a new action against Université Laval, this time titled Demande introductive d'instance en dommages et intérêts (“Originating application for damages”), in which she claimed a total amount of nearly $9.5 million from the University. This 213-paragraph proceeding largely repeated the allegations made in the first recourse, generally accusing the same parties of the same faults. However, the plaintiff had removed all allegations relating to the application for judicial review and the justification for her delay in pursuing a recourse, choosing instead to group her complaints against each representative or member of the University. The University filed a Demande en irrecevabilité pour cause de chose jugée et en rejet pour abus (“Application for dismissal on the grounds of res judicata and abuse”)against this new recourse, considering that the plaintiff was attempting to revive a dispute that had already been decided by the Quebec courts, and that she had already availed herself of her right of appeal. In response to the University’s application for dismissal, the plaintiff amended her originating application to add thirteen (13) defendants, namely the individuals targeted by her allegations.  The hearing on the defendants’ application for dismissal on the grounds of res judicata and abusetook place on October 9 and November 7, 2024, before Mr. Justice Dufresne. The law The principle of res judicata is codified in article 2848 of the Civil Code of Québec. To establish the legal presumption of validity of judgments (res judicata), two conditions must be met: Triple identity must be established to ensure that the same cause, between the same parties applying for the same purpose, has already been decided.  The judgment in a contentious matter must be rendered by a competent court and must be final.14 Before beginning his analysis of the triple identity, Mr. Justice Dufresne first examined this second criterion. He noted that the judgment in a contentious matter was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, since Mr. Justice Tremblay was seized of the application for dismissal. He also concluded that the judgment had become final as more than thirty days had elapsed since its pronouncement and permission to appeal had been refused. The second criterion is therefore satisfied.15 Mr. Justice Dufresne then proceeded to analyze the triple identity criterion. He found it had been established that the parties were legally identical in both recourses. Hundreds of allegations were compared between the first and second recourses, as were dozens of exhibits produced in support of both proceedings.16 He also noted that the plaintiff formulated the same complaints in both recourses, although the way of describing those to whom they were addressed was somewhat different. He put it this way: “[24] The faults, failures and complaints raised before Mr. Justice Tremblay, J.S.C., against the defendants are the same as those raised in the present case. Those responsible are identified. Whether they are identified as managers, employees or civil servants, does not change the fact that, legally, the defendant is the same in both recourses." As recognized in jurisprudence, adding defendants to a recourse does not prevent the court from finding that the parties are identical, since this identity does not have to be perfect.17 As for identity of cause, Mr. Justice Dufresne noted that although the vocabulary is sometimes different, the complaints of bad faith, falsification of documents, illicit and illegal application of standards, violation of certain fundamental rights, and discrimination are repeated or renewed from one proceeding to the next. In both recourses, the plaintiff raises the same issues (which she confirmed when examined by the judge on this subject during her closing arguments).18 The second recourse again sought compensation for the harm resulting from the plaintiff’s exclusion from her residency program. Mr. Justice Tremblay had already ruled that the plaintiff’s damages stem from her exclusion from the program. He had already concluded, in his judgment of May 15, 2023, that the entire recourse is inadmissible.19 Finally, on the question of identity of purpose, Mr. Justice Dufresne wondered whether the new recourse would expose the court to contradict an earlier decision. He soon discovered that this was indeed the case; allowing the plaintiff’s recourse would require rejecting the conclusions of the previous judgment.20 The abusive nature of the recourse Mr. Justice Dufresne then considered whether the plaintiff’s recourse was abusive. He considered this to be the case, since the plaintiff was repeating the allegations of a recourse that had already been dismissed. He concluded that she has not acted in good faith and that she was trying to harm the people she holds responsible for her exclusion: “[41] These modifications, by adding defendants and increasing the amount claimed, constitute an excessive and unreasonable use of proceedings. This only serves to harm these people, whom the plaintiff holds culpably responsible for her exclusion from the Program. This is a misappropriation of the ends of justice, whereby the plaintiff is attempting to take justice into her own hands to make these people pay for their faults. Moreover, the plaintiff appears to meet many of the criteria for being declared quarrelsome.” [Our translation] In closing, Mr. Justice Dufresne reminds us that article 51 C.C.P. allows the Court to act, even of its own motion, when a party engages in vexatious or quarrelsome behaviour. He considers that the plaintiff meets several criteria that would allow her to be declared quarrelsome. He mentions having examined these criteria and having considered doing so, but given that the plaintiff did not have the opportunity to present her arguments on the question of quarrelsomeness at the hearing, he concludes that he could not act in violation of the audi alteram partem principle. He grants the University’s application for dismissal on the grounds of res judicata and abuseand dismissed the plaintiff’s recourse in its entirety. Conclusion The principle of res judicata, codified in article 2848 of the Civil Code of Québec, is a pillar of our legal system. Once a court has rendered a final decision, that judgment cannot be called into question again. In the Bouchelaghem case, Mr. Justice Dufresne had to examine numerous allegations and exhibits, and he came to the conclusion that despite the different wording of the allegations and the addition of thirteen parties as defendants, the nature of the plaintiff’s second recourse remains in practice identical to the first. This judgment is a reminder that excessive and unreasonable use of proceedings, with the aim of harming the opposing party, can lead to a party being declared quarrelsome and having to pay additional costs, at the initiative of the judge hearing the case, even without an application from the party subject to the complaints. The plaintiff applied for leave to appeal Mr. Justice Dufresne’s judgment. On February 12, 2025, Mr. Justice Michel Beaupré of the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed this application.21 The case was pleaded on October 9 and November 7, 2024. 2024 QCSC 4232. The plaintiff filed an application for permission to appeal this decision on December 30, 2024. The hearing is scheduled for February 11, 2025. Bouchelaghem v. Université Laval, 2023 QCSC 4483. Bouchelaghem v. Université Laval, 2023 QCSC 4483 para. 8. Id., para. 9. Id., para. 10. Id., para. 10. Id., para. 149. Id., para. 151. An application for judicial review must be filed within a reasonable time, in accordance with article 529 para.3 C.C.P. Bouchelaghem, supra note 3, para. 116 and para. 162 to 165. Id., para. 120 to 125. Bouchelaghem v. Université Laval, 2023 QCCA 1443. Bouchelaghem v. Université Laval, supra note 2, para. 16. Id. Bouchelaghem v. Université Laval, supra, note 2, para. 23. Bouchelaghem v. Université Laval, supra, note 2, para. 8. Bouchelaghem v. Université Laval, supra, note 2, para. 27-28. This was also noted by Ms. Justice Gagné, J.C.A., in her judgment dismissing the application for leave to appeal, supra, note 13, para. 6. Bouchelaghem v. Université Laval, supra, note 2, para. 36. Bouchelaghem c. Université Laval, 2025 QCCA 144.

Quebec is currently facing a major shortage of physicians. To remedy the situation, several ministers in the CAQ government announced in early 2024 that significant changes would be implemented to reduce physicians’ administrative burden. In this context, on October 9, 2024, the National Assembly assented to Bill 68, An Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians.1 The provisions of the Act The new Act comprises 11 sections, many of which introduce amendments to the Act respecting labour standards2 (ALS) by restricting the right of employers to require documents attesting to the reasons for certain absences. Under the current legislation, an employer may be entitled to require a document from an employee who misses work owing to sickness in order to assess the reasons for the absence, its duration, or the employee’s ability to return to work. This is because, under the terms of a contract of employment,3every employer is entitled to expect their employee to fully perform the work agreed upon. Depending on the circumstances, the supporting document provided must in some instances indicate a specific medical diagnosis, an estimated duration of absence and other details relevant to handling the employee’s absence. In keeping with these principles, section 79.2 of the ALS provided that an employer informed of an absence owing to sickness, an organ or tissue donation, an accident, domestic violence, sexual violence or a criminal offence may, “[i]f it is warranted by the duration of the absence or its repetitive nature, for instance, [...] request that the employee furnish a document attesting to those reasons.” According to arbitral jurisprudence4 and that of the Administrative Labour Tribunal5, unwarranted refusal to provide such a document may constitute valid grounds for imposing an administrative or disciplinary measure, depending on the circumstances. That said, the new Act as adopted changes this balance. Indeed, a paragraph has been added to section 79.2 of the ALS specifying that “[...] no employer may request the document referred to in the first paragraph for the first three periods of absence not exceeding three consecutive days taken over a period of 12 months.” It will therefore be prohibited to require a supporting document, including a medical certificate, for the first three short-term absences (less than four days) occurring over the 12 preceding months. According to the comments of the Minister of Labour, such calculation of absences is to begin with the first absence during the year rather than as of January 1st of each year.6 The Act does not provide for an exception in cases where absences are excessive or otherwise questionable. Under which conditions will employers be entitled to require a medical certificate? Under the Act, employers retain the right to require a medical certificate where the absence is likely to last four consecutive days or more. What is more, the provision does not deny employers the right to investigate situations that appear questionable. The aforementioned prohibition will also apply to employers whose employees are governed by the Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and workforce management in the construction industry.7 Furthermore, the Act includes an amendment to the provisions relating to family or parental leave and absences. The third paragraph of section 79.7 of the ALS is amended so as to prevent employers from requiring a medical certificate to justify such absences. However, we believe this amendment in no way affects their right to require any other type of documentation, particularly as regards obligations relating to daycare services or educational institutions. Where an offence is committed, the penal provisions already included in sections 139 to 147 of the ALS apply. As these amendments are of public order and take precedence over any contract, policy or collective agreement, any measure imposed on an employee that would contravene any of these new obligations may be deemed invalid or result in a prohibited practice complaint. How will the Act affect insurers and employee benefit plan administrators? On another note, the Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians also introduces a new prohibition applicable to insurers and employee benefit plan administrators. They will no longer be entitled to require that a medical service, such as a consultation, be received in order to reimburse the cost of services or a technical aid, nor will they be entitled to require that a medical service be received at a predetermined frequency different from that considered appropriate by the attending physician for the purpose of maintaining the payment of disability benefits. Coming into force The amendments to the ALS will come into force as of January 1, 2025. The amendments concerning insurers and employee benefit plan administrators will apply subsequently at a date or dates to be set by the Government. S.Q., 2024, c. 29. CQLR, c. N-1.1. Civil Code of Québec, CQLR, c. CCQ-1991, art. 2085. See in particular the case law cited in Linda Bernier, Guy Blanchet and Éric Séguin, Les mesures disciplinaires et non disciplinaires dans les rapports collectifs du travail, 2nd ed. Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, loose-leaf, updated to May 30, 2024, paras. 1.055 et seq. See in particular : Marchessault et CPE Les Petits Adultes, 2019 QCTAT 1632, paras. 37–38; Labourdette et Protecteur du citoyen, 2019 QCTAT 4831, para. 52. COMMITTEE ON LABOUR AND THE ECONOMY, Clause-by-clause consideration of Bill 68, An Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians, October 1, 2024. CQLR, c. R-20.

PROOF OF INCAPACITY: ANALYSIS OF CIUSSS DE L’OUEST-DE-L’ÎLE-DE-MONTRÉAL (ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL CENTER) c. R.C.1 Summary The authors comment on this decision rendered on September 20, 2024, in which the Court of Appeal ruled on the capacity to consent to care in the presence of a psychiatric disorder. The Court of Appeal overturned the first instance decision, which had found the respondent capable of refusing treatment with antipsychotic medications even though he had refuted his diagnosis, because he understood the benefits that antipsychotic medications could afford him and refused to take them because of their side effects. The Court of Appeal rather concluded that the trial judge had misapplied the five criteria to be used to assess whether a person is capable of consenting to care, particularly in the context where (i) the trial judge’s conclusion ran counter to the uncontradicted opinion of an expert; and (ii) there was much evidence supporting the fact that the respondent was incapable of making an informed decision. INTRODUCTION In this case, the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (the “CIUSSS”) appealed a decision rendered by the Superior Court on March 14, 2024, dismissing its application for an authorization to provide care to R.C., a 51-year-old man. The Superior Court had concluded that the CIUSSS had not proven that the respondent was incapable of consenting to care. The Court of Appeal was thus called upon to review the trial judge’s answer to the first question (incapacity to consent) in the analytical framework2 surrounding the test that has now been used for three decades.3 THE FACTS R.C. has a complex medical history. He was hospitalized several times between 2007 and 2019 for mental health issues, including suicidal ideation and personality disorders. In 2021, he was admitted to the CHUM for COVID-19-related complications having resulted in brain damage caused by hypoxia. From 2022 onwards, he made repeated visits to the emergency room, often to obtain benzodiazepines, leading him to become addicted. Even though he adhered to treatment with antipsychotic medication for a time, R.C. stopped taking his medication because of undesirable side effects. In January 2024, after an episode of confusion, he was taken to hospital where he was diagnosed with late-onset schizophrenia. However, R.C. refuted the diagnosis, claiming that his health problems were caused by an artificial intelligence device he believed had been implanted in his body. The psychiatrists who assessed him concluded that he was incapable of consenting to care. On February 16, 2024, the CIUSSS filed an application for authorization to re-hospitalize R.C. and administer antipsychotic medications, despite his categorical refusal. After analyzing the evidence, which essentially consisted of R.C.’s testimony and that of the CIUSSS psychiatrist, the Superior Court concluded that R.C. understood the nature of his condition and the benefits of the proposed treatment, despite his refusal to accept his diagnosis. The Court was of the opinion that the CIUSSS psychiatrists, in their analysis of R.C.’s capacity, had erroneously and repeatedly carried over his rejection of the diagnosis in a cascading fashion in their analysis of the five criteria from the decision in A.G.,4 thereby making the same error as the one that the Court of Appeal had identified in the M.H. decision.5 Despite the absence of a second opinion on R.C.’s capacity, the Superior Court had determined that he was able to consent to his care. According to the trial judge, in keeping with the teachings of the Court of Appeal in the F.D. decision,6 he therefore lacked jurisdiction to order care. For this reason, he dismissed the application for an authorization to provide care. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION The Court of Appeal began by reiterating the five criteria for assessing a person’s capacity, namely: Does the person understand the nature of the illness for which treatment is proposed? Does the person understand the nature and purpose of the treatment? Does the person understand the risks and benefits involved in undergoing the treatment? Does the person understand the risks involved in not undergoing the treatment? ls the capacity to consent to treatment affected by the patient's illness?7 It pointed out that the criteria are not cumulative and that it is incumbent upon the trier to assess them as a whole.8 Moreover, the mere fact that a person refuses care that would be in their best interest is not enough to conclude that the person is incapable,9 nor is their mere rejection of their diagnosis.10 In this case, the Court of Appeal considered that the Superior Court judge had committed a palpable and overriding error making its intervention warranted. It stated that the trial judge was obliged to express an opinion on whether the evidence proffered was sufficient, adding that the judge had a proactive role to play in protecting the interests of the person involved. If the trial judge felt that a point that had not been the subject in a genuine adversarial debate raised a problem in his view, it was up to him to ask questions.11 Subsequently, the court took extracts from the evidence consisting of a psychiatric report and the testimony of its author and went on to note that the evidence did not allow the trial judge to conclude that R.C. was capable of consenting or refusing the proposed treatment plan, on the contrary. Based on the same evidence, the Court declared R.C. incapable of consenting to care and sent the case back to the Superior Court so that it could determine whether there was indeed categorical refusal and assess the terms of the treatment plan sought. AUTHORS’ COMMENTS This decision of the Court of Appeal follows approximately 20 other decisions12 respecting orders authorizing care handed down by this same court, which have all further established and clarified the guiding principles surrounding such orders since the F.D. decision of 2015.13 These successive decisions have not only added to case law, they have refined the assessment criteria and legal requirements pertaining to applications for authorization to provide care. Such a development in case law shows that the courts are committed to circumscribing complex healthcare situations. Doing so involves striking a balance between the rights to freedom and self-determination and the protection of those who are vulnerable or otherwise unable to consent. On July 6, 2015, the Court of Appeal of Quebec marked a decisive turning point where orders authorizing care are involved by rendering a decision that sent a clear message to the Superior Court, namely F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria).14 In that decision, an analytical framework was established to ensure compliance both with the provisions of the law and the spirit of the law. Since then, the Court has handed down some 20 other significant decisions, each shedding additional light. The guiding principles derived from these decisions can be summarized under the following themes: Rights relating to the judicial process  Every person has the fundamental right to contest an application for a order authorizing care, to be heard and to be represented.15 The judge must proactively protect the user’s interests and ensure that they are represented by a lawyer.16 Scope of the care plan Requiring a definite care plan does not mean dictating which medication should be administered in a limitative way.17 A judge may remove certain substances from a treatment plan if they deem that to be in the patient’s best interest.18 It is crucial to draw a distinction between preventive care and a treatment plan that includes various alternatives as the situation evolves.19 For a future hospitalization clause to be valid, there must be a reasonable foreseeability of hospitalization.20 When a patient is to be placed, the application for authorization must indicate where they are to be placed.21 Physical restraint may only be used if it is necessary to avoid serious harm, and must be limited to the minimum.22 A parent’s refusal to consent to a treatment plan may not be warranted if the plan is in the child’s best interests.23 Duration of the authorization When the person concerned is not cooperating and access to their previous medical records is not available, the judge must be especially careful in assessing whether the proposed care plan is legal, in particular in terms of its duration and scope.24 The duration of the care order should be as short as reasonably possible, without compromising the effectiveness of the treatment.25 When a future hospitalization is contemplated, the judge must take into account the time required to stabilize the patient.26 The 30-day period for a future hospitalization should not be considered an absolute limit, as a longer period may be deemed necessary after a thorough analysis.27 The evidence The mere fact that a relationship exists between an expert and a party does not make the expert’s testimony inadmissible: The circumstances surrounding the expert’s role must be reviewed.28 An expert who does not know a patient’s reasons for refusing treatment is not deemed to have breached their duty to inform.29 An expert may testify to reported facts without the possibility of anyone opposing them; however, this does not mean that reported facts are proven, as the rules of evidence remain stringent in this context.30 An expert report may suffice as testimony; the judge need not require the patient’s testimony if the patient cannot understand the issues at hand.31 Applications for safeguard orders may be unsuccessful where there is no expert report and it is not demonstrated that the matter is urgent.32 This review highlights the significant advances that the courts have made in overseeing applications for orders authorizing care and protecting vulnerable people. The analytical framework established in the F.D. decision remains relevant, and subsequent decisions have further refined its questions. The decision that the Court of Appeal handed down in Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal c. R.C. is milestone in the jurisprudence on court orders authorizing care. By overturning the lower court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the need for a thorough assessment of the capacity to consent, emphasizing that the work of medical teams and applications made by healthcare institutions are important to ensure appropriate care. This decision not only underscores the fact that it is important to protect the rights of users, but also that the work of the court is crucial, for it must ensure that the criteria are met without substituting its opinion for that of the experts heard. CONCLUSION The decision discussed in this paper is part of a series of decisions that have clarified and enhanced the guiding principles established since the F.D. decision was handed down in 2015.33 The Court of Appeal has provided valuable guidelines for judges, institutions and healthcare professionals to use in their assessment of applications for authorization to provide care. Through a careful review of the circumstances of each case, the courts have shown that they are committed to effectively circumscribing complex health situations by ensuring that institutions have the tools they need to respond appropriately. Lastly, we must recognize that while progress has been made, there are still unresolved issues that need to be addressed. Recent court decisions, including the one that led to the R.C. decision,34 illustrate the importance of constant dialogue between those involved in the legal aspect of cases and those dealing with clinical realities. As jurisprudence continues to develop, paying close attention to future developments will be key to ensuring that healthcare institutions can act effectively in consideration of patients’ needs. 2024 QCCA 1231. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. See the landmark decision, Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, para. 57. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. This decision, para. 13; with reference to Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA), pp. 28 to 33. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 45; M.C. c. Service professionnel du Centre de santé et de services sociaux d’Arthabaska-et-de-L’Érable, 2010 QCCA 1114, para. 13. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 46. This decision, para. 14, with reference to Starson v. Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, para. 79 and M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 61–62. This decision, para. 18. We have excluded the following decisions from our analysis: Bédard c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 508; M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2019 QCCA 203; S.F. c. CIUSSS de Centre-Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal – Hôpital général juif – Sir Mortimer B. Davis, 2021 QCCA 1531; P.L. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2018 QCCA 318; N.G. c. Sir Mortimer B. Davis Jewish General Hospital, 2021 QCCA 1892; F.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2017 QCCA 1206. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. Ibid. M.H.c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 68 and 69. A.N. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2022 QCCA 1167 , para. 30. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale c. D.M., 2017 QCCA 1333, para. 25. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean c. O.G., 2018 QCCA 345, paras. 15 and 16. C.R.c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux du Bas-St-Laurent, 2017 QCCA 328, para. 28. G.J. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de Laval, 2021 QCCA 1944, paras. 24 to 26. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Mauricie-et-du-Centre-du-Québec (CIUSSS MCQ) c. J.B., 2017 QCCA 1638,, paras. 30 to 35. X.Y.c. Hôpital général du Lakeshore, 2017 QCCA 1465, para. 20. A.P. c. Centre hospitalier universitaire Sainte-Justine, 2023 QCCA 58, para. 19. L.C. c. Centre hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal (CHUM), 2015 QCCA 1139, paras. 4 and 5. D.A. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2016 QCCA 1734, para. 31. T.F. c. CIUSSS de l’Est-de-l’île-de-Montréal , 2022 QCCA 1306, para. 25. N.M. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2022 QCCA1567, para. 17. M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’Île-de-Montréal , 2021 QCCA 1326, para. 11. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal (Douglas Mental Health University Institute) c. I.A., 2023 QCCA 1100, para. 30. Institut universitaire en santé mentale Douglas c. W.M., 2016 QCCA 1081, para. 5 A.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 1240, paras. 50, 56–57. A.F. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2021 QCCA 928, para. 50. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. CIUSSS de l'Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (St. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.,2024 QCCA 1231.

The 2023 Federal Budget (the “Budget”), tabled on March 28, 2023, proposes amendments to certain provisions of the Income Tax Act (ITA) that would make “genuine” intergenerational business transfers no longer subject to the anti-avoidance rules of section 84.1 and allow the transferor to benefit from their capital gains exemption. To do so, the Budget establishes new general conditions that the parties must meet, as well as specific conditions that apply to “immediate” transfers, or those made over a period of no more than 36 months, and “gradual” transfers, or those that take five to ten years to complete. The general conditions that the parties must meet when disposing of a company may be summarized as follows: The vendor must be an individual other than a trust. Immediately prior to the transfer, the vendor, alone or with their spouse, must control the currently operating company. At the time of the transfer, the purchasing company must be controlled by one or more of the vendor’s children, who must be at least 18 years of age. The notion of “child” also includes stepchildren, grandchildren and nieces and nephews. The shares of the company being transferred must be qualified small business corporation (QSBC) shares or shares of the capital stock of a family-farm or family-fishing corporation (QFFP). The specific conditions relate to the transfer of control, economic interests and management of the company, and vary from case to case. FOR AN IMMEDIATE TRANSFER (36-MONTH TEST) In the case of immediate transfers, de jure control (being the holding of the majority of shares having voting rights), and de facto control (which includes the economic influence making effective control of the company likely), must be transferred at the time of sale. Voting and participating shares not transferred to the purchasing company at the time of sale must be transferred within the following 36 months, such that after this period, the transferor may hold only preferred shares, that is, non-voting or non-participating shares for an indefinite period (vs 10 years in the case of a gradual transfer). Also, the child, or at least one member of the group of children, must participate in the family business on a regular, significant and continuous basis for a minimum period of at least 36 months after the transfer is made. Lastly, the transferor must take reasonable steps to transfer the business’s administration and know-how and completely cease to manage the business before the 36th month after the transfer was made. FOR A GRADUAL TRANSFER (FIVE–TO–TEN–YEAR TEST) If the transfer is gradual, only de jure control must be transferred at the time of disposition. The balance of the voting and participating shares not transferred at the time of disposition must be transferred within 36 months of the first transfer. However, under the rules respecting gradual transfers, the transferor will only be bound to transfer de facto control of the business within 10 years of the initial transfer. In the case of a transfer of economic interests, the vendor is expected to significantly reduce the value of the equity and advance they have invested in the business within 10 years of the initial sale. The same requirement for a child’s active participation in the company and transfer of the management of the business apply, but this time for a period of 60 months after acquisition. PREVIOUS RULES (Bill C-208) The provisions of the 2023 Federal Budget have the effect of setting aside certain requirements of Bill C-208 applicable to the realization of a capital gain. Under Bill C-208, for the transferor to benefit from their capital gains exemption, the operating company and the purchasing company could not be amalgamated within 60 months of the sale. The bill also required that an independent assessment of the fair market value of the company’s shares be filed with the Canada Revenue Agency, along with an affidavit signed by the vendor. However, as of January 1, 2024, these criteria are no longer applicable. An assessment will no longer be required, although under section 69 of the ITA, the transfer will still have to be made at fair market value. The 2023 budget (reinforced by the 2024 Federal Budget) also introduces new rules for the alternative minimum tax, a temporary tax that the transferor in an intergenerational business transfer often has to pay. To avoid having this temporary tax becoming permanent, it’s important to understand the subtleties of these new rules. Our team of tax professionals will be happy to help you and answer any questions you may have about these new legislative changes.