Naming rights agreements: coming soon to an arena near you!

September 20, 2023

Although the more nostalgic among us were recently celebrating the announcement of a third film (and sequel) of In a galaxy near you (Dans une galaxie près de chez vous), a sci-fi series on Quebec TV, sports fans might be disappointed if the arena near them ever ends up being renamed.

In the first instalment of our series of articles on sports law, we examined various issues surrounding team branding. We would now like to focus on the naming of stadiums, arenas and our favourite sports venues, which often feature corporate names or trademarks.

In a press release dated August 15, 2023, the Montreal Canadiens announced that their training centre, previously known as the Bell Sports Complex, would be renamed the CN Sports Complex.

The reasons for this change have to do with naming rights agreements. These agreements stem from a “marriage of values” for commercial purposes between two brands that share a number of clearly defined objectives.

In this article, we will answer two fundamental questions: how do these agreements work and what are the objectives?

Defining a naming rights agreement

A naming rights agreement is a contract between a company and an operator or owner of a venue, building, event or facility. Under such agreements, a company obtains the exclusive right to name a venue, building, event or facility by making royalty payments or providing other benefits. This enhances the company’s visibility because its name or brand is now associated with the venue, building, event or facility. In return, the owning or operating entity is paid a royalty that helps to support its activities or boost its profitability. Naming rights agreements are commonly used for naming stadiums, arenas and sporting events.

It should be noted that naming rights agreements are different from sponsorship agreements. A sponsorship agreement is another type of arrangement under which a company can obtain visibility associated with an event. For example, the Royal Bank of Canada entered into a sponsorship agreement with the Montreal Canadiens to display its logo on the team’s jerseys. One of the main differences between sponsorship agreements and naming rights agreements is their duration. A sponsorship agreement has a shorter term (usually 3 to 5 years), whereas a naming rights agreement may run from 5 to 20 years, sometimes longer.

An ever-growing market

Underscoring the importance of naming rights agreements, over 90% of the teams in North America’s five largest professional sports leagues have signed one:

In Europe, the most popular sport by far is soccer. The status of naming rights agreements in European soccer is not comparable to the North American situation, but everything indicates that their popularity will continue to rise in the coming years:

What are the primary objectives of naming rights agreements?

Although most North American sports teams have entered into naming rights agreements, the frequency with which stadiums or sports venues are renamed remains low due to the long-term nature of these arrangements.

Companies are prepared to invest considerable sums in these agreements. There are various reasons for this, including the desire to partner with an organization that shares certain values, or to reap the benefits of a unique financial tool, or to consolidate business interests or gain a foothold in a given market.

In 2017, the Air Canada Centre, which hosts the Toronto Maple Leafs (NHL) as well as the Toronto Raptors (NBA), was renamed the Scotiabank Arena. Under this agreement, Scotiabank will reportedly pay $40 million annually over 20 years to maintain the new name. At the time, this was a record amount.

But the new (publicly disclosed) record is now held by the Crypto.com Arena, formerly known as the Staples Center, home to two NBA teams (LA Lakers and LA Clippers), together with the LA Kings (NHL). In 2021, Crypto.com agreed to pay approximately $50 million annually for 20 years.

In addition to the recent CN Sports Complex name change, Uniprix Stadium,which hosts the Omnium National Bank tennis tournament, became IGA Stadium back in 2018.

When the IGA Stadium agreement was concluded, Eugène Lapierre, Senior Vice-President at Tennis Canada, offered this assessment: “IGA attaches a good deal of importance to healthy eating, while for our part, we’re working hard to develop tennis in Canada. Our objectives are in sync.”¹ Similarly, France Margaret Bélanger, President, Sports and Entertainment of Groupe CH, confirmed this marriage of values between the Montreal Canadiens and CN: “CN is not only a world leader in transportation, but also an iconic Canadian company which, like the Canadiens, has been based in Montreal for over a century.”² It is clear that these companies were carefully selected on the basis of “common ground”, which implies a sharing of values between them and the operators of the IGA Stadium and the CN Sports Complex.

Choosing the right partner: a key strategic issue

Choosing the right company whose name or brand will be publicly displayed is essential. An owner or operator will want to avoid any association with a company whose identity is incompatible or whose values are not in alignment.

Several examples of dubious partnership choices spring to mind:

The Chicago White Sox’s baseball stadium changed its name from U.S. Cellular Field to Guaranteed Rate Field in 2016. This change sparked controversy, drawing ridicule from the public. The problem was that the White Sox are a high-profile brand, known throughout the sports world and enjoying immense prestige. In contrast, Guaranteed Rate was a local company, unknown to many baseball fans, and was simply unable to bear the weight of a storied franchise such as the White Sox. The social networks lit up at the time, adding to Guaranteed Rate’s visibility. The company certainly achieved its objective of “getting its name out there”!

Away from the sports realm, another relevant example is the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), which operates that city’s mass transit system. In April 2023, the TTC announced that it wanted to look into the possibility of selling the rights to name train or subway stations – an idea that it had initially announced in 2011. The outcry was immediate: “This will turn the TTC into a joke”, said Rami Tabello, a representative of the Toronto Public Space Initiative. “It's going to turn our civic identity and put a price tag on it. We need to say that our city is not for sale.”³ Just imagine the conductor’s announcement: “Next stop, Pepsi Station”!

Structuring a naming rights agreement

Although the parties to naming rights agreements are free to negotiate their own terms and conditions, certain provisions should be included to ensure a good long-term relationship.

A naming rights agreement should be comprehensive and detailed enough to enable both parties to “uncouple” quickly and easily if a disturbing or controversial event occurs that could have an adverse impact on their brand image or reputation. As a general rule, such agreements include a termination clause in case one party defaults or is in breach of contract. It is therefore important to clearly identify what constitutes a default or a breach of contract.

Along with the digital boards, certain spaces on the ice of hockey rinks or advertising on helmets, crests or jerseys, the rights stemming from a naming agreement are valuable assets that can be monetized by means of various financial instruments. Not only can these agreements be monetized as soon as they are signed, but they can also be transferred for a consideration to a third party, such as an alternative investor. Hence the importance of ensuring that naming rights agreements are flexible and transferable, thereby facilitating third-party transfers and monetization. As an additional type of financial instrument, naming rights agreements provide immediate access to cash flows.

Intellectual property and trademark rights: what precautions should be taken?

Naming rights agreements often facilitate the creation of new intellectual property linked to the joint use of brands. According to trademark law, the owner of a brand must, and is generally assumed to, exercise control over the products and services associated with the brand. In addition, when a new form of use extends to new services stemming from a naming rights agreement, it is advisable to verify whether the brand’s trademarking is sufficient or should be extended. Here is another point to consider: when the naming rights agreement expires, the chosen partner must not have permanently acquired rights to the brand. These agreements, therefore, must carefully circumscribe property rights as well as the terms and conditions governing intellectual property.

It is also important to outline the civil liability arising from use of the brand. Considerations include compensating the brand owner for the partner’s use of the brand and, conversely, compensating the partner in the event that the brand infringes third-party-owned intellectual property. In any event, the brand owner cannot stand idly by if the user goes beyond what is permitted in the agreement (this would amount to breach of contract).

North America and Europe: two different realities

Naming rights agreements generate significant revenues for sports teams. A team unable to find the right partner may find itself at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other competitors in its league or even compared to other sports.

This is the daunting reality facing a number of European soccer clubs, which are having a harder time finding partner companies for naming rights agreements than sports teams are in North America.

One British example involves London-based Tottenham Hotspur, which has been unable to find a co-contractor to enter into a naming rights agreement for its new stadium since 2019. The team is now in serious financial difficulty and is attempting to host events other than soccer (concerts, boxing, NFL games, etc.) to make up for its revenue shortfall.

In Europe, naming rights agreements are not as widespread as they are in North America. This is primarily due to the fans’ reaction. In Europe, soccer boasts a tradition-steeped history: fans tend to be opposed to change or to the idea of “selling” an iconic stadium to a company.

On the other side of the Atlantic, marketing icons are often linked to companies that have signed naming rights agreements.

To understand this phenomenon, consider the city of Pittsburgh and the Steelers’ football stadium, which was named Heinz Field for over 20 years under an agreement involving (unsurprisingly) the Heinz company. The stadium was also home to two gigantic Heinz ketchup bottles mounted atop the scoreboard:

Image 1: Heinz ketchup bottles atop the Heinz Field scoreboard.

The Heinz agreement expired and the facility was renamed Acrisure Stadium in July 2022; the ketchup bottles were removed. Steelers fans were soon calling for the ketchup bottles to be brought back—in their eyes, the gigantic bottles were an emblem of the team. Art Rooney II, the team’s legendary owner, acceded to the fans’ demands earlier this year: one of the bottles was reinstalled above a gate outside the stadium.

Image 2: Some fans were outraged when the Heinz ketchup bottles were removed from Acrisure Stadium.

Image 3: One of the ketchup bottles was reinstalled above Gate C outside the stadium.

It should be noted that the Heinz company was founded in Pittsburgh in 1869 by Henry J. Heinz; it is still headquartered there. In Pittsburgh, the Heinz family is both emblematic and iconic. For local residents, Heinz is much more than a brand of ketchup or a food processing company: it is a key part of their history and culture, interwoven with the social fabric. The Heinz ketchup bottles towering over the football stadium were not just a marketing ploy; they were also a cherished symbol for the community and the city of Pittsburgh.

Conclusion

Unbeknownst to many of us, the impacts of naming rights agreements can be felt discreetly in our day-to-day lives. In addition to being a vehicle for conveying emotions and exerting an influence on our experience of certain events and places, these agreements drive our emotional attachment to certain sports properties.

Pierre Durocher, Le stadium Jarry change de nom, Le Journal de Montréal, April 16, 2018 (https://www.journaldemontreal.com/2018/04/16/le-stadium-uniprix-devient-le-stadium-iga).
Montreal Canadiens, Montreal Canadiens' practice facility to be named CN Sports Complex, media release, August 15, 2023 (https://www.nhl.com/canadiens/news/montreal-canadiens-practice-facility-to-be-named-cn-sports-complex-345595466).
CBC News, TTC deal opens door to station naming rights, July 6, 2011 (https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ttc-deal-opens-door-to-station-naming-rights-1.1023460).

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Authors

Sébastien Vézina
Partner, Lawyer
Eric Lavallée
Partner, Lawyer and Trademark Agent

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April 24, 2024

Supreme Court of Canada ruling: Managers are not eligible for unionization under the Labour Code

On April 19, 2024, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decision in Société des casinos du Québec inc. v. Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec, marking the end of an almost 15 year-long debate on the freedom of association of managers and their exclusion under the Labour Code. The facts The Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec (the “Association”) represents first-level managers at the province’s four casinos operated by the Société des casinos du Québec (the “Société”). The Association is a professional syndicate within the meaning of the Professional Syndicates Act. Although the Association is not governed by Quebec’s Labour Code (the “Code”), given the exclusion of managers from the notion of “employee” provided for in theCode, this exclusion does not prevent members of the Association from associating. In fact, in 2001, the Association and the Société signed a memorandum of understanding governing certain aspects of the collective labour relations. However, faced with the inability of the Association’s members to access the remedies offered by the Code, such as protections against bad-faith bargaining, the right to strike and the specialized dispute resolution mechanism, in 2003 the Association lodged a complaint with the International Labour Organization’s Committee on Freedom of Association. Dissatisfied, the Association then filed a petition for certification under the Code in 2009, requesting that the exclusion of management staff from the definition of “employee,” and therefore from the unionization process under the Code, be declared unconstitutional, as it infringed on the freedom of association protected by the Charters. The Société raised an exception to dismiss, since managers are excluded from the application of the Code. Proceedings prior to the Supreme Court of Canada In its 2016 decision, the Administrative Labour Tribunal (the “ALT”) found that the exclusion of managers from the definition of “employee” violates the freedom of association of the first-level managers represented by the Association, and that this infringement is not justified in a free and democratic society. The exclusion was declared inoperative in the context of this application. According to the ALT, the Association does not benefit from a meaningful process for bargaining in good faith for its members’ working conditions. Furthermore, the Association members’ right to strike is infringed without any other mechanism being provided, which, according to the ALT, constitutes a substantial infringement of the right to collective bargaining. In 2018, the Superior Court of Québec allowed the Société’s application for judicial review. The Superior Court concluded that the exclusion of managers from the Code does not contravene the freedom of association. Employers must be able to trust their managers and, for the sake of employee unionization, there can be no ambiguity about managers’ allegiance1. Managers can organize and associate, but not under this law. In 2022, the Court of Appeal overturned the Superior Court’s ruling and reinstated the ALT’s decision. According to the Court of Appeal, the ALT was right to conclude that the effects of the exclusion from the Labour Code regime constitute substantial interference with the exercise of the freedom of association. The Supreme Court of Canada's decision In a new development on April 19, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Société’s appeal, essentially ruling that the exclusion of managers from the Code does not violate the freedom of association. Although the seven (7) judges hearing this case concluded that the Dunmore analytical frameworkis the relevant one, there are applicable concurring reasons. In the opinion of the majority of the Court, a two-part test must be applied: The Court must consider whether the activities in question fall within the scope of freedom of association; and The Court must consider whether the statutory exclusion substantially interferes with those activities, in purpose or effect. In this case, the Association alleged that by excluding managers from the application of the Code, the government was preventing its members from “engaging in a process of meaningful collective bargaining with their employer, with constitutional protection for the Association, sufficient independence from the employer, and the right to recourses if the employer does not negotiate in good faith."2 According to the Supreme Court, the Association’s claim was indeed based on an activity that is protected under the freedom of association, thus passing the first part of the test. However, the Association’s claim fails the second part of the test. The Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion of managers from the Code’s definition of an employee does not substantially hinder the Association’s activities. As the Superior Court had found, this exclusion is intended to distinguish managers from employees and avoid conflicts of interest, in particular by ensuring that the employer can trust its managers and that employees can protect their own interests. The memorandum of understanding between the Société and the Association demonstrates that the members are able to associate and negotiate with the employer. Moreover, this protocol enables the Association to take legal action before the ordinary courts of law in the event of non-compliance with its terms and conditions. According to the Supreme Court, “the right to meaningful collective bargaining does not guarantee access to a particular model of labour relations."3 Conclusion After several years of debate, the Supreme Court of Canada has finally settled the question of the constitutionality of the exclusion of managers from Quebec’s collective labour relations regime set out in the Labour Code. As this exclusion does not violate managers’ freedom of association, they will not be able to validly file petitions for certification under the Code. However, they will be able to exercise their freedom of association in other ways, as in this case, through the Professional Syndicates Act, as well as before the ordinary courts of law. This decision is a positive one for Quebec employers, as it protects the structure of workplaces and the allegiance of managers within organizations. 2018 QCSC 4781, para. 116 et seq. 2024 SCC 13, para. 47. 2024 SCC 13, para. 55.

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April 16, 2024

Tax opportunities under the Indian Act

Although it is not often well-understood in business and tax circles, the Indian Act (the “Act”), coupled with federal and provincial tax laws, provides several tax planning opportunities for Indigenous taxpayers. These laws provide various tax exemptions for people who qualify as “Indians” under the Act, as well as for “bands” and other “councils.” These terms are defined in the Act and require case-by-case analysis, but essentially they refer to people of Indigenous origin who have at least one family member who is registered or entitled to be registered as an Indian within the meaning of the Act. The criteria for a tax exemption In particular, those who qualify can benefit from a tax exemption when income is earned on a “reserve.” There are several criteria to be met, and although the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) has issued guidelines on the subject, their application remains a question of fact that varies depending on the particular circumstances applicable to each taxpayer. In general, the CRA requires that income earned by an “Indian” within the meaning of the Act be sufficiently connected to a reserve to be exempt. This is the case when, for example, income-generating services are performed entirely or almost entirely within the territory of a reserve, when the employer and the employee reside on a reserve, or when income is derived from non-commercial activities carried out by a band. Business income can also be tax-exempt, but the criteria for being considered connected to a reserve are stricter, since generally only income-generating activities situated on a reserve will be tax-exempt. However, it is still possible to organize the affairs of a taxpayer and their corporate entities to ensure that these criteria are met, or to highlight certain connecting factors. Such planning, if done properly, is entirely legitimate and can result in significant tax savings. In a recent interpretation (CRA Views 2022-0932231I7), the CRA illustrated this principle by considering employment income related to an off-reserve airport to be exempt, even if none of the guidelines are followed, in cases where such an airport is necessary to supply a reserve that has no other means of transportation and delivery. This interpretation shows that the connection between an income and a reserve is not established solely by the physical presence of the income-generating business, and that several other arguments, sometimes more subtle, can be used to support the connection between an income and a reserve. A few nuances to consider However, care must be taken when a company is incorporated by someone who qualifies as an “Indian.” A company with its head office on a reserve cannot qualify as “Indian” within the meaning of the Act. Its income therefore cannot be tax-exempt, and will be taxed according to the usual rules. Despite this, certain plans can ease the tax burden on these companies and on shareholders who qualify as “Indians” under the Act, such as paying wages and bonuses to an employee shareholder. But it’s essential to carefully analyze the various pitfalls and risks that such planning entails. Furthermore, certain exemptions exist for companies formed by bands, but the eligibility criteria are strict and require a thorough analysis of the proposed structure. In addition to the income tax exemption, “Indians” within the meaning of the Act and certain entities mandated by bands may benefit from a tax exemption when they purchase goods on a reserve or have goods delivered to them on a reserve. Different exceptions and nuances apply. However, companies headquartered on a reserve are not exempt from their tax collection obligations and may be required to register for the GST/QST. To help you understand these rules and ensure optimal tax planning, we invite you to consult our tax team. We look forward to working with you on your business projects.

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April 15, 2024

Can artificial intelligence be designated as an inventor in a patent application?

Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is becoming increasingly sophisticated, and the fact that this human invention can now generate its own inventions opens the door to new ways of conceptualizing the notion of “inventor” in patent law. In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (“UK Supreme Court”) however found that an artificial intelligence system cannot be the author of an invention within the meaning of the applicable regulations under which patents are granted. This position is consistent with that of several courts around the world that have already ruled on the issue. But what of Canada, where the courts have yet to address the matter? In this bulletin, we will take a look at the decisions handed down by the UK Supreme Court and its counterparts in other countries before considering Canada’s position on the issue. In Thaler (Appellant) v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Mark,1 the UK Supreme Court ruled that “an inventor must be a person”. Summary of the decision In 2018, Dr. Stephen Thaler filed patent applications for two inventions described as having been generated by an autonomous AI system. The machine in question, DABUS, was therefore designated as the inventor in the applications. Dr. Thaler claimed that, as the owner of DABUS, he was entitled to file patent applications for inventions generated by his machine. That being so, he alleged that he was not required to name a natural person as the inventor. Both the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal dismissed Dr. Thaler’s appeal from the decision of the Intellectual Property Office of the United Kingdom not to proceed with the patent applications, in particular because the designated inventor was not valid under the Patents Act 1977. The UK Supreme Court, the country’s final court of appeal, also dismissed Dr. Thaler’s appeal. In a unanimous decision, it concluded that the law is clear in that “an inventor within the meaning of the 1977 Act must be a natural person, and DABUS is not a person at all, let alone a natural person: it is a machine”.2 Although there was no doubt that DABUS had created the inventions in question, that did not mean that the courts could extend the notion of inventor, as defined by law, to include machines. An ongoing trend The UK Supreme Court is not the first to reject Dr. Thaler’s arguments. The United States,3 the European Union4 and Australia5 have adopted similar positions, concluding that only a natural person can qualify as an inventor within the meaning of the legislation applicable in their respective jurisdictions. The UK ruling is part of the Artificial Inventor Project’s cross-border attempt to ensure that the DABUS machine—and AI in general—is recognized as a generative tool capable of generating patent rights for the benefit of AI system owners. To date, only South Africa has issued a patent to Dr. Thaler, naming DABUS as the inventor.6 This country is the exception that proves the rule. It should however be noted that the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission of South Africa does not review applications on their merits. As such, no reason was given for considering AI as the inventor. More recently, in February of this year, the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued a guidance on AI-assisted inventions. The guidance confirms the judicial position and states in particular that “a natural person must have significantly contributed to each claim in a patent application or patent”.7 What about Canada? In 2020, Dr. Thaler also filed a Canadian patent application for inventions generated by DABUS.8 The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (“CIPO”) issued a notice of non-compliance in 2021, establishing its initial position as follows: Because for this application the inventor is a machine and it does not appear possible for a machine to have rights under Canadian law or to transfer those rights to a human, it does not appear this application is compliant with the Patent Act and Rules.9 However, CIPO specified that it was open to receiving the applicant’s arguments on the issue, as follows: Responsive to the compliance notice, the applicant may attempt to comply by submitting a statement on behalf of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) machine and identify, in said statement, himself as the legal representative of the machine.10 To date, CIPO has issued no notice of abandonment and the application remains active. Its status in Canada is therefore unclear. It will be interesting to see whether Dr. Thaler will try to sway the Canadian courts to rule in his favour after many failed attempts in other jurisdictions around the world, and most recently in the UK Supreme Court. At first glance, the Patent Act11 (the “Act”) does not prevent an AI system from being recognized as the inventor of a patentable invention. In fact, the term “inventor” is not defined in the Act. Furthermore, nowhere is it stated that an applicant must be a “person,” nor is there any indication to that effect in the provisions governing the granting of patents. The Patent Rules12 offer no clarification in that regard either. The requirement implied by the clear use of the term “person” in the wording of the relevant sections of the law is important: It was a key consideration that the UK Supreme Court analyzed in Thaler. Case law on the subject is still ambiguous. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, given that the inventor is the person who took part in conceiving the invention, the question to ask is “[W]ho is responsible for the inventive concept?”13 That said, however, we note that the conclusion reached was that a legal person—as opposed to a natural person—cannot be considered an inventor.14 The fact is that the Canadian courts have never had to rule on the specific issue of recognizing AI as an inventor, and until such time as the courts render a decision or the government takes a stance on the matter, the issue will remain unresolved. Conclusion Given that Canadian law is not clear on whether AI can be recognized as an inventor, now would be a good time for Canadian authorities to clarify the issue. As the UK Supreme Court has suggested, the place of AI in patent law is a current societal issue, one that the legislator will ultimately have to settle.15 As such, it is only a matter of time before the Act is amended or CIPO issues a directive. Moreover, in addition to having to decide whether AI legally qualifies as an inventor, Canadian authorities will have to determine whether a person can be granted rights to an invention that was actually created by AI. The question as to whether an AI system owner can hold a patent on an invention generated by their machine was raised in Thaler. Once again, unlike the UK’s patent act,16 our Patent Act does not close the door to such a possibility. Canadian legislation contains no comprehensive list of the categories of persons to whom a patent may be granted, for instance. If we were to rewrite the laws governing intellectual property, given that the main purpose such laws is to encourage innovation and creativity, perhaps a better approach would be to allow AI system owners to hold patent rights rather than recognizing the AI as an inventor. Patent rights are granted on the basis of an implicit understanding: A high level of protection is provided in exchange for sufficient disclosure to enable a person skilled in the art to reproduce an invention. This ensures that society benefits from such inventions and that inventors are rewarded. Needless to say, arguing that machines need such an incentive is difficult. Designating AI as an inventor and granting it rights in that respect is therefore at odds with the very purpose of patent protection. That said, an AI system owner who has invested time and energy in designing their system could be justified in claiming such protection for the inventions that it generates. In such a case and given the current state of the law, the legislator would likely have to intervene. Would this proposed change spur innovation in the field of generative AI? We are collectively investing a huge amount of “human” resources in developing increasingly powerful AI systems. Will there come a time when we can no longer consider that human resources were involved in making AI-generated technologies? Should it come to that, giving preference to AI system owners could become counterproductive. In any event, for the time being, a sensible approach would be to emphasize the role that humans play in AI-assisted inventions, making persons the inventors rather than AI. As concerns inventions conceived entirely by an AI system, trade secret protection may be a more suitable solution. The professionals on our intellectual property team are at your disposal to assist you with patent registration and provide you with a clearer understanding of the issues involved. [2023] UKSC 49 [Thaler]. Ibid., para. 56. See the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Thaler v Vidal, 43 F. 4th 1207 (2022), application for appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed. See the decision of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office in J 0008/20 (Designation of inventor/DABUS) (2021), request to refer questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal denied. See the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Commissioner of Patents v Thaler, [2022] FCAFC 62, application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia denied. ZA 2021/03242. Federal Register: Inventorship Guidance for AI-Assisted Inventions. CA 3137161. Notice from CIPO dated February 11, 2022, in Canadian patent application 3137161. Ibid. R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4. SOR/2019-251. Apotex Inc.v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 77 at paras. 96–97. Sarnoff Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 712, para. 9. Thaler, paras. 48–49, 79. Ibid., para. 79.

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April 2, 2024

Environmental obligations: directors and officers, you may have more responsibilities than you think

In general, the directors and officers of a legal person have obligations and responsibilities relating to the legal person’s activities. Each director must act with prudence, diligence, honesty, loyalty and in the legal person’s interest.1 Each officer is responsible for representing the legal person and directing its activities.2 That said, directors and officers must keep in mind that they have greater duties and responsibilities and a heavier burden to meet when it comes to ensuring compliance with certain environmental laws. Since it came into force on May 12, 2022, the Act respecting certain measures enabling the enforcement of environmental and dam safety legislation (the “Act”) has ensured the enforcement of various environmental laws.3 The Act essentially provides for two types of consequences arising from the actions of directors, officers and, in some instances, other representatives of a legal person. The first involves a particular burden as regards compliance with environmental laws, and the second, consequences relating to the administration of the environmental authorization scheme. The duty of directors and officers to ensure compliance with environmental laws The Act’s criminal provisions provide for stiffer penalties for directors who commit an offence under an environmental law. Section 47 of the Act provides that where an offence is committed by a director or officer of a legal person, the minimum and maximum fines that would apply in the case of a natural person for such offence are doubled. Also, where a legal person commits an offence under an environmental law, its director or officer is presumed to have committed the offence, unless it is established that they exercised due diligence and took all necessary precautions to prevent the offence.4 The Act additionally provides that anyone who, by an act or omission, helps a person to commit an offence or induces a person, by encouragement, advice, consent, authorization or order to commit such an offence commits that offence and is liable to the same penalty as that prescribed for the offence they helped or induced the person to commit.5 Naturally, this rule applies to the directors and officers of a legal person, but is not limited to them. For example, it would also apply to an engineer or legal advisor who provides a legal person with advice causing it to commit an offence under an environmental law. Lastly, where a legal person has defaulted on payment of an amount owed,6 the directors and officers are solidarily liable, with the legal person, for payment of such amount. However, they may be exempted from this obligation if they are able to establish that they exercised due care and diligence to prevent the failure which led to the claim.7 This rule could apply, for instance, where a legal person is insolvent, which underscores the need to anticipate and effectively manage the environmental issues that a legal person is likely to face. Conduct of directors, officers and shareholders and the environmental authorization scheme The Environment Quality Act (EQA) establishes a ministerial authorization scheme for certain activities considered likely to have an impact on the quality of the environment.8 This authorization scheme is discretionary. Any activity covered by such scheme cannot be legally carried out unless the required authorization has first been issued. Holding and keeping such authorization is therefore fundamental for the company in question to continue to pursue its activities. Under the Act, the Minister of the Environment9 may refuse to issue, amend or renew a ministerial authorization, or decide to amend, revoke or cancel such an authorization, or oppose its transfer in certain situations relating to the conduct of the directors, officers and shareholders10 of the legal person holding the authorization.11 Situations in which the Minister may intervene in this way are, for example, those where one of a legal person’s directors, officers or shareholders has: filed a false declaration or document, or false information, or has distorted or omitted to report a material fact to have the authorization issued, maintained, amended, renewed or transferred failed to comply with an injunction made under any act that is administered by the Minister of the Environment defaulted on payment of an amount owed under any act administered by the Minister of the Environment (including monetary administrative penalties or any other fees that must be paid under such acts) been found guilty of an offence under an act administered by the Minister of the Environment or any regulations made under those acts been found guilty of an offence under a fiscal law or an criminal offence connected with activities covered by the authorization12 Thus, the conduct of directors, officers or shareholders can have repercussions on a legal person’s rights and obligations in carrying out activities authorized by the Minister. In addition, their conduct could hinder or even prevent the transfer of an authorization as part of an asset sale. Directors and officers have a vested interest in ensuring that the legal person they represent complies with environmental laws. Evidently, compliance is not only in the interest of the legal person itself, but also that of its directors and officers, whose personal liability and assets could be at stake should the legal person fail to comply. Articles 321 and 322 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.) Article 312 of the C.C.Q. These environmental laws are the Environment Quality Act, the Act to increase the number of zero-emission motor vehicles in Québec in order to reduce greenhouse gas and other pollutant emissions, the Natural Heritage Conservation Act, the Act respecting threatened or vulnerable species, the Pesticides Act and the Dam Safety Act (section 1 of the Act). Section 51 of the Act. Section 49 of the Act. The amount owing may be a monetary administrative penalty, a fine or financial compensation required under a notice of execution, among other things. Section 66 of the Act; In addition, under section 67 of the Act, the reimbursement of an amount owing is secured by a legal hypothec on the movable and immovable property of the debtor, in this case the director and officer of the legal person. Section 22 of the EQA. The EQA also provides that certain activities listed in the Regulation respecting the regulatory scheme applying to activities on the basis of their environmental impact may benefit from the more flexible declaration of compliance framework, or even an exemption. There is no need to describe these in detail for the purposes of this article. In accordance with section 2 of the Terms and conditions for the signing of certain documents of the Ministère du Développement durable, de l’Environnement et des Parcs (M-30.001, r. 1), assistant deputy ministers, directors general, the secretary general, directors, regional directors and assistant directors are authorized to sign any document relating to such decisions. For the purposes of these provisions of the Act, a shareholder means a natural person holding, directly or indirectly, shares that carry 20% or more of the voting rights in a legal person that is not a reporting issuer under the Securities Act (section 2 of the Act). Except in a situation where urgent action is required, the Minister must give prior notice of such a decision to the person concerned, so that they may submit their observations (section 39 of the Act). The Minister’s decision is then notified to the person concerned (section 40 of the Act), who may contest it before the Administrative Tribunal of Québec (sections 40 and 41 of the Act). See sections 32 to 36 of the Act.

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