Labour and Employment

This bulletin addresses the same subject as a first bulletin we published on March 10, 2025, regarding Bill 89 tabled by the government. The bill was assented to on May 30, 2025, with a number of amendments and clarifications. The bill provides for major amendments to the Labour Code (L.C.) to improve the way in which the needs of the population are taken into account during labour disputes by introducing two new mechanisms, in particular. Firstly, it grants the Minister of Labour the power to refer parties to binding arbitration when the Minister considers that a strike or lockout is causing or threatening to cause serious harm to the public after unsuccessful mediation or conciliation. Secondly, it creates a framework for a new category of services to be maintained, those “ensuring the well-being of the population,” under which critical services will be maintained during strikes or lockouts. Having followed the parliamentary proceedings closely, we noted that a number of significant amendments were made to the bill since it was introduced. The time limit to negotiate services ensuring the well-being of the population was changed from fifteen to seven clear working days and the date of entry into force of the new provisions postponed to November 30, 2025. During the parliamentary debates, the Minister gave a few examples of what could fall under the concept of “social, economic or environmental security” for the population. Social security could be at stake in situations affecting the development of a vulnerable person, or in cases linked to poverty, isolation or food insecurity, among others. Economic security could also be compromised in similar circumstances, particularly when they affect the ability to get to work or earn wages. The concept of environmental security may include natural disasters or a significant deterioration in environmental quality, in particular. Although it will ultimately be up to the courts to rule on the scope of these new provisions, we believe that the points raised in parliamentary committee will affect how they are interpreted. The following table illustrates the main differences between the general essential services framework that apply to the public services covered by the Act and the new measures that can be put in place to protect the population:   Essential services among public services  Services ensuring the well-being of the population Special powers granted to the Minister Scope of application (subject to exclusions)  Public or comparable services (ss. 111.0.16 and 111.0.17 L.C.) Parties designated by the government by order (s. 111.22.4 L.C.) Any dispute, but does not apply to certain sectors or organizations listed in s. 111.32.1 L.C. Process by which dispute is rendered subject to mechanism ALT decision (s. 111.0.17 L.C.) ALT decision (s. 111.22.5 L.C.) Notice from the Minister to the parties (s. 111.32.2 L.C.) Application criteria Possibility of endangering public health or safety (s. 111.0.17 L.C.) Disproportionate impact on the social, economic or environmental security of the population, particularly that of persons in vulnerable situations (s. 111.22.3 L.C.) Labour conflict that causes or threatens to cause serious or irreparable harm to the public and unsuccessful intervention of a conciliator or mediator (s. 111.32.2 L.C.) Effect once subject to mechanism Right to strike temporarily suspended until legal requirements are met (s 111.0.17 L.C.)   Right to lockout prohibited in public services (s. 111.0.26 L.C.)   Continuation of strike or lockout after a decision making the dispute subject to the mechanism is rendered, unless exceptional circumstances warrant otherwise pending a decision by the ALT on whether the minimum services to be maintained are sufficient (s. 111.22.11 L.C.) Right to strike and lockout ceasing at the time indicated on the Minister’s notice (s. 111.32.2 L.C.) Procedure 1. Mandatory negotiation between the parties (s. 111.0.18 L.C.) 1. Mandatory negotiation between the parties within seven clear working days of an ALT decision (s. 111.22.7 L.C.) Parties consulted for 10 days on choice of arbitrator. If this fails, appointment by the Minister (s. 111.32.3 L.C.)   At any time, the parties may agree upon one of the matters of the dispute. The agreement shall be recorded in the arbitration award, which shall not amend it (s. 111.32.4 L.C.). Procedure 2. Forwarding of the agreement to the ALT for sufficiency assessment. If no agreement is reached, the union must forward a list of which services must be maintained (s. 111.0.18 L.C.). 2. Forwarding of the agreement to the ALT for sufficiency assessment (s. 111.22.8 L.C.) Dispute referred to arbitration, with necessary adaptations (ss. 111.32.2 and 111.32.5 L.C.) Procedure 3. ALT can help the parties to reach an agreement (s. 111.0.18 L.C.) 3. ALT can help the parties to reach an agreement (s. 111.22.7 L.C.) n/a ALT’s main role Sufficiency assessment, recommendations to parties in the event of insufficiency (s. 111.0.19 L.C.) Sufficiency assessment, determination of services to be maintained in case of insufficiency or if no agreement is reached (ss. 111.22.8 and 111.22.9 L.C.) Rule on the conditions of employment in dispute. Term and amendment of decisions The ALT’s decision to require a certified association and an employer to maintain services applies to each negotiation stage.   The ALT may also amend or revoke its decision at any time (s. 111.0.17.1 L.C.). The ALT’s decision to require a certified association and an employer to maintain services applies to the negotiation stage in progress.   The ALT may also amend or revoke its decision at any time, after the parties have submitted their views (s. 111.22.10 L.C.). Save for some exceptions, the award binds the parties for no less than one year or more than three years. The parties may, however, agree to amend the content, wholly or in part (s. 92 L.C.).   The arbitrator may at any time correct an award containing a mistake in writing or calculation or any other clerical error (s. 91.1 L.C.). Entry into force October 30, 2019 November 30, 2025 November 30, 2025 Note that we summarized the information above to make it concise. Given the complexity of the provisions in question and the many nuances and clarifications that may apply, you should read the specific provisions of the Labour Code or contact your legal advisors before making any decisions. We are available to answer any questions you may have about the impact of these new provisions on your business or to help you address such matters.

 On April 24, 2025, Labour Minister Jean Boulet tabled Bill 101, An Act to improve certain labour laws, in the National Assembly of Québec. This new omnibus bill proposes some 20 measures to amend legislative provisions, including those regarding the grievance arbitration process set out in the Labour Code. The proposed measures that concern grievance arbitration include the following: Establishment of a maximum time limit of six months to appoint an arbitrator and of one year to hold a first hearing:  An arbitrator will have to be appointed within six months of the grievance being filed. If this does not occur, the party that filed the grievance will have to ask the Minister to appoint one within 10 days after the time limit has elapsed, failing which the party will be deemed to have withdrawn its grievance. However, it will be possible for the party to apply to the Administrative Labour Tribunal to have the time limit extended by 10 days if it can show that it was impossible to act. The first day of a grievance hearing must take place no later than one year after the grievance is filed. It will be possible to extend this time limit once only and for a specific number of days if the parties so request and the arbitrator agrees. Grievances filed before these new provisions come into force will not be subject to the new process. The provisions would also not apply to the public and parapublic sectors. Requirement that parties consider mediation before resorting to arbitration and introduction of measures specific to the process. Mandatory disclosure of evidence between the parties within the time limits set at the pre-hearing conference, or, failing that, at least 30 days before the hearing. Two exceptions are provided for: when an urgent situation arises or unless otherwise decided to ensure the proper administration of justice. Proof that a copy of the evidence was provided will have to be sent to the arbitrator. Requirement for the arbitrator to hold a pre-hearing conference when one of the parties requests one. These are just a few of the changes proposed by Bill 101, which also includes several other measures, such as: Measures aimed at maintaining the employment relationship for an employee who is absent because of a public health rule, or because of a disaster, as defined in the Act respecting civil protection to promote disaster resilience (chapter S-2.4). Heftier fines for criminal offences under the Act respecting labour standards and the Labour Code. A requirement for associations to present their audited financial statements at annual general meetings and to make them available to members on request. Measures concerning the health and safety of workers as well as the occupational health and safety compensation system. Bill 101 must go through a number of stages, including special consultations and public hearings, before its provisions come into force. More articles to come on this subject!

On April 28, 2025, Canadian voters will go to the polls for the federal election. Now is a good time to go over what obligations employers have under the Canada Elections Act1 (the “Act”) and what penalties apply should employers breach their obligations. Summary Employers are required to give employees who are eligible to vote three consecutive hours on election day to do so, without loss of pay. If an employee were to find themselves unable to exercise their right because of their schedule, the employer must change that employee’s schedule. However, under their management rights, employers are entitled to determine the period during which employees will be given time off to go vote. Management rights must be exercised reasonably and in accordance with applicable provisions of collective agreements, if any. In Quebec, polling stations will be open from 9:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. In addition, employers can in no case force employees to exercise their right to vote in advance. Employers contravening the Act could be fined up to $2,000, but note that certain offences may result in significantly higher penalties. The Act stipulates in particular that no employer may “by intimidation, undue influence or by any other means, interfere with the granting to an elector in their employ of the three consecutive hours for voting.”2 In such cases, offenders may face fines of up to $50,000 or imprisonment for five years. The same applies to an employer who, by intimidation or duress, would attempt to compel or compel a person “to vote or refrain from voting, or to vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate or registered party, at an election.3 As such, prudent employers should avoid making comments or behaving in a way that could be interpreted by employees as an attempt to influence their vote. Conclusion Election day is fast approaching. Don’t hesitate to contact a member of our Labour and Employment Law team if you have any questions about the application of the Canada Elections Act. [1] S.C. 2000, c. 9. [2] Id., s. 134. [3] Id., s. 282.8.

On March 3, 2025, Superior Court Justice Nancy Bonsaint dismissed an application for an interim interlocutory injunction that would allow Les Entreprises de la Batterie inc. to use a property it did not own for major construction work on its building. The judgment serves as a reminder that a party cannot manufacture a sense of urgency and then use that to support its application for an interim injunction. Summary of facts The Plaintiff, Les Entreprises de la Batterie inc., owns a building that has been under construction since March 2021, in order to convert it into a hotel that will serve as an extension to the hotel the Plaintiff currently operates.1 The Defendant owns a hotel and a piece of property adjacent to the building under construction. The property is used as a parking lot for his hotel guests.2 Construction work on the Plaintiff’s building was initially carried out in two separate phases, from March to November 20213 and from August 23, 2022, to July 2024.4 During those phases, the Parties reached various agreements whereby the Plaintiff could use one (1) of the Defendant’s parking spaces, in exchange for compensation.5 On February 14, 2025, the Plaintiff informed the Defendant that it planned to begin a new phase of construction (Phase 3) on February 28, 2025.6 The Plaintiff also informed the Defendant that, as part of the new phase of construction, the Plaintiff would need to use half of the Defendant’s parking lot, that is, six (6) parking spaces, and that the entrance to the parking lot would have to be relocated for more than two (2) years.7 Additionally, the Plaintiff pointed out that it would need access to the Defendant’s entire parking lot for a few days in the spring of 2025.8 The Plaintiff alleged that construction work on its building had to begin urgently on February 28, 2025.9 The Defendant objected to having to tolerate such a major disruption for an additional two (2) years, given that he had endured the inconveniences caused by the Plaintiff’s construction work for over four (4) years now, without being offered any form of compensation that would be considered fair or reasonable in the circumstances. On February 27, 2025, the Plaintiff brought anoriginating application before Justice Bonsaint, seeking orders for an interim interlocutory injunction, an interlocutory injunction and a permanent injunction, as well as for a declaration of abuse of process and damages, which was amended on February 28, 2025.10 At the interim interlocutory injunction stage, the Plaintiff asked the Court to issue a temporary order granting the Plaintiff access to the Defendant’s six (6) parking spaces so it could continue setting up its construction site.11 The Plaintiff also sought reimbursement of the professional fees incurred in applying for the injunction. The Plaintiff alleged that the hotel expansion was [TRANSLATION] “a large-scale project with costs in the tens of millions of dollars”.12 The Plaintiff further alleged that [TRANSLATION] “there is an urgent need for the construction work required to repurpose the building and turn it into a hotel to continue, without being interrupted by the Defendant’s actions”.13 The Plaintiff argued that halting construction work on its building would result in delays, significantly disrupting the timeline of the project, which was planned over the next two (2) years. Furthermore, it would lead to substantial additional costs associated with the various extras charged by the contractors it had hired to carry out the conversion and construction work.14 Needless to say, the Defendant opposed the application for an interim interlocutory injunction, arguing in particularthat the facts alleged by the Plaintiff failed to meet the urgency test.15 Those are the facts that Justice Bonsaint took into account when rendering her decision. The criteria for granting interim interlocutory injunctions In her judgment, Justice Bonsaint reviewed the legal principles governing interim interlocutory injunction applications. We will do the same below. The criteria for granting an interim interlocutory injunction are as follows: Urgency Serious issue to be tried or strong prima facie case Serious or irreparable harm Balance of convenience16 It is a discretionary and exceptional remedy that should only be granted sparingly and under strict conditions.17 The urgency criterion Urgency is [TRANSLATION] “of paramount importance”18 in determining whether an interim interlocutory injunction should be granted. If the urgency test is not met, the application simply cannot be allowed.19 Courts often describe the level of urgency required as being akin to [TRANSLATION] “a 9-1-1 emergency”.20 Interim interlocutory injunctions should only be granted in cases of [TRANSLATION] “extreme urgency”.21 For a court to find that the urgency test is met, the urgency must not result from a delay in bringing legal action. It must be [TRANSLATION] “immediate and apparent”—not the product of the plaintiff’s own lack of diligence.22 In other words, [TRANSLATION] “the alleged urgency must be real—not manufactured by the person asserting it”.23 Upon reviewing the case, Justice Bonsaint noted that the Defendant had been made aware only on January 31, 2025, that the Plaintiff would need access to his property for construction work.24 Prior to January 2025, the Plaintiff had not informed the Defendant of its true intentions regarding the work.25 It was not until February 14, 2025, that the Plaintiff officially informed the Defendant of the nature of the access required for the third phase of the project, namely, the use of at least half of the Defendant’s property from February 28, 2025, to March 31, 2027.26 Further to the Defendant’s contestation, Justice Bonsaint noted that the Plaintiff had known for several months that the third phase of the work would begin in early 2025.27 She found that the Plaintiff [TRANSLATION] “had not treated the issue of accessing the parking lot as one requiring urgent resolution”.28 The Plaintiff tried to justify its failure to be proactive, arguing that it had been unable to inform the Defendant of its space requirements before 2025 because the project timeline was still unknown at the time.29 However, Justice Bonsaint found that such explanations simply did not excuse the Plaintiff’s delay in filing its application for an interim interlocutory injunction against the Defendant.30 On the contrary, the supporting documents that the Plaintiff had submitted with its letter dated February 14, 2025, such as a plan of the Defendant’s parking lot and the preliminary project timeline, included references to “2024”.31 Given the above, Justice Bonsaint could only conclude that the Plaintiff had known for several months that construction work on its building was scheduled to begin in 2025.32 On that point, Justice Bonsaint was clear: [TRANSLATION] “The Court understands that preliminary construction timelines may be subject to change, but there is nothing to suggest that construction needed to begin ‘urgently’ on February 28, 2025. . . . the Plaintiff should have taken action as early as January 2025”.33 The Plaintiff had been aware of the access issues involving the Defendant’s property since the fall of 2024—and certainly since January 2025.34 Those issues should have prompted discussions between the Parties’ lawyers well before February 2025, and no later than January 2025.35 Discussions or attempts to settle the matter The Plaintiff also argued that, at the interim interlocutory injunction stage, discussions or attempts to settle the matter could have a bearing in determining whether the urgency requirement was met.36 Justice Bonsaint rejected that argument, given that no real negotiations had taken place, other than failed calls in November and December 2024, and again in January 2025, and that the Plaintiff had been aware of the access issues involving the Defendant’s property since the fall of 2024—and certainly since January 2025. Consequently, Justice Bonsaint dismissed the application for an interim interlocutory injunction, seeing as the Plaintiff had asked the Court to find that such an order, which would grant the Plaintiff access to half of the Defendant’s parking lot for two (2) years, needed to be issued urgently, even though the Plaintiff itself had not considered the need to access the parking lot as being an urgent matter to be resolved before the third phase of construction began.37 Key takeaways The urgency criterion is of paramount importance in determining whether an interim interlocutory injunction should be granted. That requirement must be met for the Court to allow such an application. In assessing the facts and allegations related to an application for an interim interlocutory injunction, the Court must ensure that the urgency is real—akin to a 9-1-1 situation—and not manufactured by the party seeking the relief. A delay attributable to the plaintiff cannot serve as a basis for granting an interim interlocutory injunction against the defendant. Half-hearted attempts at settlement discussions or negotiations do not excuse the delay between a party becoming aware of the facts warranting an interim interlocutory injunction and the filing of the application. Diligence is therefore essential in managing and mounting such cases, making it more likely that an interim interlocutory injunction will be granted. Entreprises de la Batterie inc. c. Biron, 2025 QCCS 608, paras. 1 and 10 (hereinafter the “Judgment”). Judgment, para. 4. Judgment, para. 10. Judgment, paras. 16 to 19. Judgment, paras. 10 to 18. Judgment, para. 27. Judgment, paras. 3 and 27. Judgment, para. 3. Judgment, para. 2. Judgment, para. 6. Judgment, para. 7. Judgment, para. 46. Judgment, para. 47. Judgment, para. 48. Judgment, para. 8. Judgment, paras. 35 and 37 to 39. Judgment, para. 36. Judgment, para. 41. Id. Judgment, paras. 41 and 43. Judgment, para. 42. Judgment, para. 42. Judgment, para. 40. Judgment, paras. 61 and 62. Judgment, para. 62. Judgment, paras. 64 and 65. Judgment, para. 68. Id. Judgment, para. 74. Judgment, para. 75. Judgment, paras. 76 and 77. Judgment, para. 82. Judgment, para. 82. Judgment, para. 84. Judgment, para. 85. Judgment, para. 83. Judgment, para. 90.