Regulatory Affairs

Eight quotes hallucinated by AI cost $5,000 for substantial breach (art. 342 C.C.P.) in the Specter Aviation case.1 While AI can improve access to justice, unverified AI use can lead to sanctions, adding to the risks unrepresented parties face. Quebec courts advocate for openness to AI, but with proper controls: AI is only useful when verified, traceable and supported by official sources. The cost of hallucinations On October 1, 2025, the Superior Court rendered judgment on a contestation to an application for homologation of an arbitral award rendered by the Paris International Arbitration Chamber (PIAC) on December 9, 2021. Under articles 645 and 646 C.C.P., the role of the Court in such a situation is limited to verifying whether one of article 646’s limiting grounds for refusal has been demonstrated. The applicant’s grounds—ultra vires, procedural irregularities, infringement of fundamental rights, public order, abuse of power—were deemed inappropriate and unconvincing. Although the decision is interesting in this respect, it is even more so in another one altogether. In his contestation, the unrepresented defendant relied on all possible support he could get from artificial intelligence. In response, the plaintiffs filed a table listing eight occurrences of non-existent citations, decisions never having been rendered, irrelevant references and inconsistent conclusions. Questioned at the hearing, the defendant did not deny that some references might have been hallucinated.2 In his judgment, Justice Morin turned the issue to principles. On one hand, access to justice requires a level playing field and the orderly and proportionate management of proceedings. On the other, even though unrepresented claimants or plaintiffs are given flexibility, never is forgery allowed: “Fabrication or shams cannot be tolerated to facilitate access to justice.”3 The Court therefore qualified the presentation of fictitious case law or fictitious quotes from authorities, whether intentionally or through simple negligence, as a serious breach that contravenes the solemnity that the act of filing of proceedings carries. It invoked article 342 C.C.P. to order the defendant to pay $5,000, to deter such conduct and protect the integrity of the process.4 Art. 342 C.C.P.: The power to punish substantial breaches Article 342 C.C.P. stems from the reform that was adopted in 2014 and came into force in 2016. Because this provision authorizes the court to impose a fair and reasonable sanction5 for significant breaches in the conduct of proceedings, it can be said to be punitive and dissuasive in nature. This power is distinct from the power granted by articles 51 to 54 C.C.P. which govern abuse of procedure, and an exception to the general regime of fees6 by which extrajudicial fees can be awarded, when warranted.7 A “substantial breach” must not simply be a trivial issue. It must reach a certain degree of seriousness, but it need not involve bad faith. It implies additional time and expense and contravenes the guiding principles of articles 18 to 20 C.C.P. (proportionality, control and cooperation).8 Nearly ten years later, case law illustrates a range of uses: $100,000 for the late filing of applications or amendments resulting in postponements and unnecessary work;9 $91,770.10 for a continuance on the morning of trial for failure to ensure the presence of a key witness;10 $10,000 for repeated delays, tardy amendment of proceedings and non-compliance with case management orders;11 $3,500 for the failure to or delay in disclosing evidence;12 $1,000 for filing an undisclosed statement in the middle of a hearing to take the opposing party by surprise.13 Sanctions and uses of AI in Canada and elsewhere Moreover, although the use of section 342 to sanction unverified use of technological tools appears to be a first in Quebec, a number of Canadian judgments have already imposed penalties for similar issues. In particular, they awarded: $200 in costs against an unrepresented party for having filed pleadings containing partially non-existent quotes to compensate for the time spent to make verifications.14 $100 in Federal Court, at the lawyer’s personal expense, for having quoted non-existent decisions generated by AI, without disclosing its use, further to the Kuehne + Nagel test.15 $1,000 before the Civil Resolution Tribunal of British Columbia to compensate for time needlessly spent dealing with clearly irrelevant, AI-generated arguments and documents in a case opposing two unrepresented parties.16 $500 and expungement of file containing AI-hallucinated authorities for non-compliance with the Federal Court’s AI policy.17 The $5,000 sanction ordered in this case was a deterrent; however, it is distinct from these other essentially compensatory amounts while in line an international trend, which can be observed  in the following cases: On June 22, 2023, in the United States (S.D.N.Y.), a Rule 11 penalty of USD 5,000 was imposed along with non-pecuniary measures (notice to client and judges falsely cited), in Mata v. Avianca, Inc.18 . On September 23, 2025, in Italy, a sum of €2,000 was awarded ex art. 96, co. 3 c.p.c. (€1,000 to the opposing party and €1,000 to Cassa delle ammende), plus €5,391 in legal costs (spese di lite), by the Tribunale di Latina.19 On August 15, 2025, in Australia, personal costs of AUD 8,371.30 were ordered against the plaintiff’s lawyer, with referral to the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia, following fictitious citations generated by AI (Claude, Copilot).20 On October 22, 2025, in the United States (E.D. Oklahoma), monetary penalties totaling $6,000 were imposed on attorneys personally. They were also required to repay fees of $23,495.90, and some of their pleadings were stricken from the record with the requirement to refile verified pleadings.21 In addition to monetary penalties, Quebec courts have already identified a number of problematic situations related to the use of AI, such as: The Régie du bâtiment du Québec had to examine a 191-page brief containing numerous non-existent references. The author finally admitted to having used ChatGPT to formulate them. The commissioner underscored the resulting work overload and the need to regulate the use of AI before the RBQ.22 In a commercial case, the Court suspected hallucinated references and dismissed them, ruling on the credible evidence.23 At the Administrative Housing Tribunal (AHT), a lessor who had read translations of the C.C.Q. obtained through ChatGPT—which distorted its meaning—saw his application dismissed. However, his conduct was not found to be abusive, as his good faith was recognized.24 Two related AHT decisions noted that an agreement (a “Lease Transfer and Co-Tenancy Agreement”) had been drafted with the help of ChatGPT, but the AHT simply analyzed them as it usually does (text, context, C.C.Q. rules) and concluded that there had been a deferred lease assignment, without drawing any particular consequence from the use of AI.25 At the Court of Québec, a litigant attributed a self-incriminating formulation in his application to ChatGPT; the Court dismissed his explanation.26 In an application to have evidence set aside, the applicant claimed that he thought he was obliged to respond to investigators after having done research on Google and ChatGPT regarding his duty to cooperate with the employer just prior to the interview. The Court noted that he had been clearly informed of his right to remain silent and that he could leave or consult a lawyer. It therefore concluded that there was no real constraint and allowed the statement.27 Openness to AI with proper controls, certainly, but with a caveat These are just a few of a long and growing list of cases across Canada and the world around. Despite this trend, the decision in Specter Aviation avoids stigmatizing AI. The Court rather insisted on remaining open to AI, pointing out that it must be used with proper controls, reminding us that a technology that facilitates access to justice must be welcomed and given proper controls, not proscribed.28 Openness to AI comes with clear requirements, such as those set out in the opinion published by the Superior Court on October 24, 2023. In the notice, the Superior Court called for caution, the use of reliable sources (court websites, recognized commercial publishers, established public services) and “meaningful human control” of generated content.29 The practice guides issued by various courts all point in the same direction: We should govern the use of AI without banning it. The Federal Court requires a declaration when a filed document contains AI-generated content and insists on “human in the loop” verification.30 The Court of Appeal of Quebec,31 the Court of Québec32 and the municipal courts33 have issued similar warnings: need for caution, authoritative sources, hyperlinks to recognized databases and full responsibility of the author. Nowhere is AI banned—all make its use conditional on verification and traceability. Some clues suggest that the judiciary itself is using artificial intelligence. In the Small Claims Division, on at least two occasions, a judge attached English translations generated by ChatGPT as a courtesy, specifying that they had no legal value and that the French version prevailed.34 In family law, a Superior Court decision in a family matter clearly used a Statistics Canada link identified by an AI tool (the URL includes “utm_source=chatgpt.com”), but the reasoning remains rooted in primary sources and case law: The AI was used as a search tool, not to provide a legal basis.35 A decision handed down on September 3, 2025, by the Commission d’accès à l’information is a particularly good illustration of openness with proper controls. In Breton c. MSSS,36 the court allowed exhibits containing content generated by Gemini and Copilot, because they were corroborated by relevant, primary sources that had already been filed (Journal des débats, newspaper excerpts, official websites). Despite art. 2857 C.C.Q. and the flexibility of administrative law, the Court reiterated that AI content is admissible if, and only if, it is verified, traceable and supported by official sources. AI that aims to please us and that we want to believe Two constants emerge from the sanctioned cases: excessive confidence in the AI’s reliability and underestimated risk of hallucination. In the United States, in Mata v. Avianca,37 the lawyers claimed that they believed that the tool could not invent cases. In Canada, in Hussein v. Canada,38 the plaintiff’s lawyer claims to have relied on an AI service in good faith, without fully realizing that it was necessary to check references. In Australia, in JNE24 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,39 the court reported an over-reliance on tools (Claude, Copilot) and insufficient verification. In Quebec, the AHT found that a lessor had been misled by the use of artificial intelligence,40 while at the Administrative Labour Tribunal (ALT), ChatGPT-generated answers deemed to be approximately 92% accurate were used.41 These examples describe a generalized trust bias that is particularly risky for those who represent themselves: AI is perceived as a reliable way to gain speed, but in reality, it requires greater human control. Large language models are optimized to produce plausible and engaging responses; but, without proper controls, they tend to confirm user expectations rather than pointing out their own limitations.42 A notice published last April by OpenAI concerning an update that made its model “overly supportive” testifies to the underlying complexity of striking the right balance between engagement and preciseness.43 This makes it easier to understand how a quarrelsome litigant may have persuaded himself, based on an AI response, that he was entitled to personally sue a judge for judicial acts perceived as biased.44 Models trained to “please” or to keep users engaged can generate responses that, in the absence of legal contextualization, amplify erroneous or imprudent interpretations. Although AI service providers generally seek to limit their liability for the consequences of incorrect answers, the scope of such clauses is necessarily limited. When ChatGPT, Claude and Gemini apply legal principles to facts reported by a user, doesn’t the entity offering the service expose itself to the rules of public order that make such acts the exclusive prerogative of lawyers, which cannot be waived by a simple disclaimer? In Standing Buffalo Dakota First Nation v. Maurice Law, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal reiterated that the prohibition on the practise of law applies to any “person" (including a corporation) and expressly contemplated that technological mediation would not change the analysis of what prohibited acts are.45 In Quebec, this principle is enshrined in section 128 of the Act respecting the Barreau du Québec and the Professional Code: general legal information is permitted, but individualized advice can only be provided by a lawyer. While some aberrant situations have involved lawyers, unrepresented claimants or plaintiffs appear to be the most exposed to the effects of AI. Should we focus on educating users first, or restrict certain uses? The tension between access to justice and protecting the public is quite obvious. Conclusion The Specter Aviation ruling confirms that artificial intelligence has its place in court, provided that rigorous controls are applied to it, and that it is useful when verified, but sanctionable when not. While AI offers unprecedented possibilities in terms of access to justice, combining it with public protection remains a major challenge. Despite this clear signal, containing over-reliance on tools designed to be engaging and supportive, and that claim to have an answer to everything, will remain a challenge for years to come. Specter Aviation Limited c. Laprade, 2025 QCCS 3521, online: https://canlii.ca/t/kfp2c Id., paras. [35], [53] Id. para. [43] Id. para. [60] Chicoine c. Vessia, 2023 QCCA 582, https://canlii.ca/t/jx19q, para. [20]; Gagnon c. Audi Canada inc., 2018 QCCS 3128, https://canlii.ca/t/ht3cb, paras. [43]–[48]; Layla Jet Ltd. c. Acass Canada Ltd., 2020 QCCS 667, https://canlii.ca/t/j5nt8, paras. [19]–[26]. Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C-25.01, arts. 339–341. Chicoine c. Vessia, supra. note 5, paras. [20]–[21]; Constellation Brands US Operations c. Société de vin internationale ltée, 2019 QCCS 3610, https://canlii.ca/t/j251v, paras. [47]–[52]; Webb Electronics Inc. c. RRF Industries Inc., 2023 QCCS 3716, https://canlii.ca/t/k0fq8, paras. [39]–[48]. 9401-0428 Québec inc. c. 9414-8442 Québec inc., 2025 QCCA 1030, https://canlii.ca/t/kdz4h, paras. [82]–[87]; Biron c. 150 Marchand Holdings inc., 2020 QCCA 1537, https://canlii.ca/t/jbnj2, para. [100]; Groupe manufacturier d’ascenseurs Global Tardif inc. c. Société de transport de Montréal, 2023 QCCS 1403, https://canlii.ca/t/jx042, para. [26]. Groupe manufacturier d’ascenseurs Global Tardif inc. c. Société de transport de Montréal, supra. note 8, paras. [58]–[61] ($100,000 to Global Tardif, $60,000 to Intact Assurance, $40,000 to Fujitec, all as legal costs awarded under art. 342 C.C.P.); see also $20,000 for an application for an amendment made on the 6th day of a trial, forcing a continuance: Paradis c. Dupras Ledoux inc., 2024 QCCS 3266, https://canlii.ca/t/k6q26, paras. [154]–[171]; Webb Electronics Inc. c. RRF Industries Inc., supra. note 7. Layla Jet Ltd. c. Acass Canada Ltd, supra note 5, paras. [23]–[28]. Électro-peintres du Québec inc. c. 2744-3563 Québec inc., 2023 QCCS 1819, https://canlii.ca/t/jxfn0, paras. [18]–[22], [35]–[38]; see also Constant c. Larouche, 2020 QCCS 2963, https://canlii.ca/t/j9rwt, paras. [37]–[40] (repeated delays in adhering to undertakings despite an order, sanction: $5,000). Constellation Brands US Operations c. Société de vin internationale ltée, supra. note 7, paras. [39]–[43], [47]–[52]; see also AE Services et technologies inc. c. Foraction inc. (Ville de Sainte-Catherine), 2024 QCCS 242, https://canlii.ca/t/k2jvm (repeated delays in transmitting promised documentation and breach of an undertaking before the court; compensation of $3,000). Gagnon c. SkiBromont.com, 2024 QCCS 3246, https://canlii.ca/t/k6mzz, paras. [29]–[37], [41]. J.R.V. v. N.L.V., 2025 BCSC 1137, https://canlii.ca/t/kcsnc, paras. [51]–[55]. Hussein v. Canada (IRCC), 2025 FC 1138, https://canlii.ca/t/kctz0, paras. [15]–[17], applying Kuehne + Nagel Inc. v. Harman Inc, 2021 FC 26, https://canlii.ca/t/jd4j6, paras. [52]–[55] (reiterating the principles of Young v. Young and the two-step test: (1) conduct causing costs to be incurred; (2) discretionary decision to impose costs personally). AQ v. BW, 2025 BCCRT 907, https://canlii.ca/t/kd08x, paras. [15]–[16], [38]–[40]. Lloyd's Register Canada Ltd. v. Choi, 2025 FC 1233, https://canlii.ca/t/kd4w2 Mata v. Avianca, Inc, No. 22-cv-1461 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023) (sanctions order), online: Justia https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2022cv01461/575368/54/ Tribunale di Latina (giud. Valentina Avarello), sentenza 23 septembre 2025, Atto redatto con intelligenza artificiale a stampone, con scarsa qualità e mancanza di pertinenza: sì alla condanna ex art. 96 c.p.c., La Nuova Procedura Civile (september 29, 2025), online: https://www.lanuovaproceduracivile.com/atto-redatto-con-intelligenza-artificiale-a-stampone-con-scarsa-qualita-e-mancanza-di-pertinenza-si-alla-condanna-ex-art-96-c-p-c-dice-tribunale-di-latina/ Australia, Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2), JNE24 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, [2025] FedCFamC2G 1314 (August 15, 2025), Gerrard J, online: AustLII https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/FedCFamC2G/2025/1314.html United States, District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, Mattox v. Product Innovations Research, LLC d/b/a Sunevolutions; Cosway Company, Inc.; and John Does 1–3, No. 6:24-cv-235-JAR, Order (October 22, 2025), online: Eastern District of Oklahoma https://websitedc.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Mattox_v._Product_Innovations_Research_USA_22_October_2025.pdf Régie du bâtiment du Québec c. 9308-2469 Québec inc. (Éco résidentiel), 2025 QCRBQ 86, online: https://canlii.ca/t/kfdfg, paras. [159]–[167]. Blinds to Go Inc. c. Blachley, 2025 QCCS 3190, online: https://canlii.ca/t/kf963 para. [57] and n. 22. Lozano González c. Roberge, 2025 QCTAL 15786, online: https://canlii.ca/t/kc2w9 paras. [7], [17]–[19]. Marna c. BKS Properties Ltd, 2025 QCTAL 34103, online: https://canlii.ca/t/kfq8n paras. [18], [21]–[25]; Campbell c. Marna, 2025 QCTAL 34105, online: https://canlii.ca/t/kfq81 paras. [18], [21]–[25]. Morrissette c. R., 2023 QCCQ 12018, online: https://canlii.ca/t/k3x5j para. [43]. Léonard c. Agence du revenu du Québec, 2025 QCCQ 2599, online: https://canlii.ca/t/kcxsb paras. [58]–[64]. Specter Aviation Limited c. Laprade, supra. note 1, para. [46]. Superior Court of Quebec, “Notice to Profession and Public – Integrity of Court Submissions When Using Large Language Models,” October 24, 2023, online: https://coursuperieureduquebec.ca/fileadmin/cour-superieure/Districts_judiciaires/Division_Montreal/Communiques/Avis_a_la_Communite_juridique-Utilisation_intelligence_artificielle_EN_October_24_2023.pdf Federal Court, “Notice to the Parties and the Profession – The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Court Proceedings,” December 20, 2023, online: https://www.fct-cf.ca/Content/assets/pdf/base/2023-12-20-notice-use-of-ai-in-court-proceedings.pdf; Federal Court, Update – The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Court Proceedings, May 7, 2024, online: https://www.fct-cf.ca/Content/assets/pdf/base/FC-Updated-AI-Notice-EN.pdf Court of Appeal of Quebec, “Notice Respecting the Use of Artificial Intelligence Before the Court of Appeal”, August 8, 2024, online: https://courdappelduquebec.ca/fileadmin/dossiers_civils/avis_et_formulaires/eng/avis_utilisation_intelligence_articielle_ENG.pdf Court of Québec, “Notice to the legal community and the public – Maintaining the integrity of submissions before the Court when using large language models,” January 26, 2024, online: https://courduquebec.ca/fileadmin/cour-du-quebec/centre-de-documentation/toutes-les-chambres/en/NoticeIntegriteObservationsCQ_LLM_en.pdf Cours municipales du Québec, Avis à la profession et au public – Maintenir l’intégrité des observations à la Cour lors de l’utilisation de grands modèles de langage, December 18, 2023, online: https://coursmunicipales.ca/fileadmin/cours_municipales_du_quebec/pdf/Document_d_information/CoursMun_AvisIntegriteObservations.pdf Bricault c. Rize Bikes Inc., 2024 QCCQ 609, online: https://canlii.ca/t/k3lcd n. 1; Brett c. 9187-7654 Québec inc, 2023 QCCQ 8520, online : https://canlii.ca/t/k1dpr, n. 1. Droit de la famille – 251297, 2025 QCCS 3187, online: https://canlii.ca/t/kf96f paras. [138]–[141]. Breton c. Ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux, 2025 QCCAI 280, online: https://canlii.ca/t/kftlz, paras. [24]–[26], [31]. Mata v. Avianca, Inc, supra note 18. Hussein v. Canada (IRCC), 2025 FC 1138, supra note 15, paras. [15]–[17]. JNE24 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, supra note 20. Lozano González c. Roberge, supra note 24, para. [17]. Pâtisseries Jessica inc. et Chen, 2024 QCTAT 1519, online: https://canlii.ca/t/k4f96, paras. [34]–[36]. See Emilio Ferrara, “Should ChatGPT be Biased? Challenges and Risks of Bias in Large Language Models” (2023), SSRN 4627814, online: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4627814; Isabel O. Gallegos et al, “Bias and Fairness in Large Language Models: A Survey” (2024) 50:3 Computational Linguistics 1097, doi: 10.1162/coli_a_00524. See OpenAI, “Sycophancy in GPT-4o: what happened and what we're doing about it,” April 29, 2025, online: https://openai.com/research/sycophancy-in-gpt-4o; see also “Expanding on what we missed with sycophancy,” May 2, 2025, online: https://openai.com/index/expanding-on-sycophancy/ [44]Verreault c. Gagnon, 2023 QCCS 4922, online: https://canlii.ca/t/k243v, paras. [16], [28]. Standing Buffalo Dakota First Nation v. Maurice Law Barristers and Solicitors (Ron S. Maurice Professional Corporation), 2024 SKCA 14, online: https://canlii.ca/t/k2wn9 paras. [37]–[40], [88]–[103].

Introduction When we hear the term “export controls,” we may think it only applies to weapons and other highly sensitive technologies, but that is not the case. There are a multitude of circumstances—some unexpected—to which it is important to know that export controls apply. This is especially true if you are involved in research or in the design and development of seemingly innocuous solutions that are not necessarily tangible objects. Today, technological knowledge is shared not only through conventional partnerships between businesses or universities, but also through data sharing or access to databases that feed large language models. Artificial intelligence is, in itself, a means of sharing knowledge. Feeding such algorithms with sensitive data, or data that can become sensitive when combined, carries a risk of violating the applicable legal framework. Here are some key concepts. Overview of the federal export control framework The Export and Import Permits Act In Canada, the Export and Import Permits Act (the “EIPA”) establishes the primary framework governing the export of controlled goods and technologies. The EIPA gives the Minister of Foreign Affairs the power to issue, to any resident of Canada who applies for one, a permit authorizing the export or transfer of a wide range of items included on the Export Control List (the “ECL”) or destined for a country listed on the Area Control List. In other words, the EIPA regulates, and at times prohibits, the trade of critical goods and technologies outside Canada. The Export Control List To get the full picture of the ECL, we need to refer to the Guide to Canada's Export Control Listas published by the Department with its successive amendments, the most recent of which date back to May 2025 (the “Guide”). In summary, the Guide includes military goods and technologies, strategic goods and dual-use (civilian and military) goods and technology that are controlled in accordance with Canada’s commitments made in multilateral regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, bilateral agreements, and certain unilateral controls implemented by Canada as part of its defence policy. The Guide also includes forest products, agricultural and food products, apparel goods and vehicles. Other laws that affect exports Also to take into account are the sanctions that Canada imposes under laws that affect exports, such as: the United Nations Act the Special Economic Measures Act the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act These sanctions against specific countries, organizations or persons include a number of measures, including restricting or prohibiting trade, financial transactions or other economic activities with Canada, or the freezing of property located in Canada.1 Finally, in order for an individual (or an organization) to transfer controlled goods outside Canada, they must register with the Controlled Goods Program (the “CGP”) to obtain an export permit, unless exempt. Key concepts Did you know? Certain goods and technologies are referred to as “dual-use” goods and technologies. This means that even though they were initially designed for civilian use or appear harmless, they may be subject to export controls if they can be used for military purposes or to produce military items. A “technology” is broadly defined to include technical data, technical assistance and information necessary for the development, production or use of an item listed on the ECL. Also included in this notion, albeit indirectly, are the technologies referred to in any of the regulations associated with the laws listed above, which make certain countries subject to specific technology transfer restrictions. A “transfer” in relation to a technology, means to dispose of it (e.g. sell it) or disclose its content in any manner from a place in Canada to a place outside Canada. This definition stems from legislative amendments to the EIPA, which expanded the scope of the law to include the mere transfer of intangible technologies by various means, thereby broadening the circumstances to which permits apply as regards transfers.2 Regarding trade relations with the United States, Canadian exporters may face additional restrictions and considerable challenges, particularly in situations where their employees or other stakeholders involved are foreign nationals.The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) and the Export Administration Regulations(“EAR”) are two key sets of rules that govern exports from the United States.3 They protect both similar and distinct interests. While the ITAR aim to protect defence articles and defence services (including weapons and information), the EAR govern dual-use items.4 Both prevent exports5 in a broad sense, i.e., up to and including the transfer of information to so-called “foreign” persons, except with the permission of the authorities. It is thus quite possible that Canadian exporters will be required to comply with these American regulations, which, in addition to targeting territories, target the national origin of individuals. This is diametrically opposed to Canada’s export regime, which rather centres on prohibiting trade with a country or anyone located there. In this regard, note that Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms considers national origin to be a ground for discrimination. 6 A Quebec business can thus find itself struggling to balance its contractual obligations under a contract with an American company with the requirements of the Quebec Charter. Artificial intelligence: novel challenges The development of large language models in the field of artificial intelligence represents a new challenge from an export control standpoint, and a significant one at that. For example, if a large language model is trained using restricted data, a state subject to the aforementioned sanctions might attempt to use the large language model to indirectly obtain information to which it would not otherwise have had direct access. As a result, training a large language model on plans, technical specifications or textual descriptions of technologies covered by transfer restrictions (which can include knowledge transfers) can create a risk of non-compliance with the law. The same applies to accessing such data for retrieval-augmented generation, a widely used technique to expand and improve large language model responses. To limit the risk during research and development, a company that trains a large language models on such data or allows access to such data for retrieval-augmented generation will need to consider where the data will be hosted and processed. Similarly, once the artificial intelligence application is developed, it will be important to restrict access to it in a manner consistent with the law, both in terms of locating the servers on which the large language model will be installed and in terms of user access. Sanctions Any person or organization that contravenes any provision of the EIPA or its regulations commits an offence punishable by fine and/or imprisonment, as applicable. Also, failure to register with the CGPmay constitute an offence under federal laws that can lead to prosecution and substantial sanctions against the offender(s).7 Conclusion Canada’s export controls are quite complex, not only in how they are structured, but also in how they must be implemented. With the changing geopolitical and commercial landscape, it is advisable to periodically read the resources made available by the relevant authorities and put in place appropriate policies and measures, or to seek professional advice in this regard. Government of Canada, “Types of sanctions” (date modified: 2024-09-10): Types of sanctions Martha L. Harrison & Tonya Hughes, “Understanding Exports: A Primer on Canada’s Export Control Regime” (2010) 8(2) Canadian International Lawyer, 97 The ITAR and EAR are included in the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”). Austin D. Michel, “Hiring in the Export-Control Context: A Framework to Explain How Some Institutions of High Education Are Discriminating against Job Applicants” (2021) 106:4 Iowa L Review, 1993 The ITAR and EAR also provide for restrictions on re-exportation. See Maroine Bendaoud, “Quand la sécurité nationale américaine fait fléchir le principe de non-discrimination en droit canadien : le cas de l'International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)” (2013) Les cahiers de droit, 54 (2–3), 549 Government of Canada, “Guideline on Controlled Goods Program registration” (date modified: 2025-05-08): Guideline on Controlled Goods Program registration – Canada.ca

Executing a judgment in Quebec In Quebec, a bailiff can proceed with the forced execution1 of a judgment rendered by a civil court, such as the Court of Québec or the Superior Court,2 as soon as it becomes final,3 in accordance with article 656 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.). Execution process The execution process begins when the creditor (the party having won the case) sends their instructions to a bailiff, who transcribes them into a notice of execution. The notice is then filed in the Court record and can be consulted free of charge at the court office or on SOQUIJ, for a fee. Prescription and renewal of debt A debtor who has been ordered by judgment to pay a sum of money should know that the debt can be recovered for 10 years, and that if the creditor executes the judgment in those 10 years but the debt goes unpaid, a new 10-year prescription period will start to run and the debt will remain owing. Article 2924 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.) states that “[a] right resulting from a judgment is prescribed by [is extinguished after] 10 years if it is not exercised.” A creditor who has been unable to execute their judgment within the 10-year prescription period has the possibility of interrupting prescription by filing a notice of execution and making sure to serve it on the debtor, in accordance with article 2892 para. 2 C.C.Q. Clearly, a well-informed creditor will be able to indefinitely renew the prescription period to execute their judgment, until the debt has been paid in full. To constitute a valid interruption, the notice of execution must absolutely be filed with the court and be served on the debtor, but the subsequent seizure need not be conclusive. Jurisprudential confirmation Mohawk Council of Kanesatake v. Sylvestre This method of interrupting the extinctive prescription of rights resulting from a judgment has just been confirmed in Mohawk Council of Kanesatake v. Sylvestre, 2025 SCC 30: [62] ... The filing and service of the notice, itself part of the judicial application for seizure, interrupted prescription in 2016 pursuant to art. 2892 C.C.Q. Here is an excerpt of the Honourable Court’s summary: ... [F]iling and serving a notice of execution counts as a judicial application that interrupts the 10-year prescription period... It did not matter that the bailiff later found nothing to be taken and suspended the seizure. It also did not matter that the bailiff did not notify the debtor that the seizure had been suspended.  ... [T]he 10-year period exists to ensure people act on time and to bring stability to debtor-creditor relations, but it should not punish creditors who take the right steps before the deadline. With this decision, the Court gave clarity and certainty to both creditors and debtors about how judgment debts can be enforced and what types of events can interrupt prescription. Additional points Prescription is interrupted when a notice of execution is filed with the Court and served on a debtor by bailiff. The notice of execution may include several seizure options, and the bailiff may attempt more than one, depending on the case. An unsuccessful seizure does not result in the “judicial application” being dismissed. If this is the case, the notice of execution remains valid and has the effect of interrupting prescription, such that a new 10-year period starts to run. There is no requirement for the bailiff to draw up minutes of a nulla bona if no property is seized. The bailiff can prepare minutes to certify that no property was seized, but there is no such requirement under the C.C.P., and the debtor suffers no prejudice if this is not done. The 10-year prescription period is not interrupted if the debtor opposes the execution and the Court allows such opposition. Conclusion This ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada confirms that the filling and service of a notice of execution maintains the validity of a judgment for a renewable period of 10 years. The term “execution” means that a party having succeeded in a judgment may choose one or more ways to compel the other party (the debtor) to pay what is owed to them by seizing immovable property, movable property, bank accounts, wages, and so on. Article 656 para. 2 C.C.P. states that “[e]xecution may be forced if the debtor refuses to comply voluntarily and the judgment has become final.” Article 566 C.C.P., which deals with the recovery of small claims, states that a “judgment creditor may themselves draw up the notice of execution if the only execution measure is seizure of the debtor’s income in the hands of a third person”, and section 13.1 of the Tax Administration Act states, among other things, that the Agence du revenu du Québec may prepare and file a notice of execution and then seize a sum of money or income in the hands of a third person, but that it must hire a bailiff in other cases. The term “final” in this article means that the case is over, that the judgment can no longer be appealed and that the creditor can force a debtor to comply with the judgment’s orders.

What is natural hydrogen? Natural hydrogen, also called native hydrogen, does exist. It refers to hydrogen found naturally in the environment, often as a gas trapped underground. Unlike industrially produced hydrogen, which results from chemical processes, natural hydrogen is extracted directly from nature. This naturally occurring resource is generating growing interest as a potential source of clean, renewable energy. However, exploration and large-scale production are still in the early stages. Discovery of natural hydrogen The first major discovery of natural hydrogen occurred in 1987 in Bourakébougou, Mali, by the company Hydroma Inc. In this village, a well revealed naturally occurring hydrogen in the subsurface. This discovery sparked global interest in hydrogen’s potential as an energy source. The region continues to be studied to better understand and develop this promising resource. Regulation and exploration in Quebec n Quebec, natural hydrogen exploration is not currently covered by the Mining Act, which governs the exploration and exploitation of mineral substances. Because natural hydrogen represents an emerging resource, it will eventually need to be addressed through new regulations or incorporated into an existing legal framework. For now, since hydrogen is mainly studied in the context of renewable energy, it may fall under environmental or energy-related regulations. Legal framework in France In France, the legal status of natural hydrogen differs significantly. Natural hydrogen is classified as a mineral resource, meaning that its exploration and extraction are governed by the provisions of the French Mining Code. Initiatives in Quebec Although natural hydrogen exploration in Quebec is not yet covered by the Mining Act, several companies have obtained exclusive exploration rights (formerly known as “claims”) and are actively conducting fieldwork. Through their efforts, they are helping to advance the legal and regulatory framework surrounding this new energy resource. The Government of Quebec is currently examining potential legislative amendments to the Mining Act to include natural hydrogen, or the adoption of a new, dedicated law to regulate it