Labour and Employment

Is a foreign employer subject to the Act Respecting Labour Standards (the “ARLS”) merely because one of its employees performs work from home in Quebec? In a much-anticipated decision released on November 5, 2026, in Marchetta c. Petros 724 inc.1, the Quebec Court of Appeal answered that question in the negative and dismissed the appeal of an employee who sought to have the ARLS applied to her employment relationship with her U.S. employer. Lavery wishes at the outset to underscore the significant contribution made to the debate by the Canadian Association of Counsel to Employers / Association canadienne des avocats d’employeurs (“CACE”). In a context where the employer did not participate in the appeal, CACE obtained leave to intervene as amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) in order to assist the Court on the interpretation of section 2 of the ARLS and on the issues relating to its territorial scope. This decision is of particular importance to foreign employers that employ individuals working remotely from Quebec or domiciled there, a situation that has become increasingly common with the rise of remote work and the dematerialization of tasks made possible by technological tools. It also highlights the private international law issues raised by determining the laws applicable in such contexts. The practical impact of these issues is all the more significant given that the ARLS provides employees with recourses and remedies that differ from those generally available in most North American jurisdictions. In particular, the ARLS allows employees with at least two years of uninterrupted service to seek a reinstatement order from the Administrative Labour Tribunal (the “ALT”) in the context of contesting a dismissal without good and sufficient cause. Background: The Territorial Scope Provided for in the ARLS To properly frame the issue, it is important to recall that section 2 of the ARLS establishes a specific territorial connecting-factor regime that differs from those found in other provincial statutes governing labour and employment standards in Canada. Section 2 of the ARLS establishes both connecting factors relating to the employee and a distinct connecting factor relating to the employer. As regards the employee, the provision applies more specifically to an employee who performs work both in Quebec and outside Quebec, as well as to an employee who, while domiciled or resident in Quebec, performs work outside Quebec. In both situations, however, the ARLS further requires that the work be performed for “an employer whose residence, domicile, undertaking, head office or office is in Québec.” That specific wording was central to the analysis in Marchetta. Marchetta in Brief In this case, the employee, who held the position of financial consultant, performed most of her work remotely from her home in Quebec, using her own computer and personal telephone. She worked for a U.S. employer that had no head office, residence, domicile, office or other official presence in Quebec, and in respect of which no activity in Quebec had been established. The employee’s services were provided exclusively for the benefit of U.S. clients, and she only occasionally travelled to the United States to meet with some of them. The evidence also did not support a finding that the employee’s home served as a place of business for the employer. The employee was advised in December 2018 that her employment was being terminated following the company’s sale of a substantial portion of its Canadian assets. She then filed a complaint with the Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (the “CNESST”) alleging dismissal without good and sufficient cause and contesting the termination of her employment. The complaint was subsequently referred to the ALT. In an initial decision, the ALT upheld the complaint and ordered the employee’s reinstatement, despite the jurisdictional arguments raised by the employer. Following an application for administrative review, however, the ALT revised that first decision and dismissed the complaint, among other grounds because the ARLS did not apply territorially and the termination of employment resulted from a genuine layoff. The Superior Court subsequently upheld that second decision in judicial review proceedings. Seized of the matter, the Court of Appeal in turn confirmed that the Superior Court had committed no reviewable error in concluding that the mere fact that the employee performed her work from her home was not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish that the employer maintained an office or carried on an enterprise in Quebec within the meaning of the ARLS. The Court of Appeal confirmed that, to reach such a conclusion, there must be at least some evidence showing that the employer intended to use the employee’s residence or home to conduct its business. More specifically, such evidence must reveal a certain degree of organization of the place where the employee works, making it possible to conclude that it constituted a foothold for the employer in Quebec for some of its activities, whether concrete or in development. The Court nevertheless acknowledged that a different finding could be warranted in other circumstances, even in the absence of an establishment in Quebec, including in cases where the evidence shows that the employer carries on activities in Quebec or uses the employee’s home to conduct its business. For example, the case law reviewed referred to situations where: the employee acted as a salesperson or representative in Quebec from a home office used as the employer’s business address, with certain related costs borne by the employer;2 the employer paid for the installation of business telephone lines, Internet or fax services at the employee’s home, provided the equipment necessary to perform the work, and stored documentation or promotional materials there for its clients, some of whom were located in Quebec;3 although working largely from home, the employee nevertheless carried out concrete market development, representation or public relations activities in Quebec for the employer’s benefit.4 Key Considerations for Foreign Employers The decision confirms that, while the physical location where the work is performed remains relevant to the analysis, the specific connecting factors set out in the ARLS must still be met before a foreign employer is subject to it. In that regard, there is no automatic rule: remote work from Quebec alone is not sufficient. The analysis will depend closely on the evidence and on the concrete organization of the employment relationship. In our view, it is also worth emphasizing that the analysis may evolve over the course of the employment relationship. The absence of activities in Quebec at the time of hiring does not preclude a sufficient territorial connection from arising later if the employer’s activities or how the work is organized change. Foreign employers should, therefore, pay close attention to the evolution of their activities and how work is organized throughout the employment relationship. It should also be noted that this decision is specific to the ARLS’s scope and to the circumstances in which it may be found inapplicable. This does not, however, mean that other Quebec laws that may govern the employment relationship, including the Civil Code of Québec, are therefore inapplicable. Accordingly, each situation requires a case-by-case analysis based both on the applicable legislative framework and on the characteristics of the employment relationship, including the duties and responsibilities performed, the clients served, and the arrangements for expense reimbursement and the provision of equipment. Particular attention should also be paid to the drafting of employment agreements and policies applicable to employees hired in Quebec to work remotely. Finally, the Marchetta decision forms part of a trilogy of judgments released the same day by the Quebec Court of Appeal concerning remote work and the notion of establishment. These decisions raise important issues for employers in Quebec. Our Labour and Employment Law team is currently reviewing this trilogy, and a more detailed bulletin on its key takeaways and practical implications will follow in the coming days. 2026 QCCA 1461. Ladouceur et Almico Plastics Canada inc., D.T.E. 90T-490 (T.A.). Commission des normes du travail c. Micros System Inc., 2009 QCCS 6083. Boisvert et Marnier-Lapostolle Chile Spa, 2018 QCTAT 4718.

On October 5, a provincial election will be held in Quebec. In view of this election day, we think a reminder of employers’ obligations under the Election Act1 may be appropriate. 1. Time off for voting On election day, an employer must ensure that their employees who are eligible to vote have a period of four (4) consecutive hours to go and vote during polling station opening hours, i.e., between 9:30 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.2 This period does not include the time normally allotted for meals.3 Under the Election Act, an employee is eligible to vote if they have attained 18 years of age, are a Canadian citizen, have been domiciled in Quebec for at least six (6) months, are not disqualified from voting due to a tutorship order, and are not disqualified from voting under certain other laws.4 If an employee’s normal working hours do not allow them to have this four (4) hour period, the employer must grant them the required leave. The employer has the right to determine the time of day when this leave is granted.5 Due to the employer’s management rights, the employer can modify employees’ working hours so that they have the time required to go and vote. However, the Election Act stipulates that no deduction may be made from employees’ wages. Furthermore, the employer cannot penalize employees for their absence from work during this leave.6 Note that management rights do not allow an employer to force an employee to vote in advance. Conversely, if an employee’s shift ends before 4 p.m. or begins after 1:30 p.m., the employee already has the minimum time required to vote and the employer therefore has no additional obligation toward that employee. Furthermore, it should be noted that an employee can explicitly waive their leave to exercise their right to vote, even partially.7 2. Election officiers If an employee who is a member of the election staff (an election officer) makes a written request for leave from work to allow them to perform their duties, the Election Act obliges the employer to grant this request. This leave is unpaid.8 3. Penalties The Election Act provides that an employee who believes they have been the victim of a violation of their right to four hours to vote may file a complaint with the Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (CNESST), in the same way as an employee who believes they have been the victim of a practice prohibited under the Act respecting labour standards9could do.10 The Election Act also provides for criminal sentences in the event of a violation. For example, an employer who does not allow an employee four consecutive hours to vote is liable to a fine of $5,000 to $30,000 for a first offence, and $20,000 to $60,000 for a repeat offence within ten years.11 The same penalties apply to an employer who does not allow an employee who is an election officer to be absent from work to perform their duties. They also apply to any employer who “uses his authority or his influence to incite any of his employees to refuse to become an election officer or to abandon that office after having accepted it.”12 If you have any questions, feel free to reach out to our Labour and Employment Law group. Election Act, CQLR, c. E-3.3 (the “Act”). Id., s. 333 and s. 335, par. 1. [3]Id., s. 335, par. 1. Id., s. 1. Id., s. 335, par. 2. Id., s. 335, par. 3. https://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/en/understand/understanding-voting/four-hours-to-vote/ Election Act, s. 144. Act respecting labour standards, CQLR, c. N-1.1. Election Act, s. 335, par. 4. Id., s. 556. Id.

On July 15, 2026, the Superior Court of Québec reiterated the scope and extent of the power a regional medical director (RMD) has when suspending the clinical privileges of a primary care paramedic (hereinafter “paramedic”). The Court established that an RMD's decisions under section 68 of the Act respecting pre-hospital emergency services (hereinafter the “Act”) command a high degree of deference, given the RMD’s training and expertise in emergency medicine. Background of the Benoît c. CISSS des Laurentides case In Benoît c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides (2026 QCCS 2629), the plaintiff and his partner, both paramedics, responded to a call to help a patient. At the end of the intervention, the patient refused transport to a hospital, prompting her daughter to file a complaint with the Regional Service Quality and Complaints Commissioner. The matter was brought to the attention of the RMD. Consequently, on January 9, 2024, after a complaint was filed with the Regional Service Quality and Complaints Commissioner, the RMD decided to suspend all the plaintiff’s privileges because of several irregularities identified in the intervention, which the RMD deemed to be major. On January 15 2024, the RMD summoned the plaintiff, his union representative, and his employer, Services préhospitaliers Laurentides-Lanaudière, to discuss the situation. The RMD upheld her decision to withdraw the plaintiff's clinical privileges until he completed remedial training. The plaintiff challenged the RMD’s decision by way of judicial review before the Superior Court of Québec. The plaintiff essentially argued that section 68 of the Act assigns a purely advisory role to the RMD, meaning its decisions lack any binding effect on the employer. Section reads as follows: 68. In an urgent case and to ensure the quality of the care provided, the regional medical director may request an employer to temporarily suspend all or some of the clinical duties of an ambulance technician under the employer’s responsibility and to require the ambulance technician to take the corrective action the regional medical director considers necessary. The national medical director must be informed of every request for the total suspension of duties as well as the corrective action required within five days after the request. The plaintiff added that the RMD’s decision was unreasonable.   The Superior Court’s decision The Superior Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that the standard of reasonableness applies under the principles established in Vavilov.1 Consequently, the plaintiff bore the burden of proving a flaw serious enough to render the RMD’s decision unreasonable—a burden he failed to meet. The Court noted that the RMD’s training and expertise in emergency medicine make them uniquely qualified to assess urgency under section 68 of the Act. As the RMD is entrusted with “exercis[ing] the clinical authority necessary to maintain the standards of quality” (para. 39), [translation] “the fundamental objective of suspending privileges is to protect the public” (para. 41). Ultimately, the Court found no exceptional circumstances requiring it to vary the findings of fact and the RMD’s assessment of urgency, emphasizing that in reviewing evidence on an application for judicial review, [translation] “the threshold of deference is not only high, but it reaches the highest possible level” (para. 57). Takeaways on the application of section 68 of the Act Applying section 68 of the Act falls to each RMD, and the exercise of that power attracts a very high degree of judicial deference. Far from being merely advisory, an RMD’s decisions are binding on a paramedic’s employer. Consequently, a paramedic who challenges an RMD’s decision made under section 68 of the Act by way of judicial review faces a heavy burden: They cannot merely disagree with the RMD’s assessment—they must demonstrate a serious flaw capable of rendering the decision unreasonable. In an environment where clinical, regulatory, and organizational imperatives intersect, decisions made in clinical, hospital and pre-hospital settings can raise complex issues. Our team can provide you with rigorous and strategic guidance to help you assess risks, interpret applicable obligations and direct your actions on an informed basis. To learn more, please feel free to contact Karl Chabot. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65.

Restrictive covenants are frequently included in contracts that govern business practices and relationships. They are intended to protect the legitimate interests of the parties, such as goodwill, confidential information, team stability and—more broadly—the value of a business.  That said, more often than not, restrictive covenants that apply to health care professionals  need to be modified. A so-called “professional-patient” relationship differs from an ordinary business relationship, as a clientele consisting of patients has its own distinct characteristics. Indeed, the Court of Appeal of Quebec has repeatedly reiterated that restrictive covenants—namely non-compete and/or non-solicitation clauses—cannot, directly or indirectly, compromise the continuity of care or restrict a patient’s free choice. Therefore, the analysis must extend beyond financial protection alone to include public order considerations relating to access to care and continuity of care.  The challenge thus lies in drafting clauses that are both useful and enforceable. This requires a focus on what actually needs to be protected, while avoiding restrictions that would dissuade a health care professional from continuing treatment or prevent patients from receiving care from their physician of choice.  The most common restrictive covenants  The purpose of a non-compete clause is to prevent individuals from engaging in competing activities after a contractual relationship has ended. With regard to employment, article 2089 of the Civil Code of Québec1 requires that the clause be limited as to time, place and type of employment, to what is necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the party in whose favour the “protection” is established.2   A non-solicitation clause does not necessarily target the practice of the profession as such, but rather actions intended to actively attract individuals or entities associated with the business, including patients, referrals or employees. Although it is often presented as less intrusive, it can nonetheless have effects comparable to those of a non-compete clause if it is worded so broadly that it effectively prevents a professional from seeing patients who wish to be under their care.  Unique characteristics of the health care sector: patients, continuity of care and public order  One particular restriction applies in the health care sector: a non-compete clause must neither treat patients as a commercial asset nor place the professional in a position of having to choose between: (i) complying with the clause; or (ii) ensuring the continuity of care required by a patient’s medical condition. Patients are not parties to the contract between the employer, the clinic or the purchaser and the health care professional, and are not considered objects in commerce.3 It is therefore risky to attempt to govern their conduct by way of a contract, as if they were parties to the agreement.4  It should be noted that this premise is considered when covenants are assessed.5 The law and various codes of ethics generally require professionals, in particular, not to “abandon” a patient, to ensure a secure transfer of records, and to uphold—within the limits of the regulatory framework—the patient’s freedom to choose their service provider.6 The contract, therefore, cannot be drafted as though the protection of goodwill alone justified restrictions that compromise continuity of care.  Jurisprudential insights from the Court of Appeal of Quebec  Where a health care professional practises at a clinic, a non-compete clause between the clinic and the professional must not prevent a patient from continuing to receive care from the professional of their choice should the patient-professional relationship be terminated. A clause that violates this rule is especially vulnerable to being deemed invalid if it directly or indirectly prohibits practitioners from treating or taking on patients connected to a clinic—particularly where it makes no exceptions for emergency care or the continuation of treatment.7 Thus, a clause that prohibits treating former patients of a clinic or accepting patients “originating” from it, with no exceptions—particularly regarding ongoing care—may exceed what is required to protect goodwill and may conflict with the continuity of care. Similarly, a non-solicitation clause that treats the mere act of responding to a patient’s request as solicitation may, in practice, turn a prohibition on solicitation into a prohibition on providing treatment,8 which should be avoided.  The issue does not lie solely in explicit prohibitions. It can also stem from a mechanism designed to deter professionals from accepting patients in order to avoid penalties. In this regard, a penalty clause triggered by the act of treating a patient may exert economic pressure that could affect the patient’s choice and the continuity of care, even if the provision does not expressly refer to the discontinuation of care.9  Professional context vs. commercial context  From a structuring perspective, one often useful approach is to draw a clear distinction between clinical practice and commercial involvement.10 A prohibition against providing clinical care is the measure that most directly affects the continuity of care, as it prevents the professional from providing care precisely when a patient wishes to continue treatment.11 The stronger the pre-existing therapeutic relationship and the longer the course of treatment, the greater the risk of hindering the patient’s freedom of choice and the continuity of care.12 In other words, discontinuing treatment is generally more problematic in long-term care (e.g., orthodontics, psychiatry) than in one-off procedures (e.g., dental cleanings). Where restrictive covenants result in the disruption of the continuity of care, their consequences are too serious to be left to the vagaries of the market.13   Conversely, certain restrictions relating to the leadership, management, operation or control of a competing business may sometimes be more justifiable where they protect a specific legitimate interest without actually preventing the continuity of care. While this approach does not ensure a clause’s validity, it does reduce the likelihood that the clause will be deemed invalid, provided that the clause is carefully worded in terms of time limit, scope and definition of protected activities, and that it accurately reflects what is actually observed in clinical practice.  Five recurring issues with drafting  Territory  The issue of territory continues to come up frequently as a point of contention. In health care, territory must be defined based on the actual service area and the legitimate interest to be protected, while considering the impact on access to care.14 A territory that is too big could mean less services,15 particularly in specialized fields, whereas a territory that is too small could render the clause commercially ineffective.16 It is also important to note that territorial scope must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. A standard clause provided by a recognized association may even be deemed ineffective if it does not reflect the legitimate interests of the business in question.17  That said, even in the absence of an established territory, a restrictive clause may be valid, provided that the target clientele is clearly defined.18   Time limit  The time limit must be clearly established and reasonable. A clause with no time limit—or one with an ambiguous start date—is particularly problematic.19 Even where the time limit has been clearly established, it must be based on a defensible business rationale and must not exceed what is necessary, especially where the restriction affects clinical practice rather than specific conduct.  Activities The definition of prohibited activities is often crucial. Broadly worded provisions—such as a general prohibition against providing “similar” services—become difficult to enforce without conflicting with clinical requirements.20 In practice, it is generally more prudent to focus on identifiable and verifiable conduct rather than prohibiting a physician from treating a patient who wishes to be under their care. Where treatment is ongoing, it may be necessary to include an explicit provision regarding continuity of care to reduce the likelihood that the clause will be deemed invalid.21  Non-solicitation clause  A non-solicitation clause requires a particularly careful definition of the concept of “solicitation”. A non-solicitation clause that would prevent a professional from earning a living would likely be deemed invalid and unreasonable.22 The recurring point of contention remains the distinction between actively and specifically trying to attract patients, and responding to a patient’s request to seek care from a particular professional. The degree of precision in targeting the clientele is also very important.   Penalty clause   The penalty clause must be handled with caution. In a health care context, the amount of a penalty or the form it will take can dissuade professionals from continuing treatment. Imposing a penalty simply for providing treatment—regardless of whether active solicitation or unfair conduct23 occurred—could be perceived as indirect coercion that infringes the patient’s freedom of choice.24 The penalty is more likely to fulfill its purpose when it targets specific and quantifiable acts, while remaining proportionate to the anticipated commercial prejudice.  It is also important to note that if any one of these analytical criteria is deemed unreasonable, that alone may be sufficient to render the restrictive covenant invalid in its entirety.25   Conclusion  The rulings of the Court of Appeal of Quebec26 underscore a crucial point, namely that the protection of goodwill or an investment, however legitimate it may be, cannot result in a restriction on a patient’s freedom of choice or in an infringement—indirect or otherwise—on the continuity of care. When drafting clauses, the soundest approach is generally to target conduct that is genuinely problematic from a business perspective—such as active solicitation, the use of confidential information and unfair competition—rather than imposing a general prohibition against treating patients.  Where more significant restrictions are being contemplated, distinguishing between clinical practice and commercial involvement may help reduce the likelihood that the clause will be found invalid, provided that it remains reasonable as to duration, territory and scope of activities, and that it is consistent with the clinical imperatives established by case law.  The content of this article is published for general information purposes only and should not be construed as constituting a legal opinion or legal advice. Be sure to contact a member of our team for advice specific to your situation.  CCQ-1991. Payette c. Guay inc., 2013 CSC 45, para. 61. Mirarchi c. Lussier, 2007 QCCA 284, para. 46. Mirarchi c. Lussier, para. 43. Mirarchi c. Lussier, 2007 QCCA 284, para. 27. Mirarchi c. Lussier, 2007 QCCA 284, para. 29-35. Mirarchi c. Lussier, 2007 QCCA 284, para. 50-53. Pitl c. Grégoire, 2018 QCCA 1879. Mirarchi c. Lussier, 2007 QCCA 284, para. 52. Mirarchi c. Lussier, 2007 QCCA 284, para. 35. Mirarchi c. Lussier, 2007 QCCA 284, para. 29. Mirarchi c. Lussier, 2007 QCCA 284, para. 49. Mirarchi c. Lussier, 2007 QCCA 284, para. 51. Gestion Philippe Girard inc. c. Clinique de réhabilitation prosthodontique de Québec inc., 2022 QCCA 1146, para. 103. Gestion Philippe Girard inc. c. Clinique de réhabilitation prosthodontique de Québec inc., 2022 QCCA 1146, para. 104. Pitl c. Grégoire, 2018 QCCA 1879, para. 60. Pitl c. Grégoire, 2018 QCCA 1879, para. 64-69. Services financiers Bertrand Lapointe inc. c. Groupes financiers Claude Grefford inc., 2026 QCCA 98, para. 9.; Payette c. Guay inc., 2013 CSC 45. Pitl c. Grégoire, 2018 QCCA 1879, para. 79. Gestion Philippe Girard inc. c. Clinique de réhabilitation prosthodontique de Québec inc., 2022 QCCA 1146, para. 102 and 104. Théberge c. Lévesque, 2007 QCCA 898, para. 52. Pitl c. Grégoire, 2018 QCCA 1879, para. 43. Théberge c. Lévesque, 2007 QCCA 898, para. 59. Théberge c. Lévesque, 2007 QCCA 898, para. 54. Pitl c. Grégoire, 2018 QCCA 1879, para. 70-71. and the Supreme Court of Canada